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Many countries exist in a "gray zone" between
authoritarianism and democracy. For countries in this
conceptual space-which is particularlyrelevant today given the
haltingpath of change in the Arab world-scholars,judges, and
rule of law activists conventionally urge an abstract notion of
'judicial independence" as a prerequisite for successful
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democratic transition. Only recently, for example, Pakistan's
judiciary was widely lauded for its "independence" in
challenging the military regime. However, judicial
independence is neither an all-or-nothingconcept nor an end in
itself. With the return of civilian rule in Pakistan, a series of
clashes between Parliamentand the Supreme Court has raised
concern that the same judiciary celebrated for challenging the
military regime-while invoking exactly the same abstract
notion of judicial independence-might now be asserting
autonomy from weak civilian institutions in a manner that
undermines Pakistan'sfragile efforts to consolidate democracy
and constitutionalism.
In this Article, I challenge the conventional view by
examining these recent developments in Pakistan, which are
instructive for other countries in this gray zone. Over many
decades, as Pakistan has cycled between military and weak
civilian rule, the military and its affiliated interests have
entrenched their power, and the judiciary has played a central
role in facilitatingthat process. The result has been an enduring
institutional imbalance that has undermined Pakistan's weak
representative institutions. This process of entrenchment has
never gone entirely unchallenged, and Pakistan'scurrent shift to
civilian rule offers genuine potential for the long-term
consolidation of democracy and constitutionalism. But this
persistent institutional imbalance and continued military
dominance remains a significant obstacle to fully realizing that
potential. Accordingly, I urge an understanding of judicial
independence that goes beyond abstract, unqualified notions of
judicial autonomy and instead contemplates an appropriate
balance between autonomy and constraint-one that not only
enables representative institutions to strengthen their
governance capacities and power to rein in the military, but also
enhances mechanisms of judicial accountability to reinforce the
democratic legitimacy of the judiciary's role. Pakistan's
experience also has broader significance, suggesting lessons-or
at least notes of caution-about the relationship between
entrenched status quo interests and an "independentjudiciary"
in other countries, such as Egypt, that risk languishing in the
gray zone between authoritarianismand democracy but seek a
more complete shift to democracy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Discussions of constitutional change often assume a model of
progression along a straight line, moving from authoritarianism
through a standard sequence of steps that, if successful, results in
consolidation of democracy, constitutionalism, and the rule of law.'

1.
See Thomas Carothers, The End of the Transition Paradigm, 13 J.
DEMOCRACY 5, 6-7 (2002) (discussing the conventional assumption that
"democratization tends to unfold in a set sequence of stages"); Kristen A. Stilt,
ConstitutionalAuthority and Subversion: Egypt's New PresidentialElection System, 16
IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 335, 336 (2006) ("Most recent scholarship on constitutional
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The model also rests on certain premises concerning the processes
with "judicial
institutions
these transitions require,
and
independence" often understood as especially crucial.2
However, the trajectories of constitutional development can be
nonlinear, fitful, ambiguous, and protracted.3 While scholars
increasingly have studied the role of courts in authoritarian regimes, 4
many countries exist in a "gray zone" between authoritarianism and
democracy, where they may evolve for indefinite periods of time.5 For
these regimes, conventional premises-including assumptions about
judicial independence-might either not apply or demand ongoing
reassessment. The questions arising from this gray zone are
particularly salient today in the Arab world, where in the wake of the
2011 popular mobilizations in Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria,

change is grounded in an evolutionary model ... in which nations proceed from
authoritarian forms of government to democracy.").
See Ash U. Bdli, The Perils of Judicial Independence: Constitutional
2.
Transition and the Turkish Example, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 235, 237 (2012) (discussing
democratization literature's "standard recommendations regarding the prerequisites
for transitions away from authoritarianism," including judicial independence); Robert
W. Gordon, The Role of Lawyers in Producing the Rule of Law: Some Critical
Reflections, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 441, 443 (2010) (discussing "converge[nce]"
of different visions of promoting rule of law "on an institutional program" that includes
"courts staffed with 'independent' judges"); Gretchen Helmke & Frances Rosenbluth,
Regimes and the Rule of Law: JudicialIndependence in Comparative Perspective, 12
ANN. REV. POL. Sc. 345, 361 (2009) ("If there is any concept of modern governance that
enjoys more widespread admiration even than democracy, it is judicial independence.").
See Stilt, supra note 1, at 338 (noting "large category of unexamined
3.
constitutions that have undergone change and emendation but in less clear
directions"); Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political
Transformation, 106 YALE L.J. 2009, 2057 (1996) ("In transitional constitutional
processes . . . constitutions are not created all at once, but in fits and starts."); CHARLES
TILLY, CONTENTION AND DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE, 1650-2000, at 13 (2004) (contesting
"the existence of standard sequences of change from undemocratic to democratic
regimes"); Noah Feldman, Review: Constitutions in a Non-Constitutional World: Arab
Basic Laws and the Prospects for Accountable Government, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 390,
391 (2003) (urging scholars to "promote conceptual clarity by finding a way to talk
about partial rule of law and partial constitutionalism").
4.

See generally RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN

REGIMES (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008).
5.
Carothers, supra note 1, at 9-11 (noting that of the nearly one hundred
countries considered "transitional," only a small number are close to "becoming
successful, well-functioning democracies"); see also AYESHA JALAL, DEMOCRACY AND
AUTHORITARIANISM IN SOUTH ASIA: A COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 3

(1995) ("Far from representing a neat and sharp dichotomy, democracy and
authoritarianism.... may frequently overlap irrespective of the formal designation of
polities and states as democratic or authoritarian."); STEVEN LEVITSKY & LUCAN A.
WAY, COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM: HYBRID REGIMES AFTER THE COLD WAR 5-13

(2010) (conceptualizing "competitive authoritarian" regimes in which "formal
democratic institutions exist . .. but in which incumbents' abuse of the state places
them at a significant advantage"); Larry Diamond, Thinking About Hybrid Regimes, 13
J. DEMOCRACY 21, 23 (2002) (discussing the "astonishing frequency with which
contemporary authoritarian regimes manifest, at least superficially, a number of
democratic features").
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Bahrain, Libya, Yemen, and Syria, the path of change remains
halting and its ultimate direction uncertain. 6
This Article examines the relationship between constitutional
change and judicial independence within this gray zone by analyzing
recent developments in Pakistan, whose evolving circumstances have
foreshadowed events in the Arab world.7 While in recent years
Pakistan has drawn attention in the United States to an extent
unparalleled in its history, that discourse has erased much
complexity, focusing almost exclusively on war, terrorism, religious
extremism, and most fundamentally, the specter of existential state
"failure."8 This narrow scope of attention is hardly new. Observers
have long reduced Pakistan's history to a static narrative involving
crisis, instability, and failure. 9 In the context of more dynamic

See Michelle Pace & Francesco Cavatorta, The Arab Uprisings in
6.
Theoretical Perspective-An Introduction, 17 MEDITERRANEAN POL. 125, 135 (2012)
("[T]he Arab uprisings have shown that there is no linear transition from liberalizing
authoritarian rule to a fully fledged democracy of the liberal kind."); NADIA MARZOUKI,
FOUR KEYS To UNDERSTAND TUNISIAN POLITICS AFTER THE ELECTIONS 1 (2011) ("[I]t is
much too early to draw any conclusion or to speculate about the future of political
debates in Tunisia."); TAMIR MOUSTAFA, DRAFTING EGYPT'S CONSTITUTION: CAN A NEW
LEGAL FRAMEWORK REVIVE A FLAWED TRANSITION? 3-6 (2012) (discussing uncertainty
arising from Egypt's post-Mubarak constitutional development); Anthony Billingsley,
Writing Constitutions in the Wake of the Arab Spring: The Challenge of Consolidating
Democracy, FOREIGN AFF. (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
136699/anthony-billingsley/writing-constitutions-in-the-wake-of-the-arab-spring
(discussing the "dynamic and complicated battle[s]" over constitutional change in
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya).
7.
See Michele Dunne & Shuja Nawaz, Can Egypt Avoid Pakistan's Fate?,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2012, at A21 (discussing the parallels between recent developments
in Egypt and Pakistan); Michael C. Dorf, How Rulings of the Supreme Constitutional
Court of Egypt Hold Lessons for Emerging Democracies, and for Our Own, VERDICT
http://verdict.justia.com/2012/06/20/how-rulings-of-the-supreme(June 20, 2012),
constitutional-court-of-egypt-hold-lessons-for-emerging-democracies-and-for-our-own
(same); Myra MacDonald, Army, Allah and America: On Pakistani Pitfalls and the
Future of Egypt, REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/
2011/01/30/army-allah-and-america-on-pakistani-pitfalls-and-the-future-of-egypt/ (same).
8.
See SAADIA TOOR, THE STATE OF ISLAM: CULTURE AND COLD WAR POLITICS
IN PAKISTAN 1 (2011) ("Western media has no space for ... stories that contradict the
dominant narrative of Pakistan as a fountainhead of extremism."); MANAN AHMED,
WHERE THE WILD FRONTIERS ARE: PAKISTAN AND THE AMERICAN IMAGINATION 49
(2011) ("Pakistan-as an object of consumption-is marketable only via its violence or
its failure."); Madiha R. Tahir, Chaos Theory: How Pakistan Was Cast as a Failed
AM),
2009,
9:48
(Apr.
24,
REV.
COLUM.
JOURNALISM
State,
http://www.cjr.org/behind..thenews/chaos-theory_1.php (arguing that U.S. public
discourse discusses Pakistan "as though it were a psychiatric patient refusing its
happy pills"); Rafia Zakaria, Hearts, Minds and Floods, DAWN, Aug. 18, 2010,
http://dawn.com/2010/08/18/arts-minds-and-floods-by-rafia-zakaria/ (positing "inability"
in U.S. public discourse "to ever see Pakistan as something other than a militant
haven").
9.
See, e.g., Manan Ahmed, Legends of the Fail, NATIONAL (U.A.E.), May 7,
2009, at 3 (documenting "decades worth of books" positing Pakistan's "failure");
ANATOL LIEVEN, PAKISTAN: A HARD COUNTRY 3 (2011) ("Tariq Ali wrote Can Pakistan
Survive? The Death of a State in 1983, a generation ago. That's quite a long deathbed

6

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 46:1

discussions addressing the prospects of an emerging "Asian
Century,"' 0
Pakistan
exists
at Asia's
margins-not just
geographically, but also conceptually.
Without question, as Pakistani observers regularly lament, the
trajectory of Pakistan's constitutional development has been
"checkered," cycling through periods of military and weak civilian
rule for decades." However, recent events paint a more complex
picture. Indeed, the only recent exception to these standard
narratives of Pakistan's "failure" is revealing. In 2007-four years
before the protests in Cairo's Tahrir Square-Pakistan's lawyers took
to the streets to oppose the attempt by its President and Army Chief,
General Pervez Musharraf, to remove the nation's chief justice, under
whom its Supreme Court had asserted unprecedented autonomy from
the military regime. This "lawyers' movement" in support of the
judiciary triggered a broader movement for democracy and
constitutionalism. Musharraf's subsequent crackdown failed, and
while neither the regime's legal and institutional edifice nor the
military's entrenched power was entirely dislodged, the movement
prompted elections that repudiated Musharraf and ultimately forced
him from power.12
Since then, Pakistan's lawyers and judges have been lauded for
their commitment to "judicial independence." 3 But abstract

scene by any standards."). For recent attempts to complicate these conventional
narratives, see generally PAKISTAN: BEYOND THE "CRISIS STATE" (Maleeha Lodhi ed.,
2011); Naveeda Khan, Introduction to BEYOND CRISIS: RE-EVALUATING PAKISTAN 1-26
(Naveeda Khan ed., 2010).
See, e.g., Anupam Chander, The Asian Century?, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717
10.
(2011); Teemu Ruskola, Where Is Asia? When Is Asia? Theorizing Comparative Law
and InternationalLaw, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 879 (2011); Holning Lau, Grounding
Converqationson Sexuality and Asian Law, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 773 (2011).
11.
E.g., AHMED, supra note 8, at 28-29 (discussing "checkered past" of
constitutionalism in Pakistan); FINAL REPORT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE ON

1 (2010) [hereinafter PCCR REPORT] ("Pakistan has a
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
chequered constitutional history."); HAMID KHAN, CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL
HISTORY OF PAKISTAN 732 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing lessons of Pakistan's "chequered
constitutional and political history"); ZULFIKAR KHALID MALUKA, THE MYTH OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN PAKISTAN 3 (1996) ("[Tjhe history of constitution-making in
Pakistan has been long and chequered."); see also ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG &
JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 150 (2009) ("Pakistan's
constitutions seem to die with some frequency").
12.
See Anil Kalhan, Constitutionand "Extraconstitution" Colonial Emergency
Regimes in Postcolonial India and Pakistan, in EMERGENCY POWERS IN ASIA:
EXPLORING THE LIMITS OF LEGALITY 89, 93-96

Thiruvengadam eds.,
aftermath).

(Victor V. Ramraj

& Arun

K.

2010) (discussing Pakistan's "lawyers' movement" and its

13.
See, e.g., HAROLD BAER, JR., JUDGES UNDER FIRE: HUMAN RIGHTS,
INDEPENDENT JUDGES, AND THE RULE OF LAW 69-78 (2011) (celebrating Pakistan's

"courageous judges and lawyers" and finding cause for "hope for the rule of law" in
judges' assertions of independence); see also Lucien Karpik & Terence C. Halliday, The
Legal Complex, 7 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SCI. 217, 226-27 (2011) (celebrating Pakistan's
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invocations of judicial independence offer little guidance on the forms
it should take in any given context to advance democracy,
constitutionalism, fundamental rights, the rule of law, or other
socially desirable ends. And in the wake of Pakistan's return to
civilian rule in 2008, a series of clashes among Parliament, the
Supreme Court, and the military has raised concerns that the same
empowered judiciary that, only a few years ago, was widely
celebrated for challenging Musharrafs military regime might nowwhile invoking the same basic conception of judicial independence 14 be
undermining
Pakistan's weak,
post-Musharraf
civilian
government. 15
Both descriptively and normatively, an adequate assessment of
these concerns demands a more concrete and contextualized
understanding of judicial independence than the black-and-white, allor-nothing conception typically invoked.1 6 Judicial independence

judiciary for "delegitimiz[ing Musharrafs] regime while simultaneously "legitimating
themselves").
14.
See, e.g., Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, Chief Justice, Speech Given upon
Acceptance of Harvard Law School Association's Medal of Freedom (Nov. 19, 2008),
available at http://watandost.blogspot.com/2008/11/deposed-chief-justice-iftikhar.html
("Pakistani lawyers are now struggling to keep their autocrats, military as well as
democratic, from influencing judges." (emphasis added)); see also id. ("Our autocrats,
whether uniformed or otherwise, while decreeing a democratic order are, at the same
time, postponing the establishment of an independent judiciary to an ever more distant
future." (emphasis added)).
15.
See Declan Walsh, Pakistan Court Widens Role, StirringFears, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 2012, at Al (discussing concerns that the court's "campaign of judicial
activism" against the civilian government "could damage [Pakistan's] fragile democracy
and open the door to a fresh military intervention"); Chris Allbritton & Serena
Chaudhry, Pakistan Supreme Court Takes Centre Stage as Political Player, REUTERS
(Feb.
13,
2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/13/us-pakistan-politicsidUSTRE81COMQ20120213 (discussing concerns that the court's conflict with the
civilian government may be "strengthening the hand of the military"); HARDtalk:
Interview with Aitzaz Ahsan (BBC World News television broadcast Aug. 7, 2012)
(asserting that the court has become "too powerful" and at times "overstepped its
limits"); Paula Newberg, The Court Rules in Pakistan,YALEGLOBAL ONLINE (June 21,
2012), http://yaleglobal.yale.edulcontent/court-rules-pakistan (arguing that court's
decision to remove Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani from office "amounts to a
judicial coup d'etat" and jeopardizes Pakistan's domestic politics, foreign policy, and the
fiscal stability). Scholars have raised similar concerns about courts in countries such as
Egypt and Turkey. See MOUSTAFA, supra note 6, at 9, 13 n.29 (urging safeguards to
preserve judicial independence in Egypt, but cautioning that "courts that operate
completely independent of majoritarian institutions" can also pose risks to democracy
and fundamental rights); Bhli, supra note 2, at 243 (noting ways that mechanisms to
preserve judicial independence in Turkey at times "have paradoxically served to
sustain the power of old-regime decisionmakers and block pathways to future political
liberalization"). But see Jill Goldenziel, Veiled Political Questions: Islamic Dress,
Constitutionalism, and the Ascendance of Courts, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 5 (2013)
(arguing that "courts may be better situated than legislatures to counter executive
power in hybrid regimes").
16.
See Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S.
CAL. L. REV. 315, 340 (1998) (emphasizing importance of context in conceptualizing

8
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entails neither "maximal autonomy" nor an end in itself, but rather,
as Stephen Burbank emphasizes, arises from a dynamic web of
A more complete
"relationships and interdependencies.""7
understanding of judicial independence, therefore, requires
contextualized attention to the overall balance between judicial
autonomy and constraint across multiple dimensions and its
relationship to the ends it exists to serve.' 8 In circumstances
involving shifts in constitutional arrangements, a deeper
understanding of judicial independence also requires attention to
temporal relationships between those shifting regimes, including the
manner in which laws, institutions, and interests evolve over time.19

judicial independence); see also MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS:
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

10-15 (2009) (discussing importance of context when assessing specific constitutional
doctrines and institutions); Blli, supra note 2, at 238-39 (arguing, based on Turkish
experience, that conceptualizing judicial independence "under conditions of democratic
transition demands greater attention to context than to process or to best practices in
institutional design transplanted from elsewhere"); Peter H. Schuck, Courts in a
Democracy, 1 JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV. 7, 8 (2009) ("[J]udicial independence is not a
binary phenomenon; it is manifestly a matter of degree."); cf. Barry Friedman, The
Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 331 (2005) (arguing that normative
theories of judicial review should "build[ I upon and incorporate[] positive
understandings" of how judges actually behave in real world contexts).
Burbank, supra note 16, at 317; see also Stephen B. Burbank & Barry
17.
Friedman, Reconsidering Judicial Independence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE
CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 9, 10-14 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry

Friedman eds., 2002) (explaining that "judicial independence is a means to an end (or,
more probably, to more than one end)"); John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer,
Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 963-64 (2002) ("[Judicial] independence and accountability ... are
means toward a more fundamental goal: the construction of a well-functioning
judiciary.").
18.
See Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and
Tenure of Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 966-69 (2007) (conceptualizing judicial
independence in terms of overall "packages" of rules governing selection, tenure, and
removal, along with a range of other legal rules and institutional features); Dana Ann
Remus, Just Conduct: Regulating Bench-Bar Relationships, 30 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
123, 144-45 (2011) (discussing different axes and dimensions of judicial independence);
see also Friedman, supra note 16, at 331 (noting that the spheres of judicial autonomy
and constraint are defined in a contextual manner: "by case, by court, by judge").
See Teitel, supra note 3, at 2029-35 (suggesting that "in periods of political
19.
change," the rule of law "preserves some degree of continuity in legal forms, while it
enables normative change," and assessing the role of the judiciary in these transitional
moments); Owen M. Fiss, The Limits of JudicialIndependence, 25 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 57, 68-76 (1993) (arguing that judicial independence in moments of regime
shift or transition should be assessed in a "regime relative" manner); Tom Ginsburg,
Constitutional Afterlife: The Continuing Impact of Thailand's Postpolitical
Constitution, 7 INT'L J. CONST. L. 83, 83-86 (2009) (discussing the significant
continuing influence of Thailand's 1997 constitution even after its formal abolition and
the establishment of a new constitutional regime); see also Alison L. LaCroix, Temporal
Imperialism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1329, 1334-38 (2010) (using the U.S. Supreme Court's
treatment of time in the context of legal transitions as "a lens though which we can
understand how the Court thinks about .. . its own institutional role").
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However, scholarship on constitutionalism and the judiciary in
Pakistan has not fully addressed these issues. A significant body of
work addresses how the military has used the judiciary to facilitate
direct seizures of power. 20 Important consideration has also been
given to aspects of the judiciary's role during periods of civilian rule.2 1
Recent literature on Pakistan, however, largely has not considered
the implications of the relationship between periods of military and
civilian rule for constitutionalism and judicial independence, or the
conception of judicial independence best suited to reinforce democracy
and constitutionalism. This gap is striking in the wake of the antiMusharraf movement-which itself is only beginning to draw
scholarly attention 22-and
given the relevance of Pakistan's
experiences to other countries in this gray zone.

20.
See
PAULA
R. NEWBERG,
JUDGING
THE
STATE:
COURTS
AND
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN PAKISTAN (1995); Tayyab Mahmud, Praetorianismand

Common Law in Post-Colonial Settings: Judicial Responses to Constitutional
Breakdowns in Pakistan, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 1225, 1244-45; ALLEN McGRATH, THE
DESTRUCTION OF PAKISTAN'S DEMOCRACY (1999); Zulfikar Khalid Maluka,
Reconstructing the Constitution for a COAS President: Pakistan, 1999 to 2002, in
PAKISTAN ON THE BRINK: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIETY 53, 58-60 (Craig Baxter
ed., 2004); Kalhan, supra note 12; IMTIAZ OMAR, EMERGENCY POWERS AND THE COURTS
IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN (2002); Upendra Baxi, Constitutional Interpretationand State
Formative Practices in Pakistan: A Preliminary Exploration, in COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 132,

136-40 (Mahendra P.

Singh ed.,

1989); Aziz Z. Huq,

Uncertain Law in Uncertain Times: Emergency Powers and Lessons from South Asia,
13 CONSTELLATIONS 89, 95-99 (2006); Leslie Wolf-Phillips, Constitutional Legitimacy:
A Study of the Doctrine of Necessity, 1 THIRD WORLD Q. 97, 102-04 (1979); T.K.K. lyer,
ConstitutionalLaw in Pakistan:Kelsen in the Courts, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 759 (1973).
21.
See KHAN, supra note 11, at 749-58; WERNER MENSKI ET AL., PUBLIC
INTEREST LITIGATION IN PAKISTAN (2000); NEWBERG, supra note 20, at 200-06; Osama

Siddique, The Jurisprudenceof Dissolutions:PresidentialPower To Dissolve Assemblies
Under the Pakistani Constitutionand Its Discontents, 23 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 615,
685-86 (2006); Maryam Khan & Osama Siddique, The 2005 South Asian Earthquake:
Natural Calamity or Failure of State? State Liability and Remedies for Victims of
Defective Construction in Pakistan, 9 ASIAN L. 187, 215-28 (2007); Mahmud, supra
note 20, at 1282-94; MARTIN LAU, THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF
PAKISTAN 103-05 (2006); Philip Oldenburg, Will the Judiciary Save Pakistan?, in
PAKISTAN: THE MOST DANGEROUS DECADE BEGINS (Christophe Jaffrelot & Alfred
Stepan eds., forthcoming 2013).
22.
Work on the anti-Musharraf movement, which has focused almost
exclusively on the role of lawyers and judges, and on the Supreme Court under Chief
Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, includes HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DESTROYING
LEGALITY: PAKISTAN'S CRACKDOWN ON LAWYERS AND JUDGES (2007); Zahid Shabad
Ahmed & Maria J. Stephan, Fighting for the Rule of Law: Civil Resistance and the
Lawyers'Movement in Pakistan, 17 DEMOCRATIZATION 492 (2010); Sadaf Aziz, Liberal
Protagonists?The Lawyers' Movement in Pakistan,in FATES OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM
IN THE BRITISH POST-COLONY: THE POLITICS OF THE LEGAL COMPLEX 305 (Terence C.
Halliday, Lucien Karpik, & Malcolm M. Feeley eds., 2012) [hereinafter FATES OF
POLITICAL LIBERALISM]; Tasneem Kausar, Judicializationof Politics and Governance
in Pakistan: Constitutional and Political Challenges and the Role of the Chaudhry
Court, in PAKISTAN'S STABILITY PARADOX 28 (Ashutosh Misra & Michael E. Clarke
eds., 2011); Charles H. Kennedy, The Judicializationof Politics in Pakistan, in THE
JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN ASIA 139, 147-58 (Bjbrn Dressel ed., 2012); Shoaib A.
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In this Article, I argue that Pakistan's evolution through
alternating periods of military and civilian rule has contributed to an
enduring imbalance or disequilibrium 23 between the judiciary and
other institutions, which in turn has helped to strengthen Pakistan's
unelected state institutions at the expense of its comparatively weak
representative institutions. This institutional imbalance has hindered
Pakistan's constitutional development and long-term prospects for
democratic consolidation. In Part II, I explain how Pakistan's
military, which has seized power in several coups, has engaged in a
recurring, iterative process of transformativepreservation,24 by which
its own power and that of its affiliated interests have been extended
and entrenched into periods of civilian rule. Historically, law and
courts have been central to this process. When the military has seized
power, the judiciary has validated those interventions, enabling
constitutional shifts that preserve the military's dominance. But even
when civilian rule has formally returned, the judiciary has played a
comparable role in facilitating the military's continued political
influence. The result has been a persistent institutional
disequilibrium: a politicized judiciary periodically has been
empowered to assert its autonomy from weak representative
institutions, but simultaneously has remained largely vulnerable to

Ghias, Miscarriageof Chief Justice: JudicialPower and the Legal Complex in Pakistan
Under Musharraf, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 985 (2010); Daud Munir, From Judicial
Autonomy to Regime Transformation: The Role of the Lawyers' Movement in Pakistan,
in FATES OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra, at 378; Taiyyaba Ahmed Qureshi, State of
Emergency: General Pervez Musharraf'sExecutive Assault on Judicial Independence in
Pakistan, 35 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 485 (2010); Note, The Pakistani Lawyers'
Movement and the PopularCurrency of Judicial Power, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1705 (2010)
[hereinafter PakistaniLawyers'Movement].
See Asma Jahangir, Another Aspect of the Judgment, DAWN, Dec. 19, 2009,
23.
http://archives.dawn.com/archives/31699 (expressing concern that the Supreme Court
has "disturbed the equilibrium" between Pakistan's state institutions "by creating an
imbalance in favour of the judiciary"); AYESHA JALAL, THE STATE OF MARTIAL RULE:
THE ORIGINS OF PAKISTAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEFENCE 136-93 (1990) (arguing
that Pakistan has been characterized by an enduring imbalance of power between
weak elected and strong unelected state institutions, with emphasis on military and
bureaucracy); cf. Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 17, at 995 (positing a dynamic but
stable equilibrium between federal judiciary and other branches of government in the
United States).
24.
I adapt the term from Anne Pitcher, who conceptualizes "transformative
preservation" in the context of Mozambique as a process by which that nation's
political and economic restructuring also "incorporate[d] institutional, political, and
procedural continuities" that permitted "state institutions and party elites ... to
maintain some of [their preexisting] political and economic control." M. ANNE PITCHER,
TRANSFORMING MOZAMBIQUE: THE POLITICS OF PRIVATIZATION, 1975-2000, at 6, 237
(2002); cf. Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogativeand Privacy,
105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2178-88 (1996) (conceptualizing "preservation-throughtransformation" as a process by which hierarchical status regimes modernize and
evolve, but continue to "enforce[] social stratification by means that change over
time").
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constraints by a dominant military and its affiliated interests, which
collectively comprise what I refer to as Pakistan's deep state. During
the period of civilian rule in the 1990s-which Husain Haqqani aptly
pattern of
describes as "military rule by other means" 2 5-that
institutional relationships led to clashes between Parliament and the
judiciary that weakened both institutions, facilitating the military's
ability to again seize direct control in 1999 and further extend the
reach of its power.
As the anti-Musharraf movement and its antecedents illustrate,
this entrenchment process has never been total, constant, or free from
challenge. 26 In the rest of the Article, I argue that recent
developments in Pakistan offer meaningful potential to begin
reversing the accumulated legacy of military entrenchment, but that
this basic disequilibrium-reinforced by an incomplete understanding
of judicial independence-has persisted and inhibits those prospects.
In Part III, I recount and analyze shifts beginning in 2005, when the
Supreme Court began to assert an unusual degree of autonomy from
Musharraf's regime, that have challenged military dominance. The
regime's efforts to constrain the court in response found some limited
short-term success, but also triggered the anti-Musharraf movement,
which ultimately brought regime opponents to power. This
mobilization often is characterized exclusively as a lawyers'
movement, but that depiction obscures its larger importance as an
effective exercise in constitutional politics-waged not only by
lawyers, but also by political parties and civil society; advocating not
only judicial independence, but also democracy, constitutionalism,
and civilian supremacy. This broader mobilization generated a rich
set of constitutional norms and practices to guide the transition to
civilian rule. But because the anti-Musharraf movement fully
displaced neither the regime's governing framework nor the military's
entrenched power, the disequilibrium between the judiciary, military,
and Parliament has remained.
In Part IV, I analyze and assess Pakistan's uneven regime shift
after the 2008 elections, which left its constitutional order muddled
but also reconfigured longstanding institutional patterns and planted
seeds for potentially far-reaching change. Eventually, that shift
yielded unprecedented actions by both Parliament and the judiciary

25.
HUSAIN HAQQANI, PAKISTAN: BETWEEN MOSQUE AND MILITARY 199 (2005).
26.
My account is broadly consistent with Mona E1-Ghobashy's explanation
that a country can periodically experience political contention that prompts significant
institutional change, but "without any broader redistribution of power that may
portend regime change." Mona E1-Ghobashy, Constitutionalist Contention in
Contemporary Egypt, 51 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1590, 1594-95 (2008); see also Pace &
Cavatorta, supra note 6, at 126-35 (urging reconsideration, but not dismissal, of both
"democratization/transition" and "authoritarian resilience" paradigms as means of
explaining politics in the Arab world).
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to begin reversing the legacies of military rule, but it also escalated
the conflict between them. The court decisively repudiated its
longstanding role of validating military rule, but simultaneously
asserted its autonomy from Parliament by imposing its own
resolution of core political issues arising from the post-Musharraf
transition. For its part, Parliament unanimously adopted the
Eighteenth Amendment, an unprecedented package of more than a
hundred constitutional changes that repudiated military rule,
restored parliamentary supremacy, devolved authority to provincial
governments, and reformed the judicial appointments process.
In the process, however, the judiciary's conflict over its autonomy
from the military evolved into one over its autonomy from
Parliament, even as the basic disequilibrium between Pakistan's
institutions has persisted. Since then, Parliament and the Supreme
Court have struggled to achieve a modus vivendi that advances a
and
democratic
constitutionalism
to
commitment
shared
consolidation, amidst public suspicions that the military has used
these conflicts and institutional imbalances to undermine Pakistan's
fragile transition. In Part V, I examine recent conflicts between the
Supreme Court and Parliament, in which the court has aggressively
asserted itself in a manner cutting deeply into the core of
parliamentary authority. The court has edged close to invalidating
provisions of the Eighteenth Amendment as inconsistent with the
constitution's "basic structure" and, with the encouragement of the
military and opposition parties, has privileged national security
matters over fundamental rights. The court even has disqualified an
elected prime minister from continuing to hold office, echoing the role
it has long played in facilitating the military's subversion of
democratic politics. I conclude by assessing the judiciary's increasing
self-conception as an institution whose legitimacy derives directly
from the people of Pakistan and the prospects for an institutional
equilibrium more conducive to democratic consolidation, in which
more robust mechanisms of judicial accountability might play a more
prominent role to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the judiciary's
assertions of power and autonomy vis-A-vis representative
institutions.
Pakistan's current shift to civilian rule offers genuine potential
for the long-term consolidation of democracy, constitutionalism, and
institutional
given
its
enduring
civilian
rule.
However,
disequilibrium, effectively challenging the entrenched dominance of
the military and its affiliated interests requires an understanding of
judicial independence that goes beyond abstract, unqualified notions
of autonomy. Instead, fully realizing the current moment's potential
requires an appropriate rebalancing of judicial autonomy and
constraint, along with the introduction of meaningful mechanisms of
judicial accountability, that will enable representative institutions to
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strengthen their governance capacity and power to rein in the
military and its affiliated interests.

II. TRANSFORMATIVE PRESERVATION AND INSTITUTIONAL
DISEQUILIBRIUM

Speaking in December 2011, amidst rumors of an imminent
coup, Pakistan's then-Prime Minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani, grabbed
headlines when he pointedly warned the military not to consider
itself "a state within the state," insisting instead that it must remain
answerable to Parliament like any other government agency.2 7
Gilani's statement was remarkable given the prevailing tendency of
Pakistan's politicians to tread lightly with the military. But it also
was curious for purporting to warn against what more often is simply
assumed: that Pakistan's military and its network of affiliated
interests-including elements in its intelligence agencies and
bureaucracy, along with an array of politicians and other private
actors-have already functioned as a "state within a state" for a long
time and, more ominously, may simply "exist[] beyond any civilian
control."28
In this Part, I examine the dominant role played by this
aggregation of interests-which I term Pakistan's deep state,29 to
emphasize its extensive reach beyond the military's formal
institutional boundaries-in Pakistan's politics, economy, and society,
and the critical role of law and the judiciary in facilitating that
dominance. First, I analyze the ways that the military, during periods
of its direct rule, has entrenched a hegemonic position that has

27.
Asim Yasin & Muhammad Anis, PM Fears Ouster, Rejects "State Within
State," NEWS INT'L, Dec. 23, 2011, http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?
ID=11193&Cat=13.
28.
C. Christine Fair, Pakistan's Democracy: The Army's Quarry?, 5 ASIAN
SECURITY 73, 75 (2009). Similar observations are often made about Turkey, Egypt, and
other countries where military interests have remained powerful after formal
transitions to civilian rule. See Bali, supra note 2, at 276-79 (discussing the role in
Turkey of the military, bureaucracy, police, and judiciary in securing "core
commitments of the state . . . against democratic alteration"); Dunne & Nawaz, supra
note 7 (discussing Pakistan's lessons for Egypt, given presence in both countries of
"powerful intelligence and internal security agencies that have acquired extra-legal
powers they will not relinquish easily").
29.
Although my conceptualization is distinct, I adapt Kamran Shafl's similar
usage, which in turn is borrowed from the Turkish context. See Kamran Shafi, The
Deep State and Technocrats, DAWN, Sep. 28, 2010, http://dawn.com/2010/09/28/thedeep-state-and-technocrats-by-kamran-shafil; see also Merve Kavakci, Turkey's Test
with Its Deep State, 20 MEDITERRANEAN Q. 83, 90 (2009) (discussing evolution of "deep
state" in Turkey); Dexter Filkins, The Deep State, NEW YORKER, Mar. 12, 2012, at 38
(noting that the "deep state," or derin deulet, refers in Turkey to "a presumed
clandestine network of military officers and their civilian allies" that at times "has
functioned as a kind of shadow government").
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endured during periods of formally civilian rule. Second, I explain the
centrality of law and courts to this process and to the ongoing
negotiation of military influence even after civilian rule formally has
returned.30 Finally, I assess the institutional disequilibrium resulting
from these processes, in which a politicized judiciary has been
empowered to assert its autonomy from already weak representative
institutions, but has remained vulnerable to powerful constraints by
military and deep state interests.
A. From Viceregal State to Deep State
Since its independence, Pakistan has oscillated between two
constitutional models. The prevailing "viceregal" model, favored by
the military and bureaucracy, builds' upon the inherited British
colonial state and privileges centralization and presidential power.3 '
A weaker "parliamentary" model, favored by civilian politicians and
initially favored by Pakistan's Constituent Assembly, emphasizes
parliamentary supremacy. and federalism. 32 To protect its interests
under the viceregal model, the military, which came to predominate
over political actors soon after Pakistan's independence in 1947,33 has

30.
On the structure of Pakistan's judiciary, see generally FAQIR HUSSAIN, THE
JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF PAKISTAN (2011), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/
web/page.asp?id=594; Mohammad Yasin & Sardar Shah, Administration of Justice in
Pakistan,in THE DISPENSATION OF JUSTICE IN PAKISTAN 75, 79-84 (Mohammad Yasin
& Tariq Banuri eds., 2004). My emphasis in this Article is principally on Pakistan's
"higher" or "superior" judiciary, and in particular its Supreme Court.
31.
See KHALID BIN SAYEED, PAKISTAN: THE FORMATIVE PHASE 1857-1948, at
233-78 (1968). At independence, this "viceregal system" consisted of "a powerful
Viceroy, otherwise known as the Governor-General, an Executive Council chosen by the
Governor-General, a Central Assembly with limited powers, subordinate Provincial
Governments, and, above all, a powerful bureaucracy placed in strategic positions in
the Centre, in the Provinces, and in the districts." Id. at 299.
32.
See PHILIP E. JONES, THE PAKISTAN PEOPLE'S PARTY: RISE TO POWER 2-6
(2003); see also Mahmud, supra note 20, at 1231-33 (discussing early constitutional
conflicts between "authoritarian centralism" and "representative federalism").
33.
See JALAL, supra note 23, at 3 (discussing "domestic, regional, and
international factors [that] weakened the position of parties and politicians" in Pakistan
and "tipp[ed] the institutional balance in favour of the civil bureaucracy and the
military"). A significant literature analyzes how Pakistan's army and bureaucracy
became dominant during this period. See id.; MAZHAR AZIZ, MILITARY CONTROL IN

PAKISTAN: THE PARALLEL STATE 55-68 (2008); AYESHA SIDDIQA, MILITARY INC.: INSIDE
PAKISTAN'S MILITARY ECONOMY 62-72 (2007); IAN TALBOT, PAKISTAN: A MODERN
HISTORY 126-34 (rev. ed. 2005); Hamza Alavi, The State in Post-Colonial Societies:
Pakistan and Bangladesh, NEW LEFT REV. 59, 65 (1972); D.A. Low, Pakistan and
India: Political Legacies from the Colonial Past, 25 J. S. ASIAN STUD. 257, 266 (2002).
Some of this work addresses these questions by way of explaining a contrast with
India's greater success in establishing parliamentary democracy. See PHILIP
OLDENBURG, INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND DEMOCRACY: SOLVING THE PUZZLE OF DIVERGENT

PATHS (2010); Christophe Jaffrelot, India and Pakistan:Interpretingthe Divergence of
Two Political Trajectories, 15 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT'L AFF. 251 (2002); MAYA CHADDA,
BUILDING DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH ASIA: INDIA, NEPAL, PAKISTAN 23-65 (2000);
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seized power in several coups, directly ruling Pakistan for over half of
its history. At no point, however, has the military possessed sufficient
"coercive capacity" 34 to exercise control entirely on its own. While it
has utilized force, coercion, and intimidation to attain and preserve
power, the military always has cultivated support from other
quarters-bureaucrats, politicians, judges, and other elites-to
augment its power and lend its rule a veneer of legitimacy.35
During these recurring periods of direct rule, the military has
undertaken legal, political, and institutional transformations with
the effect of preserving and extending its dominance into periods of
civilian rule, a process I refer to as transformativepreservation.The
basic approach to effecting these transformations has followed a nowestablished pattern.36 Constitutionally, as I explain in Part II.B,
military regimes have instituted sweeping changes to the governing
framework to strengthen its viceregal aspects. Most visibly, the
military has preserved its primacy over defense and foreign policy,
but its efforts have never been limited to these areas.3 7 Rather, the
military has extended its reach much further into Pakistan's political,
social, and economic structure-a position of supremacy that has
become deeply rooted over time.38

MEGHNAD DESAI & AITZAZ AHsAN, DIVIDED BY DEMOCRACY 75-142 (David Page ed.,
2005); see also JALAL, supra note 5 (discussing both contrasts and continuities in the

experiences of India and Pakistan with democracy and authoritarianism).
LEVITSKY & WAY, supra note 5, at 56-61.
34.
See C. Christine Fair, Why the PakistanArmy Is Here To Stay: Prospects for
35.
Civilian Governance, 87 INT'L AFF. 571, 572 (2011) (noting that because
"authoritarianism has never garnered widespread legitimacy," Pakistan's military has
relied upon the "connivance and acquiescence of [a] broad array of civilian institutions
and personalities"); LIEVEN, supra note 9, at 23-24 (arguing that given the strength of
Pakistan's "negotiated state," military regimes find themselves "ingested by the elites
they had hoped to displace, and engaged in the same patronage politics as the regimes
they had overthrown"); SIDDIQA, supra note 33, at 13 ("In military-dominated polities,
other dominant groups often turn into cronies of the armed forces to establish a
mutually beneficial relationship . . . ."). In this respect, Pakistan's experience is
consistent with the experiences of other countries with politically dominant militaries.
See GUILLERMO A. O'DONNELL & PHILIPPE C. SCHMITTER, TRANSITIONS FROM
AUTHORITARIAN RULE: TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES 31
(1986) (concluding, based on a study of authoritarianism in southern Europe and Latin
America, that "in no case has the military intervened without important and active
civilian support").
See Charles H. Kennedy, Constitutional and PoliticalChange in Pakistan:
36.
The Military-GovernanceParadigm,in PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN SOUTH ASIA 37, 47-71
(Rafiq Dossani & Henry S. Rowen eds., 2005); Kalhan, supra note 12.
37.
See FREDERIC GRARE, REFORMING THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN
PAKISTAN'S TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACY 36-46 (2009); SHUJA NAWAZ, CROSSED SWORDS:
PAKISTAN, ITS ARMY, AND THE WARS WITHIN 413-16 (2008); HOWARD B. SCHAFFER &

TERESITA C. SCHAFFER, HOW PAKISTAN NEGOTIATES WITH THE UNITED STATES: RIDING
THE ROLLER COASTER 81-88, 117-18, 144-46, 171-74 (2011).
38.
See Fair, supra note 35, at 572 ("With each successive coup, Pakistan's
civilian structures become ever more dysfunctional and the army, with its ever-
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First, the military and its allies have aggressively manipulatedthe political process. During periods of direct rule, military regimes
have systematically undermined and delegitimized Pakistan's weak
political parties, while simultaneously co-opting politicians into
giving their support.39 In some instances, these objectives have been
achieved by banning parties outright and holding elections on a
nonparty basis. More recently, military regimes have restricted other
associational freedoms and politicians' eligibility to hold office. To
establish a civilian fagade for the regime, the military has bypassed
existing parties by inducing or intimidating politicians to join
military-sponsored parties or coalitions, which function as proxies
and, if the regime's performance flags, potential scapegoats. 40 When
civilian rule has returned, the military has continued to exercise
considerable political influence-formalizing its own governing role
under the constitution and manipulating not only the political parties
themselves, but also media coverage and the electoral process. 41 For
their part, however, civilian politicians and political parties have
done neither themselves nor democratic governance many favors,
often facilitating their own manipulation by seeking the military's
support in short-term conflicts with each other.4 2

expanding network of corporate financial and political interests and beneficiaries, ever
more entrenched.").
For discussion of factors contributing to the ineffectiveness of Pakistan's
39.
political parties, see INT'L CRISIS GRP., AUTHORITARIANISM

AND POLITICAL PARTY

REFORM IN PAKISTAN 1, 5-6 (2005); YOGENDRA K. MALIK ET AL., GOVERNMENT AND
POLITICS IN SOUTH ASIA 176-78 (6th ed. 2009); Hasan Askari Rizvi, Democracy in
Pakistan,in A FUTURE FOR DEMOCRACY 117, 130-31 (Wilhelm Hofmeister ed., 2011).
See Aqil Shah, The Transition to "Guided"Democracy in Pakistan, in THE
40.
ASIA-PACIFIC: A REGION IN TRANSITION 207, 216-18 (Jim Rolfe ed., 2004) (discussing
Musharrafs "legal measures to stack the [electoral] process against his political
opposition" and other activities to "engineer[ ]" political processes); INT'L CRISIS GRP.,
PAKISTAN: TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY? 7-10, 15 (2002) (describing the military's
tactics to obtain support from civilian politicians and political parties and to
manipulate the political process); S. AKBAR ZAIDI, MILITARY, CIVIL SOCIETY AND
DEMOCRATIZATION IN PAKISTAN 27 (2011) ("When things go awry, [the military] blames
the politicians it itself helped create."); Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Democracy and the
Crisis of Governability in Pakistan, 32 ASIAN SURVEY 521, 523, 533 (1992) (discussing
military's creation of an anti-PPP political coalition to maintain its influence).
See, e.g., INT'L CRISIS GRP., supra note 39, at 23, 25-27 (discussing creation
41.
of National Security Council and military's use of pre-election rigging to manipulate
electoral results); S. Akbar Zaidi, Criticising Democracy or Criticising Governance?,
ECON. & POL. WKLY., Feb. 28, 2009, at 8-9 (discussing "severe constraints" that elected
civilian governments in Pakistan face, "such as having to clean up the huge mess
created by each military decade and with the secret arm of the military breathing down
[their] neck[s]"); Maleeha Lodhi & Zahid Hussain, The Invisible Government,
NEWSLINE, Oct. 1992 (investigating and documenting role played by intelligence
agencies in manipulating the political process).
See Fair, supra note 28, at 76 (noting that civilian elites and political
42.
parties often "aid and abet the erosion of democracy" by using the military to
undermine their political opponents); SHEILA FRUMAN, WILL THE LONG MARCH TO
DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN FINALLY SUCCEED? 8-9 (2011) (noting that party leaders
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Second, the military has effectively "colonized" the state's
administrative apparatus. 43 While military personnel long had been
inducted into the bureaucracy, under General Zia-ul-Haq's regime in
the 1980s, active and retired officers were placed in civilian positions
in larger numbers, at higher ranks, and via more formal quota
programs. 44 In the 2000s, Musharraf's regime made deeper
encroachments, deploying thousands of active and retired personnel
to serve on "monitoring teams" overseeing civil administration at
every level. 45 Under Musharraf, "[v]irtually every aspect of the civil
bureaucracy's functioning .. . was placed in the hands of military
personnel." 46 While the military later announced it would withdraw
many of these officers, civilian regimes have not easily reversed these
incursions into the bureaucracy. 4 7
Third, the military and its affiliates have amassed an economic
empire estimated in the billions of dollars. While the military has
long cultivated ties with elites, 48 over time the officer corps has
evolved into an elite class of its own, commanding a growing share of
the nation's wealth, status, and privilege. The military's "welfare
foundations," initially formed to provide benefits to military retirees,
now employ thousands of individuals in hundreds of commercial
ventures across many sectors. These ventures-often hidden from
scrutiny, but benefiting from large, off-budget subsidies-range from
small businesses to some of Pakistan's largest enterprises. The

"have not implemented basic democratic standards within their parties" and that
"members of a small elite tend to dominate party leadership, using their positions to
accrue personal wealth"); HASAN ASKARI RIZVI, THE MILITARY AND POLITICS IN
PAKISTAN 1947-1997, at 236-39 (2000) (discussing Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto's use of the military to maintain law and order and manage political crisis in
1977 in a manner that undermined civilian authority).
43.
JALAL, supra note 23, at 323; see also AMINULLAH CHAUDRY, POLITICAL
ADMINISTRATORS: THE STORY OF THE CIVIL SERVICE OF PAKISTAN 138-58 (2011)
(discussing the "army ingress into civil bureaucracy" since the 1980s).
44.
See CHARLES H. KENNEDY, BUREAUCRACY IN PAKISTAN 122-25 (1987);
HASAN ASKARI RIzVI, MILITARY, STATE AND SOCIETY IN PAKISTAN 234-35 (2000).

INT'L CRISIS GRP., REFORMING PAKISTAN'S CIVIL SERVICE 9 (2010).
45.
Id. at 10; see also CHAUDRY, supra note 43, at 154-57 (discussing
46.
Musharrafs aggressive efforts to deepen military control over civilian bureaucracy).
47.
See Salman Masood, PakistanArmy Chief Ousts Military from Government,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2008, at A8 (discussing order by Musharrafs successor as Army
Chief to withdraw military officers appointed to civilian bureaucracy). But see Ayesha
Siddiqa, Pakistan's Modernity: Between the Military and Militancy, ECON. & POL.
WKLY., Dec. 17, 2011, at 66 ("Contrary to his commitment to the people, Kayani did not
withdraw all military personnel from civilian departments."); CHAUDRY, supra note 43,
at 156-57 (discussing constraints on ability of civilian governments to remove military
officers appointed to civilian positions).
48.
See STEPHEN P. COHEN, THE IDEA OF PAKISTAN 68-70, 269-73 (2004)
(discussing the cultivation in 1960s by General Ayub Khan's regime of an oligarchic
elite referred to as the "Establishment"); SIDDIQA, supra note 33, at 74-75, 87-88
(discussing policies by Zia regime in 1980s to cultivate support among business
interests).
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foundations also provide opportunities for private gain by individuals
associated with them, owing to patronage networks and other
advantages arising from military connections. 49
Military officers also benefit from favorable access to land.50 The
military is Pakistan's largest landowner, using its power, influence,
and sometimes force to acquire millions of acres at well below market
value and then allocating or selling those lands to affiliated entities
and officers on favorable terms.5 1 In rural areas, these schemes have
strengthened ties to feudal elites, reinforcing severe inequalities
arising from inadequate land access. 52 In cities, the military has
become one of Pakistan's largest developers, engaged in billions of
dollars' worth of residential and commercial development schemes
and enabling officers to make large profits in often-speculative
transactions.5 3 Beyond their economic significance, these highly
visible, large-scale land grabs, which escalated sharply under
Musharraf, have greatly enhanced the military's prestige and power,
given the importance of land in Pakistani society. 54
Fourth, the military and its affiliated interests exercise
considerable influence over the media. At times, that influence entails
outright coercion and intimidation. Pakistan has long ranked among
the world's most dangerous countries for journalists, in part due to
violence against journalists deemed critical of the military.5 5 But

See SIDDIQA, supra note 33, at 18, 112-28 (discussing structure of welfare
49.
foundations and other military-affiliated economic enterprises).
See id. at 174-205 (detailing extent of land ownership and control by the
50.
military and affiliated interests); Haris Gazdar, The Fourth Round, and Why They
Fight On: The History of Land Reform in Pakistan,in LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: A
SURVEY OF PAKISTAN'S LAND REFORMS 8, 44-48 (Rakesh Kalshian ed., 2011) (noting
"the privileged access to agricultural, commercial, and residential land enjoyed by
military organizations and personnel").
See SIDDIQA, supra note 33, at 174-75.
51.
52.
See SIDDIQA, supra note 33, at 184 ("[T]he military became an instrument
of feudalism and part of the feudal class."); Talat Anwar et al., Landlessness and Rural
Poverty in Pakistan, 43 PAKISTAN DEV. REV. 855, 869 (2004) (identifying inadequate
access to land as an "important contributor[ ] to rural poverty in Pakistan"); see also
BINA AGARWAL, A FIELD OF ONE'S OWN: GENDER AND LAND RIGHTS IN SOUTH ASIA, at

xv (1994) (discussing land ownership and control as "critical determinant[s] of
economic well-being, social status, and political power" in rural South Asia); Elisabeth
Wickeri & Anil Kalhan, Land Rights Issues in International Human Rights Law, 4
MALAYSIAN J. HUM. RTS. 16, 18-23 (2010) (discussing the constellation of rights
implicated under international law by inadequate access to land).
SIDDIQA, supra note 33, at 185-99.
53.
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SOILED HANDS: THE PAKISTAN ARMY'S
54.
REPRESSION OF THE PUNJAB FARMERS' MOVEMENT 6 (2004) ("For the Pakistani military

establishment, control of land is essential for maintaining its position within the
Pakistani political structure . . . ."); SIDDIQA, supra note 33, at 174 ("Land is acquired
not just for capital accumulation, but also to exhibit the military's authority and
power . . . .").
See INT'L FED'N OF JOURNALISTS, NEW FRONTIERS, NEW STRUGGLES: PRESS
55.
FREEDOM IN SOUTH ASIA 2011-12, at 34-39 (2012); INT'L FED'N OF JOURNALISTS & PAK.
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even short of this extreme, the military utilizes a host of more subtle
means of influence, such as paying off journalists, planting and
disseminating stories (and rumors), and restricting publication or
broadcast. 56 While liberalization of Pakistan's electronic media in
recent years has enabled more open public discourse-and greater
public criticism of state institutions, including the military, than ever
before-military interests nevertheless have continued to wield
significant influence over the media under both military and civilian
rule.57 Indeed, while other factors contributed to its onset,
Musharrafs media liberalization program itself was initiated in part
with the purpose of enhancing the ability of the military and its allies
to shape public discourse.5 8
The result has been not simply the enhancement of the military's
own institutional power, but the emergence of a sprawling aggregate
of affiliated interests-Pakistan's deep state-that both benefit from
and reinforce military hegemony, even during periods of formally
civilian democratic rule. As Ayesha Siddiqa emphasizes, "The
military's political clout is not just based on its own strength but also
on the financial and political power of its collaborators or clients."5 9

FED. UNION OF JOURNALISTS, A STATE OF DENIAL: THE CRISIS OF PRESS FREEDOM AND
JOURNALIST SAFETY IN PAKISTAN (2007). One prominent television journalist asserts
that "[t]hose who dare to criticize the military are living dangerously." Hasnain Kazim,
Living in Fear of Intelligence Agents, DER SPIEGEL ONLINE (Dec. 23, 2011),
http://www.spiegel.de/internationallworld/the-perils-of-journalism-in-pakistan-living-in(quoting Hamid Mir); see also Elisabeth
fear-of-intelligence-agents-a-805639.html
Bumiller, U.S. Admiral Ties Pakistan to Killing of Journalist, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2011,
at A4; Huma Imtiaz, The Perils of Reporting in Pakistan, FOREIGN POLY (Sept. 24,
2010,
9:31
AM),
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/09/24/the-perilsof_
reporting-in-pakistan.
See SIDDIQA, supra note 33, at 98-99, 250 (discussing "tactful" and "subtle"
56.
mechanisms used by military to intimidate media "based on a system of rewards and
selective punishment"); Lodhi & Hussain, supra note 41 (documenting tactics used by
intelligence agencies to manipulate and intimidate journalists); Sonya Fatah, The
Geography of GEO, HIMAL SOUTHASIAN, Sep. 2005, at 7 (stating that after airing
sensitive or controversial material, television stations "anticipate[] a coded phone call
or a veiled threat"); Kalsoom Lakhani, Ah, the Rumor Mill. It's a Churnin?, CHUP!CHANGING UP PAK. (Dec. 7, 2011), http://changinguppakistan.wordpress.com/2011/
12/07/ah-the-rumor-mill-its-a-churnin/ (discussing dissemination of rumors as means of
manipulating public discourse); Declan Walsh, Pakistani Media Publish Fake
WikiLeaks Cables Attacking India, GUARDIAN, Dec. 9, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2010/dec/09/pakistani-newspaper-fake-leaks-india (noting the "strong influence
of Pakistan's army over an otherwise vigorous free press").
57.
See MARCO MEZZERA & SAFDAR SIAL, MEDIA AND GOVERNANCE IN
PAKISTAN: A CONTROVERSIAL YET ESSENTIAL RELATIONSHIP 30-34 (2010); SHERRY
RICCHIARDI, CHALLENGES FOR INDEPENDENT NEWS MEDIA IN PAKISTAN 5-6, 10, 15, 20
(2012).
INT'L MEDIA SUPPORT, MEDIA IN PAKISTAN: BETWEEN RADICALISATION AND
58.
DEMOCRATISATION IN AN UNFOLDING CONFLICT 16-17 (2009); MEZZERA & SIAL, supra
note 57, at 27-28.
59.
SIDDIQA, supra note 33, at 15-16; see also Hasan-Askari Rizvi, The
Military, in POWER AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN PAKISTAN 186, 210 (Anita M. Weiss & S.

20

VANDERBILT/OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 46:1

Extensive financial and political assistance by the United States has
long reinforced this dominance. 60 Originally driven by Cold War
imperatives and given renewed emphasis following the 2001 terrorist
attacks, U.S. assistance has often strengthened the military at the
expense of representative institutions. 6 ' While U.S. aid recently has
been restructured to provide greater civilian assistance and
strengthen conditions on military support, U.S. assistance, both
2
financial and political, continues to reinforce the military's power. 6
The dominance of Pakistan's military and deep state interests
has been justified and reinforced by an antidemocratic legitimating
discourse63 comprised of two basic precepts, which the military and
its allies actively propagate through government publications, school
textbooks, cultural and scholarly production, and the media. 64 First,
early in Pakistan's history, the emergence of security-related

Zulfiqar Gilani eds., 2001) (asserting that military strength "no longer depends on
controlling the levers of power" but derives from "its organizational strength and its
significant presence in the economy and society").
See NAwAz, supra note 37, at 92-118 (discussing the effects of U.S. aid to
60.
Pakistan); TOOR, supra note 8, at 153-54 (discussing role of U.S. financial assistance in
"rehabilitat[ing]" Zia's military regime). Large-scale assistance from China and Saudi
Arabia plays a similar role. See STEVE COLL, GHOST WARS: THE SECRET HISTORY OF
THE CIA, AFGHANISTAN, AND BIN LADEN, FROM THE SOVIET INVASION TO SEPTEMBER 10,
2001, 71-74, 81-82, 180, 296 (2005) (Saudi Arabia); Julian Schofield, Pakistan-China
Strategic Relations, Energy Security and Pakistani Counter-Terror Operations, in
PAKISTAN: THE US, GEOPOLITICS AND GRAND STRATEGIES 151, 161-62 (Usama Butt &
Julian Schofield eds., 2012) [hereinafter GEOPOLITICS AND GRAND STRATEGIES] (China).
INT'L CRISIS GRP., AID AND CONFLICT IN PAKISTAN 2-3 (2012); see also
61.
Mariam Mufti, The Influence of Domestic Politics on the Making of US-Pakistan
Foreign Policy, in GEOPOLITICS AND GRAND STRATEGIES, supra note 60, at 64, 72-75
(criticizing United States for neglecting "to take account of Pakistan's domestic politics"
in its assistance programs). At times, U.S. officials have all but openly signaled their
preference for the military to remain in power, or at minimum their equivocal interest
in a transition to civilian democratic rule. See COLL, supra note 60, at 42-46, 50-52,
62-63, 66-67; INT'L CRISIS GRP., supra note 40, at 32; AHMED RASHID, DESCENT INTO
CHAOS: THE U.S. AND THE DISASTER IN PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND CENTRAL ASIA
148-49 (2d ed. 2009).

Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-73, 123
62.
Stat. 2060 (2009); see also SCHAFFER & SCHAFFER, supra note 37, at 172 (discussing the
ongoing "challenge" for U.S. officials of "develop[ing] rapport with the army leadership
without inadvertently reinforcing the army's role in the country's politics and
government at the expense of civilian leadership").
See PITCHER, supra note 24, at 239-43 (discussing the articulation by
63.
political elites, in the context of "transformative preservation" in Mozambique, of
diffuse "legitimating discourse," which "legitimate[s] the transition that Mozambique
has undergone, justif[ies] its own role in it, and gain[s] supporters for its project," and
which is complemented and reinforced by messages disseminated by other elite actors).
Fair, supra note 35, at 573; see also A.H. NAYYAR & AHMED SALIM, THE
64.
SUBTLE SUBVERSION: THE STATE OF CURRICULA AND TEXTBOOKS IN PAKISTAN URDU,
ENGLISH, SOCIAL STUDIES AND CIVICS, at i-vii (2005); PAK. ARMY GEN. HEADQUARTERS,
PAKISTAN ARMY GREEN BOOK 2000: ROLE OF PAKISTAN ARMY IN NATION BUILDING 24578 (2000); SIDDIQA, supra note 33, at 98; TOOR, supra note 8, at 86-89; supra notes 5558 and accompanying text.
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concerns as defining features of the state's identity-or more to the
point, an enduring sense of insecurity-prompted the military to
understand and project itself as the state's guardian. 65 Accordingly,
the military claims the mantle of protector of not only the state's
security, but its very existence, projecting mistrust of politicians'
abilities to bear those responsibilities and in essence, to borrow from
Jonathan Simon, governing through insecurity. 66 This claimed
guardianship converges with the military's assertion of responsibility
to protect the state's identity and ideology, including its Islamic
character. 67 One consequence has been the blurring of internal and
external threats, with the military and its allies often deeming "all
internal political opposition as somehow instigated by outside
forces." 6 8
Second, the military understands and projects itself as
Pakistan's most competent institution-not just in security matters,
but in governance and development more generally. 69 This selfconception of military professionalism ("selfless, disciplined, obedient,
and competent"70 ) is defined in self-conscious contrast to Pakistan's
civilian politicians ("incompetent, insincere, corrupt, and driven by

Fair, supra note 28, at 79 ("[T]he army sees itself, and is seen by many
65.
Pakistanis, as the guarantor of an inherently insecure state."). This sense of insecurity
emerged soon after independence, and has been reinforced by several wars with India,
a civil war leading to independence of Bangladesh, an ongoing border dispute with
Afghanistan, and domestic unrest in which the army has been deployed to preserve
order.
66.
See SIDDIQA, supra note 33, at 62-64 (discussing centrality of security to
military and policymaking elites); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME:
HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A
CULTURE OF FEAR 4-5 (2007) (conceptualizing "governing through crime" as set of
practices in which "institutions ... us[e] crime to promote governance by legitimizing
and/or providing content for the exercise of power").
. 67.
See HAQQANI, supra note 25, at 2-3, 51-86 (discussing military's selfconception as "guardian of Pakistan's 'ideological frontier"'); FARZANA SHAIKH, MAKING
SENSE OF PAKISTAN 147-79 (2009) (discussing role of the military "as a major force
attempting not only to determine the national interest but to define the very meaning
of Pakistan," including its religious identity).
68.
JALAL, supra note 23, at 49-50; see also COHEN, supra note 48, at 124
(arguing that because the military "demands a united front at home on security
issues," it has "supported restraints ... on the press, political parties, and even
academia").
69.
See LIEVEN, supra note 9, at 163 ("The Pakistani military, more even than
most militaries, sees itself as a breed apart, and ... different from (and vastly superior
to) Pakistani civilian society."); see also AZIZ, supra note 33, at 93-96 (analyzing the
military's self-conception as playing an indispensable role in "nation-building"); Husain
Haqqani, History Repeats Itself in Pakistan, 17 J. DEMOCRACY 110, 111 (2006) (noting
military's "perception of itself as the country's only viable institution"); STEPHEN P.
COHEN, THE PAKISTAN ARMY 37, 107-110, 120-21 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing military's
rationales for its interventions in politics and governance). This understanding is
evident, for example, in the essays published by the Pakistan Army in 2000 on the
military's role in nation building. PAK. ARMY GEN. HEADQUARTERS, supra note 64.
70.
COHEN, supra note 48, at 71.

-22

VANDERBILT/OURNAL

[VOL. 46:1

OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

greed" 7 1)-and in part can be further traced to a more fundamental,
longstanding suspicion of the capacity of ordinary Pakistani citizens
to engage in democratic self-governance.7 2 On this basis, the military
justifies routine involvement in activities far afield of its mandate,
which constitutionally is limited to "defend[ing] Pakistan against
external aggression or threat of war, and . .. act[ing] in aid of civil
power when called upon" by civilian authorities.7 3 For example,
despite evidence that military-run enterprises are frequently
mismanaged and inefficient-often only appearing viable due to
hidden subsidies-the military repeatedly asserts that its economic
activities benefit Pakistan's development.74 Military regimes have
also invoked this understanding to engage in high-profile (and highly
selective) efforts to combat corruption. While these initiatives have
targeted interests opposed to the deep state, they invariably have
shielded those aligned with it, including interests within the military
itself, whose institutionalized self-dealing activities are often deemed
outside the realm of "corruption" altogether.7 5 This rationale also has
SIDDIQA, supra note 33, at 61-65, 249. Musharraf, for example, refers to
71.
the period of civilian rule preceding his coup as the "dreadful decade of democracy,"
during which Pakistan endured "the worst kind of governance" and "corruption and the
plunder of national wealth." PERVEZ MUSHARRAF, IN THE LINE OF FIRE 71, 78 (2006);
see also SCHAFFER & SCHAFFER, supra note 37, at 61 ("Thinly veiled contempt for
civilians, and in particular for Pakistan's politicians, is characteristic of Pakistan army
officers."); Adam Gabbatt, Pervez Musharraf Vows Return to "Suffering" Pakistan
During Visit to US, GUARDIAN, July 1, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/
jul/0 1/pervez-musharraf-pakistan-return-aspen (quoting Musharrafs opinion that "the
state is being run to the ground" by civilians "and people are again running to the
military to save the country").
For example, in his autobiography, Pakistan's first military ruler, General
72.
Ayub Khan, questioned the ability of ordinary citizens to think "in terms of national
policies."

MOHAMMAD

AYUB

KHAN,

FRIENDS

NOT

MASTERS:

A

POLITICAL

AUTOBIOGRAPHY 207-15 (1967). Similarly, opposition political figure Imran Khan
recounts more recent conversations with senior military officials who lamented to him,
with an air of resignation, that unfortunately "the people of Pakistan voted for crooks."
IMRAN KHAN, PAKISTAN: A PERSONAL HISTORY 222-23 (2011) [hereinafter KHAN,
PAKISTAN: A PERSONAL HISTORY].
PAKISTAN CONST. art. 245, § 1; see also SIDDIQA, supra note 33, at 59
73.
(noting similar provisions in the constitutions of 1956 and 1962).
See SIDDIQA, supra note 33, at 219-42 (analyzing financial data from
74.
military-affiliated foundations and enterprises). As Musharraf protested in 2004,
"[W]hat is the problem if these organizations ... are doing a good job contributing to
the economy ... ?" Id. at 15; see also LIEVEN, supra note 9, at 168-73 (defending role
played by military-affiliated enterprises in Pakistan's economy).
75.
See SIDDIQA, supra note 33, at 95 (describing military's anticorruption
efforts "as a security valve to be turned on and off as a means to regulate the political
system"); KHAN, supra note 11, at 671-72 (criticizing selective, arbitrary, and
nontransparent nature of Musharrafs anticorruption campaign against civilian
politicians and bureaucrats); RIzvI, supranote 42, at 98-102 (discussing anticorruption
campaign under General Ayub Khan's military regime against civilian politicians and
civil bureaucrats); Shah, supra note 40, at 215 (discussing Musharrafs "selective and
arbitrary anti-corruption campaign" against civilian politicians, "which explicitly
leaves out military officers and judges."); see also Akhil Gupta, Blurred Boundaries:
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justified other efforts to control civilian politicians, such as the rules
extraconstitutionally imposed by Musharraf in 2002 that limited
eligibility for legislative office to individuals with university
degrees. 76
The strength of Pakistan's deep state transcends and eclipses its
periodic transitions from military to civilian rule and therefore
inhibits the nation's prospects for democratic consolidation and
constitutionalism. The military's accumulation of power and status
over an extended period of time has not only strengthened it as an
institution, in a path dependent manner, but also has given it vested
interests in undermining representative institutions to preserve that
accumulated power and status.7 7 Outside the military's formal
institutional boundaries, the strength of Pakistan's deep state
ensures that other elites and institutions-often including its judges
and courts-independently share the military's interests in that
dominance, frequently without any need for formal collaboration,
coordination, or coercion. These shared interests are reinforced by a
shared legitimating discourse that justifies military supremacy and
delegitimizes democratic governance and which, over time, has
become deeply embedded within Pakistan's day-to-day discourseincluding its legal discourse.
As in other countries where military interests are dominant,
such as Egypt7 8 and Turkey,79 rolling back deep state power in

The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics, and the Imagined State, 22 AM.
ETHNOLOGIST 375, 388-89 (1995) (arguing, given how conceptions of "corruption" and
"accountability" are socially produced, that "there are always divergent and conflicting
assessments of whether a particular course of action is 'corrupt"').
76.
Conduct of General Elections Order, 2002, § 8A, Chief Executive's Order
No. 7 of 2002 (Pak.) (requiring federal and provincial legislators to possess at least a
"bachelor degree in any discipline or any degree recognized as equivalent by the
University Grants Commission"). That requirement not only advanced and reinforced
the regime's legitimating discourse, but also helped it manipulate politics, since it
"accredited Musharraf's allies in the religious parties-many of whose madrasah
experiences were somehow certified as being equivalent to a master's or even a Ph.D.while disqualifying local politicians with years of experience earning the trust of their
constituents." Omar Waraich, Pakistan's Fake-Degree Scandal, TIME, July 21, 2010,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2005254,00.html.
77.
See SIDDIQA, supra note 33, at 17 (noting that "[m]ilitaries that develop
deep economic interests or have a pervasive presence in the economy shrink from
giving up political control"); Aqil Shah, Security, Soldiers, and the State, in THE
FUTURE OF PAKISTAN 199, 199 (Stephen P. Cohen ed., 2011) ("Over time, the military
has developed both an institutional culture legitimizing its intervention in, influence
on, and control of the state and a vested corporate interest in maintaining its
dominance.").
78.
See YEZID SAYIGH, ABOVE THE STATE: THE OFFICERS' REPUBLIC IN EGYPT
(2012),
available
at
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/officers_republicl.pdf
(explaining the dominant political, economic, and social role played by the Egyptian
military and its affiliated interests); Shana Marshall & Joshua Stacher, Egypt's
Generals and Transnational Capital, 262 MIDDLE E. REP. (2012), available at
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer262/egypts-generals-transnational-capital
(documenting
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Pakistan may not lend itself to standard prescriptions arising from
conventional accounts of constitutional and political change.
Christine Fair warns that even if the military withdrew from an
active political role, that shift would be fleeting absent a
"simultaneous increase in the civilians' political will and capacity to
govern"; Ayesha Siddiqa argues that successful democratic
consolidation would require a "strong domestic movement backed by
external pressure" from international actors.80 Over the long term,
Pakistan's evolution out of the gray zone will require, among other
things, the development of stronger representative institutions, with
improved capacity for governance and the power to rein in these
entrenched deep state interests.
B. Constitution,Extraconstitution,and TransformativePreservation

Pakistan's history makes one fact perfectly clear: far from
consistently fostering development of those stronger and more
capable representative institutions, its judiciary historically has
played precisely the opposite role, joining other actors to actively
enable the military's subversion and control of democratic politics.
First, when the military has seized direct political control, the
on
interventions
those
validated
has
Court
Supreme
a
legal
facilitating
necessity,"
extraconstitutional grounds of "state
dimension to the process of transformative preservation. Second,
when civilian rule formally has been restored, the court has
continued to play an analogous role-under constitutional auspicesin validating dismissal of civilian governments, either at the behest
or with tacit approval of the military. In both instances, the judiciary
and its legal discourse have reinforced the broader, antidemocratic
legitimating discourse justifying military dominance. As a result, by
routinely adjudicating the validity of changes in government,
and
constitutional
its
both
judiciary-in
Pakistan's
extraconstitutional avatars-has become deeply enmeshed in what
Ran Hirschl calls "pure politics" or "mega-politics": "watershed

the extensive reach of the economic enterprises controlled or influenced by the
Egyptian military); Jeannie Sowers, Egypt in Transformation, in THE JOURNEY TO
TAHRIR: REVOLUTION, PROTEST AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN EGYPT, 1999-2011, at 1, 16

(Jeannie Sowers & Chris Toensing eds., 2012) (discussing challenges faced by "newly
elected civilian leaders to gain oversight over the military's opaque budget, extensive
land ownership, economic activities, and other privileges").
See Bili, supra note 2, at 246-47 (noting that the "persistent legacy
79.
of. .. repressive strategies" by the military and its affiliated interests is "embedded in
SemiCourts in
Shambayati,
Hootan
culture");
Turkish constitutional
Democratic/AuthoritarianRegimes: The Judicialization of Turkish (and Iranian)
Politics, in RULE BY LAW, supra note 4, at 283 (discussing continued strength of
military interests during periods of civilian rule in Turkey).
Fair, supra note 28, at 79; SIDDIQA, supra note 33, at 24.
80.

2013/

GRAY ZONE CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE JUDICIARY

25

questions of nation building and collective identity that lie at the
heart of a nation's self-definition," including "core regime
legitimacy."8 1
1.

Extraconstitutional "Necessity"

When Pakistan's military has directly seized power, it has
engaged in a multistage process of constitutional transformation,
relying upon the judiciary in a manner that both draws upon and
reinforces the broader rationales used to legitimate its dominance. 8 2
First, the military formally declares an existential or near-existential
threat to the state, which justifies displacement of the constitution in
favor of a parallel legal framework, often styled as a Provisional
Constitution Order (PCO) that strengthens viceregal governance.
Elsewhere, I have termed this parallel order an extraconstitution,
given its paradoxical status as the constitution's legal doppelginger:
while the extraconstitution self-consciously displaces the constitution,
it simultaneously seeks legitimacy by mimicking and fostering the
appearance of adherence to regular legal and institutional forms.83
For example, in more recent iterations of this process, while the
extraconstitution has relied upon the existing judiciary, it often has
simultaneously reconstituted and constrained the judiciary, typically
by requiring judges to take new oaths of office swearing allegiance to
the extraconstitution itself to retain their positions. 84
Second, the military seeks judicial validation of the takeoverfrom the safely reconstituted judiciary-under the doctrine of "state
necessity." This extraconstitutional doctrine was first articulated in
the 1950s, amidst a conflict between Pakistan's Constituent
Assembly, which was poised to ratify its first constitution, and the

Ran Hirschl, The Judicializationof Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political
81.
Courts, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SC. 93, 113 (2008); Ran Hirschl, The New Constitutionalism
and the Judicialization of Pure Politics Worldwide, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 723
(2006); see also Maryam Khan, The Politics of Public Interest Litigation in Pakistan in
the 1990s, 2 Soc. SCI. & POLY BULL. 2, 2 (2011) (discussing transformation of Supreme
Court of Pakistan between 1988 and 1999 "from a device for regime legitimation into a
self-preserving and autonomous (albeit highly politicized) power broker between a
military-backed executive and a highly fragile and fragmented parliament.").
82.
See Kalhan, supra note 12, at 100-05 (identifying and conceptualizing
patterns of extraconstitutional change in Pakistan); Mohammad Waseem,
Constitutionalism in Pakistan: The Changing Patterns of Dyarchy, 53 DIOGENES 102,
109 (2006) (arguing that military regimes in Pakistan understand themselves to act "in
transitional terms," to facilitate "change[s] in the constitutional edifice according to
[their] own preferences and priorities").
83.
See Kalhan, supra note 12, at 101; Tamir Moustafa & Tom Ginsburg, The
Functions of Courts in AuthoritarianPolitics, in RULE BY LAW, supra note 4, at 1, 5-7
(discussing authoritarian regimes' use of courts to "make up for their questionable
legitimacy by ... giv[ing] the image, if not the full effect, of constraints on arbitrary
rule").
84.
See Kalhan, supra note 12, at 103.
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Governor-General, who disagreed with the vision of parliamentary
supremacy and federalism animating that document.85 Declaring that
Pakistan's "constitutional machinery has broken down," the
Governor-General proclaimed an emergency and dissolved the
Assembly before it could ratify the proposed constitution. 86
Subsequent executive and judicial responses deepened the crisis by
effectively creating a legal and constitutional vacuum.87 Pakistan's
Federal Court then validated the Governor-General's extralegal
measures to address the crisis as justified not by the nation's interim
constitutional framework, but rather by an extraconstitutional
principle of "state necessity."88 Since then, through several military
interventions, Pakistan's Supreme Court has developed-and even
exported to other countries as persuasive authority 8O-a body of
extraconstitutional jurisprudence elaborating this doctrine, which has
proven remarkably durable.9 0 While again fostering the appearance
of regularity, the doctrine functions in a self-justifying manner, akin
to what David Dyzenhaus, following Johan Steyn, calls a "legal black
hole": a "zone in which officials can act unconstrained" by the

85.
Governor-General's Reference, (1955) 7 PLD (FC) 435, 435-36 (Pak.); see
also McGRATH, supranote 20, at 102-33 (discussing the constitutional conflict between
the Governor-General and Constituent Assembly); Mahmud, supra note 20, at 1233-34
(same).
86.
Tamizuddin Khan v. Fed'n of Pak., (1955) 7 PLD (FC) 240, 251 (Pak.)
(quoting Proclamation of Emergency).
87.
Id. (invalidating several dozen statutes adopted by the Constituent
Assembly prior to its dissolution for lack of assent to those laws by the GovernorGeneral); Usif Patel v. Crown, (1955) 7 PLD (FC) 387, 388 (Pak.) (rejecting the
Governor-General's attempt to fill the legal vacuum using his executive power to issue
an emergency ordinance).
88.
Governor-General'sReference, (1995) PLD (FC) at 478 (upholding GovernorGeneral's extraconstitutional order to validate and enforce previously invalidated laws
"with a view toward preventing the State from dissolution" before a new Constituent
Assembly has been convened); see also NEWBERG, supra note 20, at 54-60 (discussing
constitutional crisis arising from Governor-General's dissolution of the Constituent
Assembly).
89.
See Tayyab Mahmud, Jurisprudence of Successful Treason: Coup d'Etat
and Common Law, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 49, 51-93 (1994) (discussing reliance on
Pakistan's extraconstitutional jurisprudence in Uganda, Rhodesia, Seychelles,
Grenada, and Lesotho).
90.
For subsequent cases applying versions of the doctrine of state necessity,
see Zafar Ali Shah v. Musharraf, (2000) 52 PLD (SC) 869, 881 (Pak.); Nusrat Bhutto v.
Chief of Army Staff, (1977) 29 PLD (SC) 657, 733-763 (Pak.); see also State v. Dosso,
(1958) 10 PLD (SC) 533, 538-39 (Pak.) (applying extraconstitutional doctrine of
"revolutionary legality"). As one Supreme Court justice noted in 2007, "We keep on
burying the. . . doctrine of necessity but it keeps haunting us." Nasir Iqbal, SC Urged
To
Bury
Doctrine
of
Necessity,
DAWN,
Oct.
23,
2007,
http://archives.dawn.com/2007/10/23/top3.htm; see also sources cited supra note 20.
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constitution and which "in advance declares what they do to be legal"
and "by definition both necessitous and made in good faith."9 '
Importantly, if unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court's articulation
of state necessity, along with other extraconstitutional principles
flowing from that assertion of necessity, both echoes and contributes
to the legitimating discourse advanced by the military to delegitimize
democratic politics in favor of its own supremacy. For example, in
validating Zia's 1977 coup, the court credited the military with
"sav[ing] the country at a time of grave national crisis."9 2 The court
quoted approvingly from Zia's speech announcing the coup, accepting
his claim that the civilian government had lost "constitutional and
moral authority" on account of alleged electoral corruption and
subsequent unrest by opposition parties.93 When it validated
Musharrafs 1999 coup, the court reinforced this discourse more
forcefully, endorsing the military's claims that corruption,
incompetent governance, and even inadequate macroeconomic
performance justified the takeover.94 The court even took notice of the
"fact" that the Pakistani people had "welcomed" the coup. because of
the military's pledge to hold politicians accountable.9 5 Similarly,
when it upheld Musharrafs extraconstitutional order requiring
legislators to hold university degrees, the court recounted at length
what it called the "sad tale of failures on the part of the public
representatives" under civilian rule, concluding that the order
"deserves approval [as] the first step aimed at bringing about a
change in the political culture" and "rais[ing the Assemblies'] level of
competence." 96 With both coups, the court empowered the regime to
take any actions-including promulgation of constitutional
amendments-"which tend to advance or promote the good of the
people," in each case expressing faith in the military's stated
intention to only hold power long enough to deliver Pakistan more
stable, competent governance.9 7 Although the court in each instance

91.
David Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or
Outside the Legal Order?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2005, 2032 (2006); Johan Steyn,
GuantanamoBay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 1 (2004).
92.
Nusrat Bhutto, (1977) PLD (SC) at 723.
93.
Id. at 716; see also NEWBERG, supra note 20, at 163-64 (discussing the
Supreme Court's "agreement with the military that election corruption and political
disruptions ... had so compromised the PPP government that it could no longer
represent the electorate").
94.
See Zafar Ali Shah, (2000) PLD (SC) at 1129-52.
95.
Id. at 1219.
Pak. Muslim League (Q) v. Chief Executive, (2002) 54 PLD (SC) 994, 102696.
28 (Pak.), overruled by Muhammad Nasir Mahmood v. Fed'n of Pak., (2009) 61 PLD
(SC) 109 (Pak.). While the court conceded that "[n]o doubt wisdom is not related with
degrees," it nevertheless concluded that "this is an exception to the rule." Id. at 1028.
97.
Zafar Ali Shah, (2000) PLD (SC) at 1220; Nusrat Bhutto, (1977) 29 PLD
(SC) at 716.
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posited limits on the legitimate scope of authority justified by
necessity, in each case the military disregarded those limits.9 8
Third, the constitution is eventually "revived"-which creates a
quandary, as two parallel legal regimes contend for sovereignty: the
constitution, supposedly restored, and the extraconstitution, whose
very existence, constitutionally speaking, constitutes treason.9 9
Formally, Parliament must therefore decide whether the revived
constitution, the extraconstitution, or some hybrid will reign
supreme. Under both Zia and Musharraf, Parliament responded by
adopting
amendments
incorporating
the
extraconstitution's
provisions into the constitutional order itself-thereby completing the
process of effecting permanent constitutional change upon restoration
of civilian rule. In each instance, however, the Parliament that
granted its assent lacked meaningful democratic credentials, due to
election irregularities and other forms of military interference. 100
2.

Constitutionalized "Necessity"

Using this extraconstitutional process, military regimes have
periodically
transformed
Pakistan's
constitutional
order,
strengthening its viceregal character to extend the military's power
into periods of civilian rule. Upon "revival" of the constitution under
Zia's regime in 1985, for example, Parliament adopted the Eighth
Amendment, which vested sweeping authority in the presidencywhich remained closely associated with the military-at the expense
of the Prime Minister and Parliament.10 1 Through these
transformations,
the
military
preserved
its
supremacy
notwithstanding the nominal return of civilian rule, effecting a

98.
See Zafar Ali Shah, (2000) PLD (SC) at 1219-23 (announcing the
expectation that elections would be held within three years and announcing limits on
powers justified by extraconstitutional necessity); Nusrat Bhutto, (1977) PLD (SC) at
723 (cautioning Zia to ensure that "the period of constitutional deviation shall be of as
short a duration as possible"); see also KHAN, supra note 11, at 473-74, 495-97, 652-79
(discussing military's noncompliance with limits set forth by Supreme Court in these
cases).
99.
PAKISTAN CONST. art. 6, § 1 (proscribing extraconstitutional subversion of
the constitution as treason).
100.
See KHAN, supra note 11, at 509-17, 667-71 (discussing Parliament's
adoption of Eighth Amendment and Seventeenth Amendment). These amendments
also have indemnified extraconstitutional actions from being charged as treason. See
PAKISTAN CONST. arts. 270A, 270AA (repealed 2010).
101.
See Mahmud, supra note 20, at 1284-85 (discussing the extensive
presidential powers conferred by the Eighth Amendment); Mohammad Waseem,
Pakistan'sLingering Crisis of Dyarchy, 32 ASIAN SURV. 617, 620-22 (1992) (discussing
Eighth Amendment); Haris Gazdar, Goodbye General Musharraf, Hello "Troika,"
ECON. & POL. WKLY., Dec. 15, 2007, at 8, 9 (noting that under the system established
by the Eighth Amendment, the President's principal role was "to protect the corporate
interests of the military" and to serve as "the constitutional lever through which the
military acted").

2013/

GRAY ZONE CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE JUDICIARY

29

transition, as Paula Newberg describes, from "military rule to civilian
martial law."102 Indeed, Zia himself, who remained both President
and Army Chief, candidly described the supposedly revived, but
fundamentally transformed constitutional order as "no rival or
adversary" of the erstwhile military regime, but rather its
"extension." 0 3
The most consequential provision within this system of "civilian
martial law" was Article 58(2)(b), which authorized the President to
dissolve the National Assembly when, "in his opinion ... a situation
has arisen in which the Government ... cannot be carried on in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and an appeal to
the electorate is necessary."1 04 Between 1988 and 1996, the provision
was used to dismiss all four governments that held office.' 05
Defenders described it as a "safety valve," enabling elected
governments to be held accountable and thereby preventing crises
that might otherwise prompt military intervention. 0 6 Indeed, in
2000, the Supreme Court went further, directly connecting its
extraconstitutional validation of Musharrafs coup under the doctrine
of necessity to Article 58(2)(b)'s repeal in 1997. The court asserted
that if the provision still had been available, then the government
instead could have been dissolved constitutionally and Musharrafs
extraconstitutional takeover "could have been avoided." 0 7
The Supreme Court's assertion, however, simply highlights the
manner in which Article 58(2)(b) rearticulated and internalized, in

102.
NEWBERG, supra note 20, at 190-91; see also CHADDA, supra note 33, at 69
(discussing Eighth Amendment's "uneasy balance" between "the power of the militarybureaucratic oligarchy, on the one hand, and the demand for civilian rule on the
other"). As I have explained elsewhere, the logic of this paradoxical approach to
"democratic" transition-which seeks to "liberalize ... power while still retaining
control"-has antecedents in the British colonial state's responses to the Indian
independence movement. Kalhan, supra note 12, at 116-18; Anil Kalhan et al.,
Colonial Continuities: Human Rights, Terrorism, and Security Laws in India, 20
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 93, 126-31 (2006) (discussing sweeping emergency powers
available to central executive under colonial-era legal framework in India).
103.
See Hasan-Askari Rizvi, The Civilianizationof Military Rule in Pakistan,
26 ASIAN SURV. 1067, 1067 (1986) (quoting Zia).
104.
PAKISTAN CONST. art. 58, § 2, cl. b. (repealed 2010). An analogous provision
conferred discretion upon provincial governors, who are appointed by the President, to
dissolve provincial assemblies. PAKISTAN CONST. art. 112, § 2, cl. b. (repealed 2010).
Parliament repealed these provisions in 1997, but Musharraf reinstated them following
his 1999 coup. They were again repealed when the post-Musharraf Parliament adopted
the 18th Amendment in 2010. See infra Parts III, IV.
105.
See Siddique, supra note 21, at 634.
106.
Id. at 638-39, 712 (citing defenders); see also Kennedy, supra note 36, at
73-74 (arguing that Article 58(2)(b) succeeded at "keeping the military in the barracks"
and "provided some degree of accountability to civilian governments").
107.
See Zafar Ali Shah v. Musharraf, (2000) 52 PLD (SC) 869, 1218 (Pak.); see
also Mahmood Khan Achakzai v. Fed'n of Pak., (1997) 49 PLD (SC) 426, 472-80 (Pak.)
(asserting, prematurely, that Article 58(2)(b) had "shut the door on Martial Law
forever").
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constitutional terms, a power to dismiss civilian governments
comparable to that which the military already had long exercised on
extraconstitutional grounds.o 8 As a normalized, constitutional
mechanism, Article 58(2)(b) has even been considered more
destabilizing than extraconstitutional interventions, insofar as it can
appear more efficient and benign-and therefore more readily be
used. 0 9 Together with other presidential powers, Article 58(2)(b) had
precisely that destabilizing effect, as the military used its availability
as an additional means of manipulating civilian politicians.11 0 The
looming possibility of dissolution also affected political parties' own
conduct. When in government, the expectation of a limited, uncertain
tenure "condition[ed] party elites to maximize rents" while in office
and to curry favor with the military to forestall dismissal.11 1 When in
opposition, parties enlisted military support for dismissal of their
adversaries' governments-hoping to thereby ascend to power
themselves through early elections." 2 The military was therefore
able to effectively "divide and rule" civilian political leadership, and

See SIDDIQA, supra note 33, at 89 (explaining that because of Article
108.
58(2)(b), the military "no longer [needed] to stage a coup" but could "simply prevail
upon the president ... to remove the elected government"); Kalhan, supra note 12, at
110-15 (illustrating, using the example of emergency powers, how constitutional
authority can functionally approximate extraconstitutionality). Revealingly, the actual
dismissals were implemented in a "coup-like manner," with the military deployed to
control government buildings, including the Prime Minister's residence. RiZvI, supra
note 42, at 209, 215, 224-25; see also INT'L CRISIs GRP., supra note 71, at 9 (stating
that the decision to dismiss Bhutto in 1990 was made at an Army Corps commanders'
meeting); Lodhi & Hussain, supra note 41 (describing measures to implement Bhutto's
dismissal as "tantamount to a coup in civilian disguise").
109.
See Siddique, supra note 21, at 712 ("Direct martial laws are at least
blatantly illegal and easy to identify and condemn."); see also Oren Gross, Chaos and
Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional, 112 YALE L.J.
1011, 1092-94, 1099 (2002) (discussing risks of exceptional powers becoming
normalized as "[g]overnment and its agents grow accustomed to the convenience of
emergency powers," and urging the virtues of an "extra-legal measures" model of
emergency powers that calls upon officials "to act outside the legal order while openly
acknowledging their actions"); Mark Neocleous, From Martial Law to the War on
Terror, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 489, 506 (2007) (arguing that authoritarian regimes
increasingly prefer the language of "emergency powers," which "better connotes
neutrality and necessity," to that of "martial law").
110.
See Siddique, supra note 21, at 633 (noting that Bhutto's use of a civilian
militia to enforce his policies and keep the military out of politics had the effect of
"institutionalizing the use of the state's coercive arm"); Waseem, supra note 101, at
630-31 (arguing that the imbalances of power under the Eighth Amendment effected
an "enormous expansion of presidential power" and gave rise to "an ad hoc approach to
official business").
111.
Fair, supra note 35, at 576.
112.
Id.; see also SIDDIQA, supra note 33, at 91-95 (discussing parties' attempts
during 1990s to "lure the army" to support them in short-term political conflicts with
their opponents "by offering the generals greater economic incentives and
opportunities").
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no elected government in this period was permitted to complete a full
term in office. 113
Because all four dissolution orders were challenged before the
Supreme Court, the court continued to play a pivotal role-under
constitutional auspices, but functionally comparable to its
longstanding extraconstitutional role-in validating the displacement
of civilian government. 114 To be sure, unlike the self-justifying,
extraconstitutional doctrine of necessity, Article 58(2)(b) did not
create a "legal black hole" wholly lacking any limitations upon
executive power-or even necessarily what Dyzenhaus terms a "legal
grey hole," in which such limits are "so insubstantial that they pretty
well permit government to do as it pleases."" 5 To the contrary, the
court, at least theoretically, could have exercised its review in a
manner that imposed meaningful limits on the dissolution powersimilar, for example, to the role played by the Supreme Court of
India's decision in S.R. Bommai v. India,116 which effectively
constrained the Indian central government's use of its power to
dissolve state assemblies by requiring "substantial constitutional
reasons" for it to do SO.117 The Pakistan Supreme Court's Article
58(2)(b) cases even offered glimmers of that possibility, with two of
those four judgments invalidating dissolution orders under a
stringent legal standard that narrowly defined the circumstances in
which dissolution would be permitted." 8
In practice, however, the Supreme Court did not meaningfully
inhibit the dissolution power. The court lurched inconsistently in its
jurisprudence, in terms of both the legal standard and the degree of
scrutiny over the factual basis for dismissal, and at times exhibited
ideological and partisan affinities toward deep state interests.1 19 In
the two decisions upholding dissolution orders, both involving
dismissal of governments led by the Pakistan People's Party's (PPP)

See Siddique, supra note 21, at 711.
113.
One can think of this as akin to deciding a case with political implications
114.
similar to those of Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), every few years.
Dyzenhaus, supra note 91, at 2018.
115.

116.

A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1918.

117.
Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Rise of Judicial Sovereignty, 18 J. DEMOCRACY
70, 77 (2007); see also S.P. SATHE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA: TRANSGRESSING
BORDERS AND ENFORCING LIMITS 150-59 (2003).
Fed'n of Pak. v. Muhammad Saifullah Khan, (1989) 41 PLD (SC) 166, 188
118.
(Pak.) (requiring "the machinery of the Government [to have] broken down completely,
its authority eroded and the Government cannot be carried on in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution"); see also Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of
Pak., (1993) 45 PLD (SC) 473, 579 (Pak.) (following Saifullah Khan, and describing
dissolution as "an exceptional power provided for an exceptional situation" which "must
receive . . . the narrowest interpretation").

See Siddique, supra note 21, at 715 (arguing that "political and personality
119.
preferences of the judges . . . come through strongly in" the court's Article 58(2)(b)
opinions).
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Benazir Bhutto, the court departed from earlier cases in which it had
invalidated dissolution orders, modifying its legal standard and
reviewing the factual basis for dissolution more deferentially. 120 But
even in the two instances in which the court invalidated dissolution
orders-both involving prime ministers and political parties more
closely associated than the PPP with Zia and the deep state1 2 1-the
military's behind-the-scenes maneuvering ensured that the
governments were dismissed in any event. In the first case, the Army
Chief privately prevailed upon the Supreme Court not to restore the
ousted government as a remedy for the unlawful dissolution of
Muhammad Khan Junejo's government, and the court declined to do
so. 1 2 2 In the second, although the court did reinstate the dismissed
government of Nawaz Sharif, the military soon pressured both the
Prime Minister and President to resign, rendering the court's decision
inconsequential. 12 3
When dissolution orders were upheld, the Supreme Court
essentially reprised its traditional, extraconstitutional role. Like the
court's extraconstitutional jurisprudence of state necessity, the
dissolution orders and the judicial decisions upholding them
reinforced the legitimating discourse advanced by the military to
justify its supremacy and delegitimize democratic politics. Each
dissolution order was justified in part based on charges of corruption
and mismanagement-although in fact, dismissal in each instance

120.
See Ahmad Tariq Rahim v. Fed'n of Pak., (1992) 44 PLD (SC) 646, 664
(Pak.) (permitting the dissolution power to be exercised if there is an "actual or
imminent breakdown of the constitutional machinery" (emphasis added)); Benazir
Bhutto v. President of Pak., (1998) 50 PLD (SC) 388, 430 (Pak.) (rejecting need for a
"total breakdown of Constitutional machinery," and instead permitting dissolution
"where there takes place extensive, continued and pervasive failure to observe not one
but numerous provisions of the Constitution" (emphasis added)).
121.
See TALBOT, supra note 33, at 261-63, 291-95 (discussing close
relationships between the governments of Muhammad Khan Junejo and Nawaz Sharif
and the military leadership); Nasr, supra note 40, at 523 ("It is an open secret in
Pakistan that [the political party coalition led by Nawaz Sharif] was put together by
the military's Inter-Services Intelligence . .. to prevent a PPP sweep at the polls."); see
also COLL, supra note 60, at 438 (characterizing PML-N's Nawaz Sharif as the "civilian
face" of the military's "favored [political] alliance" during the 1990s).
122.
See Saifullah Khan, (1989) PLD (SC) at 192-95 (declining to reinstate
dissolved assemblies); HAMID KHAN, EIGHTH AMENDMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL AND
POLITICAL CRISIS IN PAKISTAN 56 (1994) (discussing private communications by Army
Chief Mirza Aslam Baig to the Supreme Court admonishing it not to reinstate the
dissolved National Assembly).
123.
See Nawaz Sharif, (1993) PLD (SC) at 570 (ordering Nawaz Sharifs
dissolved government to be reinstated); see also NEWBERG, supra note 20, at 219-20
(discussing military's subsequent "orchestrat[ion]" of the removal of both the President
and the Prime Minister, which rendered "[t]he force of the court's restoration
order . . . merely heuristic"); RIZVI, supranote 42, at 216-19.
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only came after other perceived threats to the military's interests. 124
As it had under the doctrine of necessity, the court credited those
allegations as valid bases for dismissal, thereby further contributing
to the military's legitimating discourse for its supremacy.125
Politically, the court's decisions had an ideological cast. By
invalidating the dissolution of governments led by parties closely
affiliated with deep state interests, but then failing to apply the same
principles when reviewing dismissal of Bhutto's PPP-led
governments, the court enhanced its own role as an institutional
"power broker," but at the expense of its own perceived neutrality and
autonomy from the deep state.1 26

C. The Effect on JudicialIndependence and Constitutionalism
Transformative preservation has shaped the judiciary's role,
institutional identity, and independence in important ways,
contributing to a disequilibrium that has hindered consolidation of
democracy, civilian rule, and constitutionalism. While observers
frequently state that Pakistan's judiciary has traditionally lacked
"independence," 127 that characterization, though not altogether
inaccurate, paints an incomplete picture. Although often discussed as
an abstract, unitary ideal, judicial independence is not a static, all-ornothing concept, or even a concept that exists along a onedimensional continuum, akin to the commonplace depiction in Figure
1. Rather, as Stephen Burbank has explained, it arises from the
evolving aggregation of "relationships and interdependencies" within
which the judiciary is embedded, more akin to the depiction in Figure
2.128 Judicial independence is also not an absolute end in itself, but
exists to serve other normative goals-democracy, constitutionalism,

124.
See Shah, supra note 40, at 213 (arguing that each government was "ousted
only after ... crossing lines drawn in their powersharing scripts written by the
military").
125.
See Ahmad Tariq Rahim, (1992) PLD (SC) at 653, 666-67 (crediting
"corruption and nepotism" as legitimate and permissible grounds for dissolution, even
if not "independently sufficient"); Benazir Bhutto, (1998) PLD (SC) at 434-38 (crediting
corruption, favoritism, and nepotism as legitimate and permissible grounds for
dissolution); KHAN, supra note 11, at 557-58, 613-16 (discussing the Ahmad Tariq
Rahim and Benazir Bhutto cases).
126.
MALIK ET AL., supra note 39, at 167.
See, e.g., IN'T'L BAR Ass'N, A LONG MARCH TO JUSTICE: A REPORT ON
127.
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY IN PAKISTAN 33 (2009); KHAN, supra note 11,
at 758; Kausar, supra note 22, at 28; U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., PAKISTAN RULE OF
LAw ASSESSMENT-FINAL REPORT 11 (2008).
Burbank, supra note 16, at 317; see also Friedman, supra note 16, at 330
128.
("The decisions of courts are influenced by the institutional structure in which they are
embedded."); Goldenziet, supra note 15, at 13 (distinguishing between "full" and
"constrained" judicial independence); Schuck, supra note 16, at 8 ("[J]udicial
independence is not a binary phenomenon; it is manifestly a matter of degree.").
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fundamental rights, the rule of law, and others.129 Those ends may
vary in importance from one context to another. For gray zone
countries such as Pakistan or Egypt, for example, strengthening
civilian representative institutions and enhancing mechanisms of
judicial accountability may be more important than in other
settings-suggesting a conception of judicial independence and the
judicial role more oriented toward "representation reinforc[ement]"
than may appear necessary in other contexts. 130
Figure 1-Judicial Independence: Along a Continuum of
Autonomy vs. Constraint

Less
Autonomous

More
Autonomous

More
Constrained

. Less
Constrained

129.
See Burbank & Friedman, supra note 17, at 11-22 (emphasizing that
judicial independence is a "means to an end," not an end in itself); Ferejohn and
Kramer, supra note 17, at 994-95 ("[Judicial] independence and accountability ... are
means toward a more fundamental goal: the construction of a well-functioning
judiciary.").
130.

See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL

REVIEW 101-02 (1980); Michael C. Dorf, The Coherentism of Democracy and Distrust,
114 YALE L.J. 1237, 1237 (2005) (assessing and critiquing "representationreinforcement" theories of constitutional interpretation); Bali, supra note 2, at 238-39
(arguing that democratic transitions "require a different definition of judicial
independence, one that incorporates a measure of interdependence ... between the
branches and introduces forms of judicial accountability that underpin the democratic
legitimacy of the courts' powers of review").
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Figure 2-Judicial Independence: Arising from "Relationships
and Interdependencies"

Both descriptively and normatively, therefore, a more complete
understanding of judicial independence demands attention to the
evolving balance between judicial autonomy and judicial constraint
across an array of dimensions, and the extent to which that balance
advances the particular ends it exists to serve in any given context.
The relationships from which the judiciary's independence or lack of
independence arises are manifold: for example, between the judiciary
and other government actors, private interest groups, lawyers and
bar associations, the media, the people at-large, and, for many gray
zone countries, the military.13 1 Within each of these relationships, the

131.
See UPENDRA BAXI, COURAGE, CRAFT, AND CONTENTION: THE INDIAN
SUPREME COURT IN THE EIGHTIEs 27-36 (1985) (analyzing the relationships between
the judiciary and a range of other entities and interests, including the executive, the
legal profession, and the public at large, as determinants of "judicial independence");
Remus, supra note 18, at 144-45 (discussing relationships between judiciary and
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balance between autonomy and constraint may be shaped at many
points of potential influence-including the judiciary's institutional
structure, the processes of appointing and removing judges, the
regulation of judicial conduct, the administration of judicial business,
and the means of responding to substantive judicial decisions. The
overall balance also may be affected by other laws, institutions, and
norms, including the scope of judicial power, and even (as depicted in
Figure 2) by the relationships among nonjudicial actors
themselves. 132
This multidimensional conception of judicial independence
complicates some conventional assumptions underlying discussions of
the judiciary and is particularly useful in understanding the, role of
the judiciary for countries within the gray zone. 133 Given the role that
status quo interests can play in undermining constitutionalism and
representative institutions, the overall balance between judicial
autonomy and constraint for gray zone countries must contemplate
and serve the long-term objective of reining in and ultimately rolling
back the power of those entrenched interests.1 3 4 For Pakistan,

political branches of government, public at large, and private interest groups as
determinants of "judicial independence").
See Peter H. Russell, Toward a General Theory of JudicialIndependence, in
132.
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM

AROUND 1, 13-22 (Peter H. Russell & David M. O'Brien eds., 2001) (identifying and
discussing various categories of potential influence and control over the judiciary);
Jackson, supra note 18, at 966-69 (identifying and discussing a range of legal rules and
structural factors that affect individual judges' decisional independence and the
judiciary's institutional independence); Jose J. Toharia, Judicial Independence in an
AuthoritarianRegime: The Case of Contemporary Spain, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 475, 48695 (1974) (explaining paradox of the judiciary's relative independence in Spain under
the authoritarian Franco regime in terms of the limited scope of its power); see also
SHYLASHRI SHANKAR, SCALING JUSTICE: INDIA'S SUPREME COURT, ANTI-TERROR LAWS,
AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 177 (2009) (arguing that in India, "fragmented political
configurations [have] allow[ed] the Supreme Court to appropriate more autonomy");
Faisal Siddiqi, Legal Empire, DAWN, Jan. 13, 2012, http://dawn.com/2012/01/13/legalempire/ ("[F]ragmentation among the power elites breeds greater judicial
independence. Greater judicial independence breeds greater judico-political power.").
133.
Cf. Bruce Peabody, Introduction to THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE: COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE PUBLIC 1, 17 (Bruce Peabody & Thomas H.
Wells, Jr. eds., 2010) (urging analysis of judicial independence that "mov[es] beyond
the presumptions that courts work best in political isolation, that they necessarily
operate from a position of institutional weakness, and that their independence is
primarily justified by strictly legal objectives").
Moreover, while legal scholars sometimes assert that courts are "less
134.
subject to cooptation" than legislatures in authoritarian or nondemocratic contexts,
such claims not only underestimate the ways in which courts may be constrained or
coopted by nondemocratic regimes, but also mask the enabling role that courts
themselves can play in the process of coopting and undermining representative
institutions. Compare, e.g., Goldenziel, supra note 15, at 45 (asserting that courts are
"tougher nuts than legislatures for authoritarians to crack"), with BAli, supra note 2, at
243 (discussing ways in which "constitutions and courts both enable and undermine
fundamental democratic reforms during periods of transition"), and Nick Robinson,
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understanding judicial independence within this disaggregated
conceptual context shows that the process of transformative
preservation, along with the resulting power of the military and deep
state interests, has been crucial in shaping the overall balance
between judicial autonomy and judicial constraint. When these
components are foregrounded, a picture emerges of institutional
imbalance or disequilibrium among the judiciary, Parliament, and
the military, as depicted in simplified form in Figure 3: the judiciary
has been subject to enduring, long-term constraints by military and
deep state interests, but nevertheless has been periodically
empowered and encouraged (in part by those very constraints) to
assert its autonomy from representative institutions.

Figure 3-Pakistan's Institutional Disequilibrium

Largely Constraint

Largely Autonomy

On the one hand, at times the military's constraints upon the
judiciary have fully risen to the level of political capture, effectively
enlisting judges as deep state actors.13 5 During periods of direct rule,
the military often has ensured the judiciary's allegiance to the

Expanding Judiciaries:India and the Rise of the Good Governance Court, 8 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 64-66 (2009) (arguing, in context of Iran and Thailand, that
the "broad role judiciaries now play can be used by elites to maintain power, or at least
to ensure that representative institutions do not run too far afoul of their interests").
Aziz Z. Huq, Mechanisms of Political Capture in Pakistan's Superior
135.
Courts, 10 Y.B. ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E. L. 21 (2003); see also Bili, supra note 2, at 313
(positing "elite capture" of the judiciary in Turkey).
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extraconstitution and alignment with its interests-sometimes
formally, by manipulating and reshaping judicial composition or
placing limits on its jurisdiction, but in other instances more
informally.136 Not surprisingly, the military's ability to constrain the
judiciary has not been terribly difficult under its direct rule. 3 7 But
even well short of these extreme moments, the judiciary has still
remained vulnerable to military and deep state constraints-even
when civilian rule has formally returned, and even in the absence of
direct, ongoing control or collaboration. At a basic level, the judges in
office under military rule, whose general alignment with the military
regime's interests often has already been assured, have remained in
office once civilian rule has returned.1 38 Given the powerful role of the
chief justices of the Supreme Court and High Courts with respect to
new appointments, the administration of judicial business, and case
assignment, these matters also have been subject to significant
influence by military and deep state interests via executive influence
over the chief justices. 39 And as with civilian politicians, the specter
of possible extraconstitutional intervention has loomed over judicial
decision making.
To be sure, the extent of the judiciary's vulnerability to
constraints imposed by the military has never been total, but rather
has varied in strength over time. Both individual judges and the
judiciary as an institution have always attempted to assert some
measure of autonomy from the military-and even when validating
military rule, the scope of that legitimation has tended to become
narrower over time.140 Until recently, however, the judiciary's most

136.
See supra Part II.B.1. At other moments, the alignment of interests
between the military and judiciary has occurred without any need for formal
collaboration or coercion.
137.
As a former Supreme Court justice once asked, "[H]ow do you expect five
men alone, unsupported by anyone, to declare martial law illegal?" NEWBERG, supra
note 20, at 7. But see Mahmud, supra note 20, at 1295-98 (criticizing Pakistan's judges
for not utilizing prudential devices, such as the "political question" doctrine, to avoid
extraconstitutional adjudication altogether).
138.
See David Dyzenhaus, Judicial Independence, TransitionalJustice and the
Rule of Law, 10 OTAGO L. REV. 345, 347 (2001) (describing how in transitions, "judges
who served the old regime" may be "thought to be deeply compromised from the start").
139.

See INT'L CRISIS GRP., BUILDING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN PAKISTAN 14-

17 (2004)); Khan, supra note 81, at 7.
140.
Compare Zafar Ali Shah v. Musharraf, (2000) 52 PLD (SC) 869, 1219-23
(Pak.) (validating Musharrafs military takeover under the doctrine of state necessity,
but purporting to limit the scope of the military regime's authority and to require
elections within three years), with Nusrat Bhutto v. Chief of Army Staff, (1977) 29 PLD
(SC) 657, 710 (Pak.) (validating Zia's military takeover under the doctrine of necessity,
but purporting to require the military regime's measures to be "proportionate to the
necessity" and "of a temporary character limited to the duration of the exceptional
circumstances"), and State v. Dosso, (1958) 10 PLD (SC) 533, 539-41 (Pak.) (deeming a
successful revolution or coup d'6tat as a "basic law-creating fact," without any
limitations on the scope of the new regime's lawmaking authority). See also NEWBERG,
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significant assertions of autonomy from the military have tended to
come either after the particular regimes being challenged were safely
out of power or when they appeared to be soon on their way out the
door.14 1 Given the nature and extent of entrenched military and deep
state power, even the strongest assertions of judicial autonomy have
never been strong enough to withstand military and deep state
interests capable of backing up constraints upon the judiciary with
extraconstitutional action and, ultimately, force-as both Zia's and
Musharrafs coups demonstrate at one end of that spectrum, but as
even more limited forms of coercion, such as influence by intelligence
agencies over appointments, demonstrate well short of that.142 And in
any event, as the court's Article 58(2)(b) jurisprudence illustrates, the
overall patterns shaping judicial composition have yielded a judiciary
that has regularly exhibited ideological affinities toward deep state
interests-and against political parties and interests less closely
associated with the military-even in the absence of direct military
efforts to influence or control judges. 143
On the other hand, although often submerged beneath
undifferentiated descriptions of its "lack of independence," the
judiciary in fact has exhibited significant autonomy from civilian
political actors-not just under military rule, where the very purpose
of military constraints on the judiciary has obviously been to displace
representative institutions, but even under civilian rule, as the
experience between 1988 and 1999 illustrates.144 For example,

supra note 20, at 191-95 (discussing higher judiciary's willingness, during later years
of Zia's military regime, to exercise jurisdiction to review petitions by regime opponents
challenging their military court convictions); Mahmud, supra note 20, at 1280-81
(recognizing that "[e]ven in the posture of general retreat, [Pakistan's] superior courts
occasionally asserted their right to determine the scope of the doctrine of necessity").
141.
E.g., Asma Jilani v. Punjab, (1972) 24 PLD (SC) 139 (Pak.) (holding that
military takeover of General Yahya Khan was invalid, but only after his military
regime had fallen); Fed'n of Pak. v. Muhammad Saifullah Khan, (1989) 41 PLD (SC)
166 (Pak.) (holding that Zia's dissolution of Muhammad Khan Junejo's government
was unlawful, but only after Zia's death); Benazir Bhutto v. Fed'n of Pak., (1988) 40
PLD (SC) 416 (Pak.) (invalidating provisions of the Political Parties Act imposed by Zia
as unconstitutional while he was still in power, but in the later years of his regime as
his power began to diminish); see also Faisal Siddiqi, JudicialSovereigns, DAWN, June
26, 2012, http://dawn.com/2012/06/26/judicial-sovereigns/ (arguing that "there is always
a rise in severe judicial dissent against the government in the last year of any
government in a transitional democratic state").
142.
See Haris Gazdar, Judicial Activism vs Democratic Consolidation in
Pakistan, EcoN. & POL. WKLY., Aug. 8, 2009, at 10 ("The judicial denunciation of
General Yahya Khan in 1972 [in Asma Jilani v. Punjab] did not prevent General Ziaul-Haq from pouncing in 1977."); Yasser Latif Hamdani, Where Is Justice?, FRIDAY
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2012 (suggesting that, even after restoration of civilian government in
2008, nominees for Pakistan's higher judiciary still must be "vetted by the intelligence
agencies for their personal views" before they can be appointed).
143.
See supra Part II.B.2.
144.
See DESAI & AHSAN, supra note 33, at 120 (discussing "sparks of judicial
activism" during the 1990s); MUNIR A. MALIK, THE PAKISTAN LAWYERS' MOVEMENT: AN
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following clashes with the governments of both Bhutto and Sharif
over judicial composition, the judiciary seized control over the judicial
appointments process. Under the constitutional provisions then in
place, the President (on advice of the Prime Minister) appointed
judges to the Supreme Court after "consultation" with the chief
justice of Pakistan, and to the High Courts under a similar process.145
Bhutto aggressively sought to pack the courts with judges regarded
as loyal to her party's interests-ignoring basic rules concerning
qualifications for appointment and seniority-based conventions for
elevating judges, and further manipulating judicial composition by
appointing ad hoc judges and transferring judges between courts. 146
Sharif proved no less aggressive, clashing with the Supreme Court
over appointments and other issues and later engaging in an ugly
effort to remove the chief justice, which culminated in a physical
attack on the Supreme Court building by a mob of Sharif s
supporters.147

Although the judiciary had never effectively resisted the
military's manipulation of its composition, it fared better vis-A-vis
these civilian governments. In the so-called Judges' Case, the
Supreme Court invalidated many of Bhutto's judicial appointments
and announced detailed rules governing the appointments process.14 8
Guided by analogous developments in India, the court held that
recommendations for appointment by the chief justice of Pakistan
and High Court chief justices would ordinarily be binding, absent
"very sound" reasons recorded by the President, which would then be
justiciable. 149 The court also required the most senior High Court
judge to be appointed chief justice of that High Court in the absence

UNFINISHED AGENDA 7 (2008) (discussing higher judiciary's "attempt to assert [its]

position as an independent organ of the state" during 1990s). In addition, as Maryam
Khan observes, the judiciary's empowerment during the 1990s was "edified by an
enduring substratum" of jurisprudence arising from the emergence of "public interest
litigation"-which intersected with the court's role in purely political questions but also
independently enhanced judicial power vis-A-vis civilian institutions in the
enforcement of fundamental rights. Khan, supra note 81, at 2; see also MENSKI ET AL.,
supra note 21, at 1-21 (discussing onset and development of public interest litigation in
Pakistan during 1990s).
High Court judges were appointed by the President (on advice of the Prime
145.
Minister) after "consultation" with the chief justice of Pakistan, the chief justice of the
High Court, and the governor of the province for that High Court. PAKISTAN CONST.
arts. 177, 193 (amended 2010).
KHAN, supra note 11, at 594-96.
146.
Id. at 622-29.
147.
148.
See Al-Jehad Trust v. Fed'n of Pak., (1996) 48 PLD (SC) 324, 363-67 (Pak.).
Al-Jehad Trust, (1996) PLD (SC) at 363-67; see also Supreme Court
149.
Advocates-on-Record Ass'n v. India, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 268 (India) (holding that the
judiciary itself has primacy vis-A-vis the executive in appointments to India's higher
judiciary and transfer of judges between courts); M.P. Singh, Securing the
Independence of the Judiciary-The Indian Experience, 10 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
245 (1999) (discussing controversies over the judicial appointments process in India).
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of "concrete and valid reasons" 5 0-a seniority principle it later
extended to ordinarily require appointment of the most senior
Supreme Court justice as the chief justice of Pakistan. 5 1 A few years
later, when Sharif resisted nominations made by the chief justice
under the Judges' Case framework, the court successfully insisted
upon the appointments.1 52
These episodes could certainly be understood as simple matters
of patronage and kieptocracy. However, they also have an
institutional dimension, given the judiciary's powerful, longstanding
role in determining the fates of civilian governments and the
weakness of Parliament vis-h-vis the President and military.1 53 With
political survival hanging in the balance, politicians-albeit much
less effectively-mirrored the military's own strategies by seeking to
manipulate the judiciary's composition to their advantage. For
example, when Bhutto superseded more senior justices to elevate
Justice Sajjad Ali Shah as chief justice, observers widely assumed
that the supercession was in part based on his dissenting opinions in
Article 58(2)(b) cases that appeared favorable to her. 154 Similarly,
when Sharif opposed the recommended nominees, it was based on
concerns that those justices would be hostile to his government.15 5
Notably, when the two Prime Ministers resisted the Supreme Court's
directives on appointments, the President and military sided with the
judiciary each time. Indeed, Bhutto's resistance to implementing the
Judges' Case was explicitly cited in the Article 58(2)(b) order
dismissing her government as part of a claimed attempt to "destroy
the independence of the judiciary."156
Given the disequilibrium among Pakistan's institutions, the
efficacy of the judiciary's assertions of autonomy from civilian
institutions was uneven. After Parliament adopted two constitutional
amendments in 1997, one of which repealed Article 58(2)(b), the
conflicts among the judiciary, Parliament, and military intensified.
Presented with constitutional challenges to the validity of these
amendments, the Supreme Court attempted to enjoin their

150.
Al-Jehad Trust, (1996) PLD (SC) at 363-67.
151.
Asad Ali v. Fed'n of Pak., (1998) 50 PLD (SC) 161, 354-55 (Pak.).
152.
KHAN, supra note 11, at 623-25.
153.
See Hirschl, Pure Politics, supra note 81, at 749 (arguing that the "crucial
political significance of the judiciary" prompts politicians "to seek tighter control over
appointments process").
154.
KHAN, supra note 11, at 595.
155.
Id. at 623.
156.
Id. at 604; see also RIZVI, supra note 42, at 229. The presidential order
dissolving Bhutto's first government also cited its "attempts ... to impair [judicial]
independence." KHAN, supra note 11, at 553. Similarly, after Musharrafs 1999 coup
overthrowing Sharifs second government, the reconstituted Supreme Court explicitly
cited the conflicts between Sharifs government and the judiciary among its reasons for
validating the coup on extraconstitutional grounds of necessity. See Zafar Ali Shah v.
Musharraf, (2000) 52 PLD (SC) 869, 1218-19 (Pak.).
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enforcement. Sharif mounted a campaign against the court, leading to
contempt of court proceedings against him, the mob attack on the
court building by his political allies, and an effort to exploit a deep
divide on the court, which ultimately led to the chief justice's ouster
by other Supreme Court judges.' 5 7 To resolve the chaos caused by this
conflict between Parliament and the Supreme Court, the military
played the role of arbiter between the two institutions-just as it
frequently did between the political parties-and thereby
strengthened its own position at the expense of both. When
Musharraf s coup came less than two years later, neither the
judiciary nor civilian politicians effectively stood in its way.
III. RESISTING THE MILITARY: THE ANTI-MUSHARRAF MOVEMENT
Like his predecessors, when Musharraf seized power in 1999, he
engaged in processes of transformative preservation that further
entrenched military and deep state power. However, by the mid2000s, the landscape had shifted dramatically, enabling an
empowered judiciary and an active movement to effectively challenge
the regime in a manner that anticipated the "Arab Spring" by several
years. In this Part, I assess the significance of this anti-Musharraf
movement-and its internal tensions-for Pakistan's subsequent
shift away from military rule. First, I recount the judiciary's
assertions of autonomy from the military and the mobilization of
Pakistan's lawyers to support that empowered judiciary. Second, I
highlight the often-neglected role of political actors in this movement.
While justifiably maligned, Pakistan's politicians nevertheless
developed an ambitious constitutional vision to strengthen
representative institutions and unwind the legacy of military
entrenchment-a vision that has effectively, if unsteadily, guided the
process and substance of constitutional change since then. Third, I
discuss Musharrafs extraconstitutional "emergency" in November
2007, which, even as it eventually led to Musharraf s downfall,
successfully constrained the judiciary and reshaped the constitutional
order to preserve the regime's interests. The convergence of the
movement's legal and political strands to resist the crackdown, with
their distinct but complementary visions of constitutional change,
ultimately culminated in elections that repudiated the regime.
However, the regime's reconfigured legal and institutional order also
remained in place, and the tensions between the movement's legal

157.
See Asad Ali v. Fed'n of Pak., (1998) 50 PLD (SC) 161, 354-55 (Pak.)
(invalidating the elevation of Justice Sajjad Ali Shah to be chief justice as
unconstitutional); see also KHAN, supra note 11, at 622-37 (discussing the conflict
between Nawaz Sharif and the Supreme Court and its consequences).
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and political strands laid the foundation for an extended series of
conflicts between the judiciary and representative institutions.
A. The "Lawyers'Movement"
Musharraf s 1999 coup followed Pakistan's extraconstitutional
script of military interventions to the letter, suspending the
constitution and issuing a PCO, to which all judges were required to
take new oaths of office.158 Most judges acquiesced, and the
reconstituted Supreme Court validated the takeover under the
doctrine of necessity.159 The regime promulgated constitutional
amendments, including the reimposition of Article 58(2)(b), that
strengthened the governing framework's viceregal elements.1 60
Finally, the regime cobbled together a political party to serve as its
civilian fagade in Parliament, which-after rigged elections and
extended maneuvering by the regime to cajole political supportformally adopted these amendments, thereby completing the process
of constitutional transformation.161 The judiciary, staffed with judges
who had taken extraconstitutional oaths of office, reprised its longrunning role by validating these and other actions.16 2
However, by 2005, when Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry
ascended to become chief justice of Pakistan, Musharrafs standing
had eroded.1 63 Under Chaudhry, the Supreme Court began to break
from its historical role by exhibiting an unusual degree of

158.
See generally Kalhan, supra note 12.
159.
See Zafar Ali Shah, (2000) PLD (SC) at 1218-19. While the court purported
to limit the scope of authority justified by necessity-including, curiously, by
admonishing Musharrafs regime to respect "independence of the judiciary"-the
regime did not heed those limits. Id.
160.
See KHAN, supra note 11, at 660-670 (discussing Musharrafs constitutional
amendments).
161.
See Shah, supra note 40, at 216-18 (discussing the regime's manipulation
of elections following the Supreme Court's decision upholding Musharrafs coup).
162.
See Pak. Lawyers Forum v. Fed'n of Pak., (2005) 57 PLD (SC) 719 (Pak.)
(upholding Seventeenth Amendment); Watan Party v. Chief Executive of Pak., (2003)
55 PLD (SC) 74, 81-82 (Pak.) (dismissing challenges to extraconstitutional changes to
the constitution imposed by Musharraf's Legal Framework Order, 2002); Hussain
Ahmed v. Musharraf, (2002) 54 PLD (SC) 853, 867 (Pak.) (rejecting challenges to
Musharrafs presidential referendum). The court also declined to extend the seniority
principles from its 1990s Judges' Case to elevations of judges from the High Courts to
serve on the Supreme Court-thereby facilitating the ability of the military and
President to strengthen their constraints upon judicial composition and administration
of justice. See Supreme Court Bar Ass'n v. Fed'n of Pak., (2002) 54 PLD (SC) 939
(Pak.); INT'L CRISIS GRP., supra note 139, at 14-17 (discussing mechanisms of executive
influence over the higher judiciary).
163.

See KIM BARKER, THE TALIBAN SHUFFLE: STRANGE DAYS IN AFGHANISTAN

AND PAKISTAN 148-49 (2011) (discussing Musharrafs decline in support "because of his
professed support for America, his refusal to step down as army chief, and his
aggressive megalomania"); Fair, supra note 35, at 578 (discussing decline in
Musharrafs public and political standing after 2004).
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That
regime.
military
Musharrafs
vis-A-vis
assertiveness
assertiveness came as a surprise. Chaudhry had taken an
extraconstitutional oath of office after Musharrafs coup and had
subsequently signed on to the judgment validating the coup and other
decisions in the regime's favor. 164 But under his tenure, the court
increasingly challenged the regime-for example, expanding its use of
public interest litigation and suo moto powers, invalidating the
regime's privatization of state-owned enterprises, and investigating
the U.S.-led counterterrorism
arising from
disappearances
not
were
actions
court's
the
Functionally,
campaign. 165
unprecedented, since its use of public interest litigation and suo moto
powers built upon mechanisms that had initially been used to
enhance its power and autonomy under civilian rule during the
1990s. 166 What was an innovation, given the court's institutional
history, was its use of these mechanisms to challenge Pakistan's
military and deep state interests, as opposed to civilian institutions.
Facing an increasingly assertive judiciary, the regime tried to
constrain it more tightly. 167 In March 2007, Musharraf confronted
Chaudhry with a raft of pretextual misconduct allegations and
pressured him to resign. When Chaudhry refused, Musharraf
suspended him and referred him for disciplinary proceedings.
Chaudhry was detained and, later, physically mistreated by police
while television cameras rolled. Outraged lawyers and bar
associations responded by mobilizing in support of Chaudhry's
reinstatement and judicial independence, which soon triggered a
broader anti-Musharraf movement advocating civilian democratic
rule.16 8 As the movement gained momentum-with Chaudhry as its
leading symbol, attracting throngs of supporters as he traveled to
speak to lawyers nationwide-the regime cracked down on protestors
and the media, whose unprecedented coverage fueled the antiregime
sentiment.1 69

See MALIK, supra note 144, at 40.
164.
See, e.g., Ghias, supra note 22, at 991-95.
165.
See Khan & Siddique, supra note 21, at 216-22 (analyzing Supreme Court's
166.
use of public interest litigation and its expansive interpretation of the constitutional
right to life during the 1990s); Khan, supra note 81 (discussing Supreme Court's
expansion of public interest litigation in the 1990s); supra note 144.
By 2007, the stakes had become particularly high for Musharraf, whose
167.
opponents were challenging his eligibility under the constitution to be reelected
President.
See Kalhan, supra note 12, at 93-96.
168.
See Somini Sengupta, A Lawyer Who Turned a Judge into a National
169.
Cause, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2007, at A3 (discussing Chaudhry and his supporters); S.
Akbar Zaidi, Is Pakistan Collapsing?, ECON. & POL. WKLY., June 18, 2011, at 16
(describing the movement as Pakistan's "first live television revolution"); see also HUMA
YUSUF, OLD AND NEW MEDIA: CONVERGING DURING THE PAKISTAN EMERGENCY (2009)

(discussing significance of television, radio, and new media platforms in enhancing the
effectiveness of social and political movements in Pakistan, and the regime's
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In July 2007, the Supreme Court dismissed Musharraf's charges
and reinstated Chaudhry, and the regime complied.170 Following
Chaudhry's reinstatement, the lawyers' movement pushed the
judiciary to consolidate and further assert its autonomy.171 The court
remained active, proceeding with its existing inquiries into
disappearances and the regime's privatization initiatives, andventuring still closer to core military interests-opening an inquiry
into the controversial military operation against militants lodged in
Islamabad's "Red Mosque" and the right of Musharraf s exiled
opponent, Nawaz Sharif, to return to Pakistan in advance of
parliamentary elections.1 72 The court also entertained petitions
challenging Musharrafs eligibility to be reelected President. Its
review of these petitions was, again, not functionally unprecedented,
since the court's institutional identity had long since come to
encompass resolution of deeply politicized questions. 7 3 But given the
court's assertions of autonomy, the regime could no longer depend
upon it as a means of validation, as it traditionally had. Upon
reviewing these petitions, the court stayed final certification of the
election results, and it was widely expected to ultimately rule against
Musharraf. 174
Like the Supreme Court's assertions of autonomy, the lawyers'
movement itself was not entirely without precedent, as it built upon
existing traditions in Pakistan in which political and social
movements had previously resisted military and deep state power.' 75

crackdowns in response); Zafarullah Khan & Brian Joseph, The Media Take Center
Stage, 19 J. DEMOCRACY 32, 33-34 (2008) (discussing importance of electronic media in
amplifying the lawyers' movement's message).
170.
Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry v. President of Pak., (2007) 59 PLD (SC)
578, 582 (Pak.) (short order).
171.
See Faisal Siddiqi, The Lawyers Movement-Achievements and Challenges,
TEETH MAESTRO (Sep. 14, 2008), http://teeth.com.pkblog/2008/09/14/the-lawyersmovement-%e2%80%93-achievements-and-challenges (identifying and describing five
'phases" of the lawyers' movement).
172.
See Pak. Muslim League (N) v. Fed'n of Pak., (2007) 59 PLD (SC) 642, 680
(Pak.) (affirming Nawaz Sharifs "inalienable right" as a Pakistani citizen to enter and
remain in Pakistan); Ghias, supra note 22, at 1010-14; Nasir Iqbal, Destruction of
Evidence Annoys Apex Court: Lal Masjid-Jamia Ha/sa Case, DAWN, Aug. 18, 2007,
http://archives.dawn.com/2007/08/18/top3.htm (reporting Supreme Court's suo moto
decision to order investigation into Lal Masjid raid). When the government blocked
Sharifs return, by detaining him upon his arrival and summarily rendering him to
Saudi Arabia, the court initiated contempt proceedings against the officials
responsible.
173.
See generally supra Part II.B.
174.
See KHAN, supra note 11, at 700, 711 n.55 (quoting unpublished Supreme
Court order that the presidential election process may proceed as scheduled, but that
"final notification of the election [results] ... shall not be issued till the final decision of
these petitions"); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 22, at 17-18.
175.
See JONES, supra note 32, at 138-39 (discussing the social movement in
1968 and 1969 against Ayub Khan's regime); TOOR, supra note 8, at 4 (highlighting
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The particular forms of contention, however, were distinct from those
antecedents and triggered a process of institutional change that
began to shift the nature of the judiciary's role, institutional identity,
and independence.1 76 The expansion of public interest litigation
enhanced the judiciary's apparent standing among Pakistan's
people,' 7 7 and the lawyers' mobilization contributed to that enhanced
public standing while simultaneously tightening the relationship
between the judiciary and the legal profession.' 78 In both instances,
these potential avenues for the judiciary's empowerment became
closely linked to the rapidly growing power of Pakistan's newly
liberalized electronic media-and contributed to a self-understanding
among many judges of being directly legitimated by and accountable
to the Pakistani people.' 7 9 As a result, these events began to
reconfigure the overall balance between autonomy and constraint
across the judiciary's relationships with a range of actors, and that
balance has remained in flux ever since.

B. The Charterof Democracy
To date, scholarship on the anti-Musharraf movement has
focused almost exclusively on the roles played by Pakistan's lawyers,
judges, and bar associations.1 80 However, this interest in the antiMusharraf movement as a lawyers' movement-waged by and on
behalf of what Terrence Halliday, Lucien Karpik, and Malcolm Feeley
term the "legal complex," and primarily in support of judicial

and foregrounding role of progressive social movements from Pakistan's "very
inception . . . in challenging both the establishment and the religious Right").
See El-Ghobashy, supra note 26, at 1594-95 (analyzing "institutional
176.
change"-paradoxically, during a prolonged period of deepening deliberalization by the
Mubarak regime-prompted by new forms of political contention by Egypt's courts,
human rights organizations, and professional associations).
See Ghias, supra note 22, at 997-99; cf. BAXI, supra note 131, at 33
177.
(discussing role of public interest litigation in enhancing the popular legitimacy of
India's higher judiciary by enabling "the Supreme Court of India [to] transform[] itself
dramatically into a Supreme Court for Indians").
See Ghias, supra note 22, at 1003-10 (recounting the evolution of the
178.
relationship between the judiciary and the legal profession in Pakistan); MALIK, supra
note 144 at 133-41 (explaining how the lawyers' movement helped mobilize public
support for the judiciary); Siddiqi, supra note 171 (discussing role of lawyers'
movement in 2007 in "enhanc[ing] and preserv[ing] ... the independence of the
judiciary by keeping a vigilant watch on the performance of the superior judiciary as
well as by testing the limits of judicial independence through public interest
litigation").
See Pakistani Lawyers' Movement, supra note 22, at 1722-23 ("Protests on
179.
the streets inspired many deposed judges to continue resisting military rule . . . .");
27,
2012,
Contempt,
DAWN,
February
Faisal
Siddiqi,
Supreme
http://dawn.com/2012/02/27/supreme-contempt/ (arguing that in the wake of the
lawyers' movement, "judicial power has become dependent on public legitimacy and as
a consequence, judicial power has become linked with media power").
See generally sources cited supra note 22.
180.
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autonomy and empowerment-has obscured the movement's
and
for democracy
as a broader campaign
significance
constitutionalism, waged in a variety of settings by politicians and
other actors. 1 8' Certainly, the lawyers' movement played the leading
role in sparking anti-Musharraf sentiment, and Pakistan's opposition
parties struggled to effectively resist the military regime, which selfconsciously exploited their weaknesses.1 82 However, civilian
politicians-though weak and divided-were not entirely missing in
action in opposing Musharraf, and ultimately played a crucial,
underappreciated role in advancing a far-reaching vision of
constitutional change and forcing Musharraf from power. 183
In 2006, Bhutto and Sharif, acting on behalf of their respective
parties while in exile in London, signed the Charter of Democracy,
which set forth a comprehensive blueprint of constitutional principles
and practices to guide the restoration of democratic rule and to
challenge the accumulated entrenchment of military power.184
Observers often neglect such preconstitutional documents, and the
Charter, though quickly endorsed by almost all political parties, drew
little attention outside of Pakistan. However, as Kirsten Matoy
Carlson has shown, such documents can illuminate key aspirational

See Ayaz Amir, Conscience of the Constitution, NEWS INT'L, Jan. 22, 2010
181.
(emphasizing role played by civilian politicians and political parties in transition away
from Musharrafs regime); Terence C. Halliday et al., The Legal Complex in Struggles
for Political Liberalism, in FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM: COMPARATIVE STUDIES
OF THE LEGAL COMPLEX AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM 1, 6-9 (Terence C. Halliday et al.
eds., 2007) (conceptualizing "legal complex" as consisting of lawyers, judges, and all
other "legally-trained personnel in a society who undertake legal work, including
prosecutors and civil servants involved in the administration of justice").
See Ian Talbot, Pakistan in 2003: Political Deadlock and Continuing
182.
Uncertainties,44 ASIAN SURV. 36, 37 (2004) (discussing weaknesses in the early stages
of the anti-Musharraf movement). The leaders of Pakistan's two leading political
parties, former Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, were both in exile
outside of Pakistan throughout most of Musharrafs rule, including the period in 2007
during which the lawyers' movement initially gained momentum. Bhutto did not
return to Pakistan until October 2007, and Sharif did not return until November 2007.
Adeel Khan, Pakistan in 2007: More Violent, More Unstable, 48 ASIAN SURV. 144, 14950 (2008).
See Kennedy, supra note 36, at 67 (discussing opposition parties' disruption
183.
of Parliament with "protests, walkouts, planned disturbances, and other
unpleasantness" for thirteen months in 2002 and 2003); Gazdar, supra note 101, at 8
("Opposition political parties, much battered and maligned, must be given credit for
maintaining their constituencies and keeping their nerves, through eight-long years of
suppression, vilification and exile."); Amir Zia, PakistaniOpposition Parties Form New
Alliance for Democracy, ASSOCIATED PRESS, December 4, 2000 (discussing the
formation of a broad coalition of Pakistan's opposition political parties to develop a
unified strategy to fully restore civilian democratic rule).
184.
Charter of Democracy, May 14, 2006, available at http://archives.dawn.com/
2006/05/16/local23.htm; see also Arif Azad, General in His Labyrinth, ECON. & POL.
WKLY., Sep. 16, 2006, at 3941 (discussing Charter's substantive provisions and
assessing its political significance).
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values that guide constitutional development and "tensions that were
85
present at constitution-making and that remain unresolved."
Carlson's observation holds true for the Charter, which laid the
foundation for both the process and substance of the constitutional
shifts that I discuss in Part IV. Indeed, at the time, Pakistani
observers described the Charter in grand terms, comparing its
significance to the Lahore Declaration, Declaration of Independence,
and Magna Carta.186 At the level of constitutional custom and
practice,' 8 7 the declaration pledged its signatories to break with past
practices by adhering to norms of political conduct more consistent
with civilian democratic rule. The Charter's signatories pledged not to
"join a military regime or any military sponsored government" or
"solicit the support of military to come into power or to dislodge a
democratic government," but instead to embrace a "bipartisan" ethos
that accepts "the due role of the opposition" and-whether in
opposition or in government-not to "undermine each other through
extraconstitutional ways."' 88 Given the extent to which contrary
practices during the 1990s had eroded representative institutions and
reinforced deep state power, this commitment was at least as
significant as the declaration's substantive provisions.189
Those substantive proposals themselves were ambitious,
squarely addressing Pakistan's most intractable constitutional
dilemmas-parliamentary versus viceregal constitutionalism, civilian
versus military primacy, federal versus provincial authority, judicial
autonomy versus constraint. The declaration expressly repudiated
the
changes-including
extraconstitutional
Musharrafs
reinstatement of Article 58(2)(b), the prohibition on serving more
than two terms as Prime Minister, and the university degree
pledged to restore
requirement for legislative office-and

185.
Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Is Hindsight 20-20? Reconsidering the Importance
of Pre-ConstitutionalDocuments, 30 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 7-13 (2005).
186.
Anil Kalhan, Whither Pakistan's Charter of Democracy?, ASIAMEDIA, Sep.
8, 2007, http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edularticle.asp?parentid=77611; see also Ayaz
Amir, Nervousness in High Places, DAWN, May 19, 2006, http://archives.dawn.com/
weekly/ayaz/20060519.htm ("[Tihe Charter of Democracy ... is one of the most
important and ... most stirring thing[s] to come out of Pakistan's confused political
milieu in a long time.").
See Upendra Baxi, Constitutionalismas a Site of State Formative Practices,
187.
21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1183, 1187-90 (1999) (discussing "forming practices" that
"constitute the idea ... of a constitution"); Pratap Bhanu Mehta, What Is
ConstitutionalMorality?, 615 SEMINAR 17, 20 (2010) (discussing B.R. Ambedkar's view
that the "core of the constitutional revolution" in India was "a form of political
organization sustained by certain ways of doing things"); Adam Tomkins, The
Republican Monarchy Revisited, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 737, 742-47 (2002) (discussing
complementary roles of law and convention in British constitutionalism).
Charter of Democracy, supra note 184, pmbl. T 6, §§ 21-22.
188.
See supra Part II.
189.
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parliamentary supremacy.19 0 The Charter also pledged to reassert
civilian authority over all military and security agencies, establishing
full parliamentary oversight over their budgets and restricting their
domestic political activities.191 Directly tackling longstanding
impasses over federalism, the Charter proposed to devolve authority
to provincial governments and to distribute financial resources to
them more equitably.' 9 2
The Charter also squarely addressed the institutional
imbalances between the judiciary and Parliament, proposing an
process that would vest
overhauled judicial appointments
responsibility for appointments in a judicial commission, which would
include judges, bar association representatives, and executive
officials, and a joint parliamentary committee.19 3 Notably, the
Charter also stated expressly that judges would not be permitted to
take extraconstitutional oaths of office, and judges who had
94
For each
previously done so could not serve on the commission.'
vacancy, the commission would forward three names to the Prime
Minister, who would select one individual to be nominated for
confirmation in a public hearing before the parliamentary
committee. 9 5 In the spirit of the Charter's code of political conduct,
the committee would be evenly divided between government and
opposition members.1 96
The Charter played a key role in guiding the parties' opposition
to Musharrafs regime and has continued to guide Pakistan's process
of constitutional development since then. To be sure, the politicians'
commitment to these principles has not been ironclad. The ink was
barely dry on the document when Bhutto-actively encouraged by the
Bush administration-began unilaterally negotiating a power sharing
deal with Musharraf, including an amnesty for thousands of
individuals charged with corruption and other criminal offenses prior
to Musharraf's coup.' 9 7 This National Reconciliation Ordinance
(NRO) was designed to shield Bhutto, her husband Asif Ali Zardari,

Charter of Democracy, supra note 184, §§ 1-2, 12, 28.
190.
Id. §§ 32, 34; see also id. § 35. The declaration also pledged to overhaul
191.
military land allotment policies and to review all land allocations to military officers
under Musharraf.
192.
Id. § 5.
Id. § 3. The commission also would oversee a newly overhauled
193.
administrative mechanism to regulate judicial conduct. Id.
194.
Id.
Id.
195.
196.
Id.
ZAIDI, supra note 40, at 185-87 (discussing power sharing deal between
197.
Bhutto and Musharraf); see also BENAZIR BHUTTO, RECONCILIATION: ISLAM,
DEMOCRAcY, AND THE WEST 225-32 (2008) (recounting negotiations with Musharraf
between August 2006 and November 2007); Former PremierDiscusses Power-Sharing
Plan (PBS television broadcast Aug. 21, 2007), available at http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/bb/asia/july-decG7/pakistan_08-21.html (interviewing Benazir Bhutto).
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and other senior PPP members from criminal charges-but excluded
the criminal charges against Sharif by Musharrafs own regime.19 8
Musharraf also agreed to resign as Army Chief before seeking
another term as President.'9 9 According to the account given by
Bhutto and her supporters, the negotiations with Musharraf were
designed not to pursue her own narrow interests, but rather to
facilitate a genuine, "orderly democratic transition."200 As described
by a pro-Musharraf politician, however, the deal constituted "a
deliberate strategy to prevent the opposition uniting and [Bhutto] fell
for it... . [I]t broke up her alliance with Nawaz Sharif and also
stopped Bhutto's MPs' boycotting [Musharrafs] re-election as
president."o20
Protected by the NRO, Bhutto returned to Pakistan in October
2007 to lead the PPP in the upcoming elections, which she and
Musharraf presumed her party would win.202 Bhutto's
maneuvering-arguably resembling the very political practices that
had undermined democratic rule during the 1990s and that the
Charter had pledged to avoid-certainly undermined trust between
the civilian political parties and thereby threatened to weaken their
effectiveness in challenging Musharrafs regime. Nevertheless, the
Charter still exerted considerable normative force and gravitational
pull in guiding the parties' challenges to the regime. In terms of
practices and norms, the document served as a "yardstick" against
which the parties' conduct could be assessed. Bhutto's deal-making
effort was short-lived, as her public standing declined when her
negotiations with Musharraf became public. 203 But while the NRO
itself remained in place, Bhutto distanced herself from Musharraf
after his November 2007 crackdown and was effective in renewing
her efforts to work with other parties' leaders on the basis of the

National Reconciliation Ordinance, No. LX of 2007, Oct. 5, 2007.
198.
See ZAIDI, supra note 40, at 186-87.
199.
BHUTTO, supra note 197, at 230. Bhutto also sought repeal of Article
200.
58(2)(b) and removal of the prohibition instituted by Musharraf against serving more
than two terms as prime minister, both of which were also sought by the Charter and
would have equally benefitted her rival Nawaz Sharif.
Christina Lamb, Threat To Strip Benazir Bhutto of Amnesty, SUNDAY
201.
TIMES (U.K.), Nov. 18, 2007 (quoting PML-Q leader Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain); see
also RASHID, supra note 61, at 376-78 (noting that agreement between Musharraf and
Bhutto was "immensely unpopular in the PPP and among the opposition leaders").
See Khan, supra note 182, at 149.
202.
See Nasim Zehra, Charter of Democracy and the 2007 Elections, NEWS
203.
INT'L, May 22, 2006; Carlson, supra note 185, at 8 (discussing the role of
preconstitutional documents in "[outlining] the more aspirational goals of the political
community"). Sharif and others repeatedly invoked the Charter when criticizing
Bhutto's negotiations with Musharraf and again in the aftermath of the February 2008
elections, when the PPP (now led by Zardari) stalled in its pledge to restore the judges
ousted by Musharraf during his "emergency."
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Charter's principles. 204 In terms of substance, the Charter squarely
confronted central dilemmas in Pakistan's constitutional history and
provided a roadmap for the reforms ultimately adopted by Parliament
in 2010. When the election campaign arrived, almost all parties
expressly included the Charter's substantive proposals in their
manifestos. 205
Foregrounding the Charter complicates an increasingly
conventional narrative contrasting Pakistan's activist lawyers with
its more incrementalist politicians.2 06 While this account has much to
commend itself, given the lawyers' leading role in resisting
Musharraf-and the politicians' less-than-inspiring record-it also
masks an important irony. While the lawyers' movement staked out
revolutionary ground in its methods and strategies, as a "movement"
its scale was limited and its core substantive vision narrow, aimed
almost exclusively at enhancing judicial autonomy and power. 207 By
contrast, Pakistan's politicians-by turns tepid and even craven in
any reasonable
against
elaborated,
actions-actually
their

204.
See Khan, supra note 182, at 150; Griff Witte, Bhutto, Sharif Joining
Forces To Press Musharraffor FairElections, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2007, at A14.
205.
See PAK. INST. OF LEGISLATIVE DEV. AND TRANSPARENCY, ELECTIONS 2008:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ELECTION 2008 MANIFESTOES OF MAJOR POLITICAL
PARTIES (2007).
See PakistaniLawyers' Movement, supra note 22, at 1723-25 (crediting the
206.
lawyers' movement with causing the "emergence of a new issue-based democratic
politics" in Pakistan); Babar Sattar, Transitionists Again, NEWS INT'L, Feb. 7, 2009
with
its
politicians
mainstream
"transitionist"
(contrasting
Pakistan's
"transformationist" lawyers and judges in the lawyers' movement). This narrative
arises from and is situated within a broader debate in Pakistan-which was
particularly prominent and charged immediately following Chaudhry's reinstatement
as chief justice in 2007-between so-called "transitionists" and "transformationists"
over the appropriate means of effecting political and institutional change. See, e.g.,
Ejaz Haider, Playing Solitaire, DAILY TIMES, Nov. 6, 2007; Ejaz Haider, Transitionists
us Transformationists, DAILY TIMES, Aug. 31, 2007; Ayesha Siddiqa, No Transition
Without Transformation, DAILY TIMES, Sep. 3, 2007; Afiya Shehrbano Zia, Civil-ising
Democracy, DAILY TIMES, Sep. 11, 2007.
207.
See LIEVEN, supra note 9, at 116 (arguing that "[t]he lawyers' only
collective programme has been the independence, power and prestige of the judiciary");
Fair, supra note 28, at 74 (arguing that the mobilization triggered by the lawyers'
movement was "effective," but "limited"); Munir, supra note 22, at 378 (arguing that
the lawyers' movement primarily focused on the narrow goal of "advancing judicial
autonomy through the restoration of deposed judges," not on the broader goal of
effecting a transition to democracy); Ayesha Siddiqa, Looking Back at the Lawyers'
Movement, FRIDAY TIMES, Mar. 23, 2012 (arguing that the "core purpose" of the
lawyers' movement was not "strengthening the system of justice for the benefit of the
common man," but rather "empowerment of the legal community"); Osama Siddique,
The Lawyers' Movement and Its Fragments, NEWS ON SUNDAY, Feb. 19, 2012 (arguing
that while the lawyers' movement was a "genuine movement" that was "commendable
and inspiring," it ultimately failed to distinguish "between popularity sustained
through meaningful performance and the pursuit of popularity beneath the veneer of
populism"). See generally Siddiqi, supra note 171 (detailing the specific goals and
objectives of the lawyers' movement at various stages of the movement).
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expectations, a vision of change with genuinely far-reaching
potential, intended not only to strengthen representative institutions
and challenge military and deep state power, but also to reconfigure
the balance between judicial autonomy and constraint. Even as their
relationships remained fraught and their collaboration tenuous,
Pakistan's politicians exhibited greater agreement than in previous
challenges to military rule, finding ways to work cooperatively, if
erratically, based on the Charter's principles.2 08

C. Emergency and Elections
These two strands of the anti-Musharraf movement convergedand conflicted-in response to Musharrafs imposition of an
extraconstitutional state of "emergency" in November 2007.209 Oddly,
Musharrafs emergency was tantamount to a coup against his own
regime. As U.S. diplomatic cables confirm, the crackdown principally
sought to preempt any threat to Musharrafs reelection by reshaping
and subordinating the judiciary. 210 As he had with his 1999 coup,
Musharraf suspended the constitution in favor of a PCO, which
arrogated sweeping presidential authority, including the power to
issue constitutional amendments. Musharraf exercised these powers
extensively, most notably by issuing constitutional amendments
insulating his reelection from further legal challenge and converting
several temporary executive ordinances, including the NRO, into
permanent laws. Musharraf required judges to take new
extraconstitutional oaths of office and designated Justice Abdul
Hameed Dogar as chief justice. A reconstituted Supreme Court
composed of these "PCO judges" validated both the emergency, under
the doctrine of necessity, and Musharrafs reelection as President. 21n
Musharraf intended these changes to be permanent, thereby
completing another iteration in the recurrent process of
transformative preservation.

See FRUMAN, supra note 42, at 13-14 (highlighting the "sustained unity of
208.
the main political parties over a lengthy period during the Musharraf era" as a
significant change from earlier movements against military rule in Pakistan).
209.
See Kalhan, supra note 12, at 96-99 (discussing Musharrafs "emergency"
and opposition responses); S. Akbar Zaidi, Musharrafand His Collaborators,EcON. &
POL. WKLY., Nov. 10, 2007, at 8 (same).
210.
See, e.g., U.S. Embassy Cable, Musharraf Convokes Dip Corps (Nov. 5,
2007), available at http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07ISLAMABAD4728
(recounting Musharrafs comments to diplomatic corps rejecting the Supreme Court's
authority to review his eligibility to be reelected as President).
211.
Tika Iqbal Muhammad Khan v. Fed'n of Pak., (2008) 60 PLD (SC) 178
(Pak.) (validating Musharrafs Proclamation of Emergency), declared void ab initio,
Sindh High Court Bar Ass'n v. Fed'n of Pak., (2009) 61 PLD (SC) 879 (Pak.);
Wajihuddin Ahmed v. Chief Election Comm'r, Islamabad, (2007) 59 PLD (SC) 13, 22
(Pak.) (vacating pre-emergency stay of final certification of presidential election
results), declared void ab initio, Sindh High Court Bar Ass'n, (2009) PLD (SC) 879.
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However, the short-lived emergency faced significant resistance.
Soon after its announcement, a seven-judge Supreme Court bench
enjoined civilian and military officials from acting under the PCO or
administering new oaths of office to judges. 212 Ultimately, dozens of
judges, including Chaudhry, either refused or were not asked to take
new oaths and were ousted. 213 While the regime arrested and
detained thousands of lawyers, judges, politicians, and ordinary
citizens, including the lawyers' movement's senior leaders, lawyers
continued to demonstrate in large numbers and to boycott
proceedings before the PCO judges. 2 14 Once again, none of this
political contention was entirely unprecedented, since judges,
lawyers, politicians, and ordinary citizens also had resisted and
extraconstitutional
previous
Pakistan's
against
mobilized
effectiveness were
and
visibility,
its
scale,
However,
interventions.
history.
Pakistan's
in
moments
previous
most
greater in 2007 than at
well
broadened
had
mobilization
anti-Musharraf
By now, the
by
resistance
in
their
joined
were
who
beyond Pakistan's lawyers,
2 15
actively
networks
Television
actors.
politicians and civil society
opposed the emergency, and while accessible to relatively few
citizens, new media outlets became potent avenues of organizing and
protest.216 The emergency also heightened political mobilization by
Pakistan's university students. 217 While the scale of the antiemergency movement was limited, owing to its composition and
barriers imposed by the crackdown itself, it nevertheless proved
effective with Pakistani citizens and, crucially, international
audiences. When Musharraf ultimately agreed to relinquish his
position as Army Chief and terminate the emergency-in anticipation
of parliamentary elections, which were postponed to February 2008

Sindh High Court Bar Ass'n, (2009) PLD (SC) at 1055 (quoting full text of
212.
order).
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 22, at 19.
213.
See Siddiqi, supra note 171; Jane Perlez & David Rohde, Lawyers Resist
214.
Emergency Rule by Musharraf,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2007, at Al. Retired judges also
were outspoken in criticizing the emergency. See MALIK, supra note 144, at 252-53.
See PakistaniLawyers'Movement, supra note 22, at 1713-15.
215.
See Pamela Constable, Political Talk Defies Ban in Pakistan,WASH. POST,
216.
Nov. 25, 2007, at A14 (discussing protests and resistance to the emergency by
journalists following the regime's censorship of television news networks); Marta
Bolognani, Virtual Protest with Tangible Effects? Some Observations on the Media
Strategies of the 2007 PakistaniAnti-Emergency Movement, 18 CONTEMP. S. ASIA 401,
405-08 (2010) (assessing the significance of blogs, online petitions, video clips, text
messaging, and other forms of new media in the anti-emergency movement).
See Marta Bolognani, Rang de Basanti in Pakistan?Elite Student Activism,
217.
the Emergence of a Virtual Globalized Public Sphere, and the 2007 Emergency, in
PAKISTAN AND ITS DIASPORA: MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES 19, 19 (Marta
Bolognani & Stephen M. Lyon eds., 2011); Shahan Mufti, Student Protests Build in
Pakistan,CHRISTIAN Sc. MONITOR, Nov. 15, 2007, at 1.
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following Bhutto's assassination-pressure from the United States
played a significant role. 218
Although the lawyers' movement and political parties had
cooperated to oppose Musharraf, the elections campaign revealed a
divide that would reverberate in the elections' aftermath. Many
within the lawyers' movement, along with some opposition
politicians, advocated a boycott of elections unless the judiciary and
constitution were restored to their pre-emergency state. 219 This
position was not universally held within the movement. However, the
main parties' decision to participate in the elections reinforced many
lawyers' suspicions that politicians inclined only to seek incremental
change would, ultimately, prove reluctant to restore the preemergency constitution and judiciary and instead, like their 1990s
predecessors, would seek to impose their own judicial constraints. 220
Nevertheless, with the elections, both strands of the antiMusharraf movement contributed to a clear repudiation of the
military regime. Despite evidence of irregularities, anti-Musharraf
parties won a decisive victory. Though falling short of a majority, the
PPP (now led by Bhutto's widower, Zardari) gained the most National
Assembly seats of any party, and Sharifs Pakistan Muslim LeagueNawaz (PML-N) the second most. The parties that comprised the
regime's civilian fagade were roundly defeated. 2 21 And while the
lawyers' movement largely boycotted the elections, it had successfully
placed judicial independence and opposition to the emergency at the
forefront of the campaign, cultivating a popular mandate for the
incoming government to roll back the regime's extraconstitution and
restore the ousted judges.
While the judiciary had attempted to assert unprecedented
autonomy from the military regime-and even had begun to enjoy
See MALIK, supra note 144, at 250-52 (discussing importance of protests
218.
and other expressions of solidarity with the lawyers' movement by lawyers and bar
associations in the United States, Canada, and other countries); Bolognani, supra note
216, at 405-06 (highlighting efforts by anti-emergency activists to use new media in a
manner that self-consciously targeted U.S. and other international audiences).
219.
These lawyers argued that since the regime could not be trusted to hold fair
elections, participation risked lending credence to a fraudulent victory by regime
loyalists, who could then validate and indemnify the actions taken under the
emergency-including subordination of the judiciary. Muneer A. Malik, First Things
First, DAWN, Dec. 6, 2007, http://teeth.com.pk/blog/2007/12/06/first-things-firstmuneer-malik-op-ed-in-dawn.
Gazdar, supra note 101, at 9. Other lawyers opposed a boycott, since
220.
engaging the political process was inherently necessary to restore the ousted judges.
See Siddiqi, supra note 171; see also James Traub, The Lawyers' Crusade,N.Y. TIMES,
June 1, 2008, at MM46; KHAN, PAKISTAN: A PERSONAL HISTORY, supra note 72
(discussing his disagreement with the lawyers' movement on election boycott); Raza
Rumi, The Flawed Boycott Mantra?, NEWS INT'L, Feb. 21, 2008 (noting risks in boycott
of "de-legitimising the main political parties that have had the roughest time during
the Musharraf years").
221.
OLDENBURG, supra note 33, at 204.
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some success in doing so-the emergency demonstrated its ultimate
vulnerability to military constraints, given Pakistan's institutional
disequilibrium and the extent of entrenched military and deep state
power, which always could be backed up with force, coercion, and
manipulation. This lesson was, of course, one that Pakistan had
learned before-and is instructive for other countries, such as Egypt,
whose constitutional regime shifts also confront powerful status quo
and military interests. 222 Even as he conceded ground to the
antiregime movement and ultimately was repudiated by the election
results, Musharraf remained President, and his constitutional and
institutional transformation, including his reshaping of judicial
composition and authority, remained in place for the new government
to wrestle with.

IV. NAVIGATING PARTIAL REGIME SHIFT AND ROLLING BACK
EXTRACONSTITUTIONALISM

Far from effecting a clear and complete "transition" to a stable
constitutional democracy, the legacy of Musharrafs emergency-as in
other countries where status quo interests have remained powerful
Pakistan languishing between
following regime shifts 2 2 3-left
constitutional regimes for a prolonged period. Musharrafs emergency
had secured his position as President and packed the courts with
PCO judges. Given the accumulated legacy of transformative
preservation, the military and deep state remained dominant. At the
same time, Musharraf and the military could hardly count on the
incoming Parliament-led by parties that had pledged to reverse not
just the emergency, but much of the regime's broader legacy-to play
its traditional role of assimilating Musharrafs extraconstitution into
the constitutional order. In this Part, I examine the contentious
process by which this impasse between constitution and
extraconstitution was navigated and ultimately broken. While this
process eventually rolled back Musharraf s extraconstitution-a
landmark achievement-and further empowered both Parliament
and the judiciary, it also exacerbated the disequilibrium and

222.
See Sowers, supra note 78 (arguing that the process of rolling back the
military's power in Egypt "will likely unfold over decades, punctuated by reversals and
periods of conflict over the role of the security forces and the military in the political
system").
223.
See, e.g., BAli, supra note 2, at 276-79 (discussing the role of status quo
forces in Turkey); Kenneth M. Pollack, Democratizers? The Pursuit of Pluralism, in
THE ARAB AWAKENING: AMERICA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST 87,

87-88 (Kenneth M. Pollack ed., 2011) (discussing challenges for political transition
presented by "contingent of powerful political and military actors who are either
ambivalent or outright hostile to democracy" in Iraq, Palestine, Tunisia, Egypt, and
Libya).
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imbalance between them, as the existing clashes over judicial
autonomy from the military morphed, almost seamlessly, into
conflicts over the judiciary's autonomy from Parliament.

A. Constitution us. Extraconstitution
The lawyers' movement pressed hard for the new coalition
government, led by the PPP with support from the PML-N and other
parties, to roll back the legacy of Musharrafs emergency, calling
specifically for removal of Musharraf and reinstatement of Chaudhry
and other ousted judges. 224 Initially, the PPP was reluctant to seek
Musharraf's removal, but the coalition ultimately agreed on plans to
impeach him. While impeachment itself was never likely, the
pressure prompted the military to prevail upon Musharraf to resign,
leading eventually to Zardari's election as President. 225
Winding back Musharraf s extraconstitutional legacy, however,
proved more intractable. The confused status of Pakistan's
constitutional framework produced complex debates about the proper
modalities to accomplish that objective. Viewed through the lens of
the constitution, the entire legal edifice established under the
emergency, including the PCO judges' appointments, could simply be
deemed illegal and summarily reversed-for example, by an executive
order or, at most, a parliamentary resolution. 22 6 However, through
the lens of the extraconstitution, those actions and laws, having been
validated by a reconstituted judiciary and implemented as formal
constitutional amendments, could only be modified, as Musharraf and
his allies insisted, through subsequent amendments. 22 7
With both constitutional and extraconstitutional institutions
coexisting side by side, this quandary-essentially political in nature,
not strictly legal-evaded easy resolution. Initially, the PPP-led
coalition came down strongly in favor of constitutionalism, pledging
to restore all ousted judges within thirty days by a simple
parliamentary resolution. Indeed, by invoking the Charter of
Democracy as the basis of their coalition, Zardari and Sharif
suggested an even more far-reaching and radical repudiation of

See Siddiqi, supra note 171.
224.
225.
See Fair, supra note 28, at 73-74; Cables Reveal How Musharraf Was
Eased Out, DAWN, Dec. 8, 2010, http://dawn.com/2010/12/08/cables-reveal-howmusharraf-was-eased-out-2/.
226.
As Chaudhry stated, "I was deposed by an Executive Order and I can be
restored by an Executive Order." Anil Kalhan, The Math of Rollback, DORF ON LAW
(Feb. 23, 2008), http://www.michaeldorf.org/2008/02/math-of-rollback.html.
227.
See Kalhan, supra note 12, at 109-10, 114 (discussing "muddled" state of
Pakistan's constitutional order after the 2008 elections); Faisal Siddiqi,
Constitutionalismof a PoliticalProblem, NEWS ON SUNDAY, Mar. 30, 2008 (discussing
conflict over the legal and constitutional modalities by which the judges ousted by
Musharraf could properly be restored to office); supra Part II.B. 1.
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Musharrafs legacy. 228 However, the new government proved
grudging in its efforts to take these steps. Zardari and the PPP
repeatedly failed to honor their commitment to restore the judges,
and as U.S. diplomatic cables confirm, that pledge was never
particularly sincere on anyone's part in the first place. 229
Zardari's misgivings about restoring the judges were based
principally on anxiety that a Chaudhry-led Supreme Court would
invalidate the NRO, thereby reopening corruption charges against
him and other PPP politicians. 230 More generally, the PPP and its
leaders had long harbored more suspicions concerning the judiciary,
given its role in validating General Zia's coup (and affirming Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto's execution) and its politicized role during the 1990s.
Sharif had his own personal motivations for the opposite position. 231
Ultimately, the PPP's unwillingness to act led Sharifs PML-N to
withdraw from the coalition and sit in opposition in Parliament.

228.
Amir Wasim & Abid Abbasi, Zardari,Sharif in Historic Accord: PML-N To
Join Gout at Centre, Judges' Restoration in 30 Days, DAWN, Mar. 10, 2008,
http://archives.dawn.com/2008/03/10/topl.htm. However, as Faisal Siddiqi observes,
while pledging to restore the ousted judges, the coalition's platform was silent as to the
judiciary as an institution and the status of incumbent PCO judges. Faisal Siddiqi,
Politics of Constitutionalism, NEWS ON SUNDAY, June 29, 2008, http://jang.com.pk/
thenews/jun2008-weeklynos-29-06-2008/enc.htm#1.
229.
U.S. Embassy Cable, Zardari's Views on Agreement with Nawaz (Mar. 10,
2008), available at http://dawn.com/2011/05/24/2008-zardari-nawaz-agreed-not-torestore-chief-justice-iftikhar-chaudhry/ (reporting Zardari's comments that he and
Sharif "had agreed (very privately)" not to restore Chaudhry); see also U.S. Embassy
Cable, Immunity for Musharraf Likely After Zardari's Election as President (Aug. 23, 2008),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/167125
available
at
[hereinafter U.S. Embassy Cable, Immunity for Musharraf] (reporting that "Zardari plans
to continue to slow roll action on the judges' restoration but remains confident that
Nawaz Sharif will not walk out of the coalition"); U.S. Embassy Cable, Zardari
Examining a Coalition with Nawaz Sharif (Feb. 20, 2008), available at
http://dawn.com/2011/05/24/2008-zardari-says-govt-without-nawaz-would-be-weak/
[hereinafter U.S. Embassy Cable, Examining a Coalition] (reporting that "Zardari
planned to meet Nawaz's demands on the judiciary by burying them in committee,
which he thought might satisfy Nawaz"); Anil Kalhan, Pakistan's "Oddfather"?, DORF
ON LAw (Aug. 27, 2008), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2008/08/pakistans-oddfather.html
(noting that Zardari had openly acknowledged breaking "one promise after another
about [restoring] the judges" during the months following the elections).
230.
See U.S. Embassy Cable, Helping Resolve the Deadlock over the Judges
(May 4, 2008), available at http://dawn.com/2011/05/27/2008-zardari-upset-at-isi-headIt-gen-nadeem-taj/.
231.
Under Chaudhry, the court had ordered Musharraf to permit Sharif's
return to Pakistan from exile. Pak. Muslim League (N) v. Fed'n of Pak., (2007) 59 PLD
(SC) 642, 680 (Pak.). After the elections, both his and his brother Shahbaz Sharifs
eligibility to hold office had been challenged in pending court cases, in which he was
loath to trust the PCO judges. See U.S. Embassy Cable, Immunity for Musharraf,
supra note 229 (inferring that Sharifs position "probably is based on Nawaz's
expectation that Chaudhry would rule in both Nawaz's and Shahbaz's favor"). Despite
the erstwhile cooperation between Sharif and Zardari, the prospect of a Chaudhry-led
court striking down the NRO was likely also a factor in Sharifs support for Chaudhry's
reinstatement. Fair, supra note 35, at 580-81.
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Sharif and the PML-N thereby became firmly aligned with the
lawyers' movement, boosting the likelihood of the judges' eventual
restoration, but also giving the movement, and by extension the
judiciary, a more political cast. 232
While this conflict may be understood in these personality-driven
terms, it also reflected a more fundamental tension between two
opposed sets of political practices in a moment of regime shift. 2 33 The
coalition's pledge to restore the ousted judges reflected the Charter of
Democracy's commitment for parties to work cooperatively to
establish a stronger foundation for constitutionalism and civilian
supremacy. By contrast, as the product of Bhutto's parley with
Musharraf, the NRO had emerged from a very different approach.
Viewed charitably, that approach sought reconciliation with
Musharrafs regime in aid of a negotiated and structured transition to
civilian democracy, redounding to the benefit of all parties.2 3 4 Less
charitably, the deal enlisted military support for Bhutto and her
party to achieve short-term political gains, but at the cost of
reinforcing the military's dominance and political centrality, as the
PPP and PML-N both had done during the 1990s.
The government's inaction also may be understood in terms of
the disequilibrium among Pakistan's state institutions. As the
experience under civilian rule in the 1990s demonstrates, Pakistan's
weak representative institutions-facing powerful military and deep
state interests, and a judiciary empowered to assert its autonomy
from civilian actors-have readily found reasons to prefer and seek a
constrained, subordinated judiciary. Moreover, hedging on
reinstatement of the judges avoided a potential confrontation at a
vulnerable moment for the new government with Musharraf and the
military. As U.S. diplomatic cables reveal, Zardari and other
politicians remained wary of the military's continued power during
the months after the elections. 235 Before his resignation, Musharraf-

U.S. Embassy Cable, supra note 230 (noting the embassy's view that
232.
"Nawaz has succeeded in changing the debate to how, not if, the former Chief Justice
returns ... [and] is reaping the popular glory as principled protector of the judiciary").
See supra text accompanying notes 187-89, 200-201; cf. Siddiqi, supra note
233.
228 (analyzing the issue of restoring ousted judges as a "political, and not a personal,
problem").
See Amir, supra note 181 (crediting Bhutto's role in successfully negotiating
234.
with Musharraf to relinquish his position as Army Chief); Faisal Siddiqi, Op-Ed., The
NRO Mystery, DAWN, Jan. 1, 2012, http://dawn.com/2012/01/01/the-nro-mystery/
(discussing "competing visions of democratic constitutionalism" reflected in conflicts
over NRO).
235.
U.S. Embassy Cable, supra note 230 (noting that Zardari's "relations with
Musharraf and ISI are fraying badly"); U.S. Embassy Cable, Examining a Coalition,
supra note 229 (noting Zardari's concern that "his own reputation within the Army was
not good"). These fears persisted even after Musharrafs resignation. See Declan Walsh,
Pakistan'sPresident Asif Ali Zardari "Preparedfor Assassination," GUARDIAN, Dec. 1,
2010, at 8 (discussing Zardari's fear in 2009 that military might "take [him] out").
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armed with not only military support, but also power to dissolve
Parliament under Article 58(2)(b)-actively sought to shape the new
government and its agenda. 236 Indeed, when his political standing
later slumped, Musharraf even considered dissolving Parliament
simply to preempt his impeachment.2 37
With its interests in alignment with those of Musharraf and the
military, the PPP-led government engaged in "crude pragmatism,"
committing to restore individual judges while simultaneously seeking
to preserve the constrained judiciary inherited from Musharrafs
regime. 238 Parliament first enacted a law-notably, with the PML-N's
support-expanding the Supreme Court from sixteen to twenty-nine
judges, enabling the government to place its own stamp on the court's
composition. 39 The government then gradually began to return most
ousted judges to the bench. These judges were not truly "reinstated"
to their previous positions, but in effect "reappointed" to new
vacancies, upon taking new oaths of office. While the government
eventually restored nearly all ousted judges, this mechanism enabled
it to do so selectively-and in particular, to avoid reinstating
Chaudhry-while simultaneously making no challenge to the status
of Musharraf's PCO judges, most notably Dogar's status as chief
justice. 240 Finally, although never presented in Parliament, the
government proposed an extensive package of constitutional
amendments that would have restored all ousted judges and rejected
many of Musharraf's extraconstitutional changes, but also
aggressively constrained judicial authority, limited judges' terms of
office, and established executive primacy in judicial appointments
and removal. 241
This strategy eventually narrowed the conflict to one mostly
involving Chaudhry and a few other judges, but left Pakistan's
constitutional order as murky as when the coalition came to power.
While the proposed amendment package signaled the PPP's

U.S. Embassy Cable, Examining a Coalition, supra note 229 ("Musharraf's
236.
advisors have tried to convince Zardari to exclude Nawaz Sharif in any PPP-led
government.").
U.S. Embassy Cable, Scenesetter for PM Gilani's Visit to Washington (July
237.
25, 2008), available at http://dawn.com/2011/05/29/2008-musharraf-debated-dissolvingparliament-to-save-himself/.
238.
Faisal Siddiqi, Politics of Legal Absurdities, NEWS ON SUNDAY (Sep. 28,
2008), http://jang.com.pk/thenews/sep2008-weekly/nos-28-09-2008/dia.htm#4; see also
U.S. Embassy Cable, supra note 230 (noting Zardari's proposals to restore ousted
judges, but for more limited terms or with more limited powers).
239.
Raja Asghar, Assembly Passes First Budget, Expands SC, DAWN (June 23,
2008), http://archives.dawn.com/2008/06/23/top1.htm.
240.
Siddiqi, supra note 238; U.S. Embassy Cable, Insights on Zardari's Plans
for the Party, Coalition, and Judges (Aug. 27, 2008), available at http://dawn.com/
2011/06/11/2008-political-scheming-to-get-zardari-elected/ (discussing the PPP strategy
of "gradual reinstatement" of judges).
241.
KHAN, supra note 11, at 718-19; Siddiqi, supranote 238.
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unwillingness to fully embrace Musharraf's extraconstitution, the
PPP simultaneously (and inconsistently) was prepared to accept
Musharrafs reconstituted and subordinated judiciary as legitimate,
including its extraconstitutional jurisprudence validating the
emergency, and to impose its own, even stronger constraints upon the
judiciary. This approach produced a sharpened divide between the
PPP and PML-N-stalling cooperation on the Charter of Democracy's
broader aims-and deepened mistrust of the government's
commitment to judicial independence within the lawyers' movement.
What had been a conflict over judicial autonomy from the military
was rapidly, and seamlessly, transmuting into a conflict over judicial
autonomy from an elected Parliament, with lasting consequences for
Pakistan's larger processes of constitutional change and democratic
consolidation.
The conflict over Chaudhry and the other ousted judges was not
resolved until it became entangled with a major political crisis. In
February 2009, the PCO-reconstituted Supreme Court held Sharif
and his brother Shahbaz Sharif, the Chief Minister of Punjab,
ineligible to hold elective office. Nominally on that basis, but
overreaching for political advantage, Zardari dismissed Punjab's
PML-N-led provincial assembly and imposed direct federal rule.
Sharif and the PML-N responded by planning massive
demonstrations in conjunction with the lawyers' movement but
largely backed by its own street power,. demanding Chaudhry's
reinstatement. 242 Faced with thousands of opponents embarking on a
"long march" from Lahore to Islamabad-and intense pressure from
his own party, the United States, and most crucially and forcefully,
the Army Chief 243-Zardari backed down, agreeing not only to restore
the Punjab government, but also to restore Chaudhry as chief justice
upon Dogar's retirement later that month. 244
Chaudhry's reinstatement is often characterized as the lawyers'
movement's "greatest victory," the result of having pushed politicians

242.
See Matthew J. Nelson, Pakistanin 2009: Tackling the Taliban?, 50 ASIAN
SURV. 112, 115-16 (2010).
243.
See Saeed Shah, Pakistan Increases Power of Army Strongman General
Ashfaq Kayani, GUARDIAN, July 24, 2010, at 19 (noting Kayani's "secret interven[tion]"
to restore Chaudhry); U.S. Embassy Cable, Implications of the Long March (Mar. 16,
2009), available at http://dawn.com/2011/05/20/fallout-from-the-2009-long-marchl
(discussing Kayani's "adroit behind-the-scenes maneuvering"); U.S. Embassy Cable,
2009),
available at
Reconciliation
(Mar.
12,
Little
Movement
on
("In
four
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/196412
conversations with Ambassador this week . .. Kayani hinted that ... he might have to
urge Zardari to resign."); U.S. Embassy Cable, Long March Round Up as of 1500 Local
Time, March 16 (Mar. 16, 2009), available at http://dawn.com/20ll/06/06/2009-armysrole-in-long-march-conclusion/ (noting Kayani's role as "primary interlocutor"
responsible for convincing Zardari to restore ousted judges).
244.
The resolution also restored the remaining ousted judges. See Nelson,
supra note 242, at 116.
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to respect the judiciary's emergent autonomy and power. 245 However,
without denying the lawyers' crucial role, this depiction pays
insufficient heed to the centrality of political elites, the military, and
the enduring disequilibrium in Pakistan's institutional relationships,
which shaped both the conflict and its resolution. Though distinct in
important ways, the structural dynamics surrounding the events
restoring Chaudhry to office echoed earlier conflicts in Pakistan's
political history. A politicized judgment, rendered by a Supreme
Court empowered to assert its autonomy from civilian political actors,
brought simmering, politically driven tensions over the balance
between judicial autonomy and constraint to the fore. When the crisis
escalated-largely outside of Parliament-it was the military that
interceded to mediate and ultimately play the decisive role in
resolving it. While important, the lawyers' movement was subsidiary
to these processes. And while the military had politically weakened in
the face of the anti-Musharraf movement, and did not formally
dismiss Zardari's government over the crisis, its continued primacy
remained plain to see. 24 6
Even as Chaudhry and other ousted judges were restored, the
larger impasse between constitution and extraconstitution remained
unsettled. But as I explain in the rest of this Part, resolution of this
conflict enabled both the judiciary and Parliament to take other
major
steps
advancing
constitutionalism
over
extraconstitutionalism-further empowering both institutions, but
also setting the stage for a reconfigured and intensified conflict
between them.
B. The Judiciary'sGreat Leap Forward
Almost immediately after Chaudhry's reinstatement, the
Supreme Court began to reassert itself, making clear its intention to
resume a forceful role as both a guardian of constitutionalism and an
arbiter of core questions of "pure politics." 247 However, in a series of
major decisions, the court elided any distinction between the
autonomy and power it claimed vis-A-vis the erstwhile military
regime and the autonomy it now began to assert, even more
forcefully, vis-A-vis the post-Musharraf civilian government. In the

245.
Ahmed, supra note 22, at 501-02; see also Kausar, supra note 22, at 32
(asserting that "the movement ended successfully" by achieving the judiciary's
reinstatement in March 2009); Pakistani Lawyers' Movement, supra note 22, at 1726
(asserting that the movement "forced nearly every major political party in Pakistan to
endorse the ideas of judicial independence and the restoration of the judiciary").
246.
See Fair, supra note 35, at 580-85 (detailing the military's continuing
centrality as "part of Pakistan's political machinery" and asserting that "it is far from
clear that the army has departed from its historical [political] role").
247.
Hirschl, Pure Politics, supra note 81.
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process, the court's jurisprudence-though resting on different
premises from its earlier jurisprudence, which openly and selfconsciously justified military supremacy-both contributed to and
reinforced the antidemocratic logic of the military's legitimating
discourse. 248
First, in two decisions normalizing the Sharifs' political status,
the court indirectly chipped away at the quasi-legal basis for
Musharrafs extraconstitution. In May 2009, the court reversed its
previous judgment disqualifying the Sharifs from elective office. 24 9 In
July 2009, the court went further, vacating Nawaz Sharif's 2000
conviction for "hijacking" altogether. 250 This latter decision
unmistakably, if obliquely, turned the court's extraconstitutional
jurisprudence of necessity on its head-gesturing instead at a
principle of necessity in defense of constitutionalism by concluding
that under applicable civil aviation law, Sharif was justified by the
need to protect "public safety and tranquility" in trying to prevent
Musharraf from returning to Pakistan to carry out his coup. 251
Second, in July 2009, a fourteen-judge bench led by Chaudhry
issued a landmark judgment holding the entire legal edifice of
Musharraf s emergency-including the initial proclamation of
emergency; the PCO; and all orders, laws, constitutional
amendments, and other actions by Musharraf during the
emergency-unconstitutional and void ab initio.25 2 The court
reiterated its order enjoining the emergency when it was declared
and held that the subsequent validation of the emergency under the
doctrine of necessity by PCO judges unlawfully appointed in the face
of that order was a nullity.25 3 Since Parliament had not acted to
endorse and indemnify Musharraf's extraconstitutional laws and
actions, the court stated, they could be afforded no legal effect. 254

248.
See also Kennedy, supra note 22, at 151-58.
249.
Fed'n of Pak. v. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, (2009) 61 PLD (SC) 644 (Pak.).
250.
Following Musharraf's 1999 coup, Sharif was convicted by an antiterrorism court of "hijacking" Musharrafs commercial flight, which Sharif-a day after
he fired Musharraf as Army Chief, and while the coup was already underwayunsuccessfully ordered to be prevented from landing in Karachi upon Musharrafs
return from an international trip. See RASHID, supra note 61, at 47.
251.
Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. State, (2009) 61 PLD (SC) 814, 847-48 (Pak.);
see also U.S. Embassy Cable, Ice May Have Cracked, but Sharifs Still Distrust in
Zardari (July 24, 2009), available at http://dawn.com/2011/05/20/sharif-confides-inamericans-about-zardari-hafiz-saeed-and-punjab-power-crisis/ (noting Shahbaz Sharifs
view that judgment was "'constitutionally significant' in discrediting rulings" justifying
military intervention and "makes it more difficult for the Army to take over").
252.
Sindh High Court Bar Ass'n v. Fed'n of Pak., (2009) 61 PLD (SC) 879
(Pak.).
253.
Id. at 1200 (declaring Tika Iqbal Muhammad Khan v. Fed'n of Pak., (2008)
PLD (SC) 178, void ab initio).
254.
Id. at 956-57.
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The court's judgment amounted to a complete unwinding of the
judiciary's composition to its pre-emergency state. For the judges
ousted by Musharraf, the court swept away the PPP-led government's
strategy of selective "reappointment," since it deemed those judges
never to have been terminated in the first place. 255 Since the position
of chief justice had never become vacant, the court invalidated
Musharrafs appointment of Dogar as chief justice. And on that basis,
the court invalidated all judicial appointments from November 2007
to March 2009-whether by Musharraf or the PPP-led civilian
government, over 100 positions in all-since they were never made
"in consultation with" a lawful "Chief Justice," as constitutionally
required. 256 The court also invalidated the civilian government's law
expanding the size of the Supreme Court, principally on technical
legislative process grounds, but also because Parliament's increasing
the size of the court had "militate[d] against the independence of the
judiciary."2 57 Those PCO judges who already were judges when they
took extraconstitutional oaths of office were restored to their previous
positions, but also were referred for judicial misconduct proceedings
and, in some cases, charged with contempt of court. 258
At one level, these cases may simply be understood as the
judiciary getting its own constitutional house in order, decisively
repudiating its longstanding extraconstitutional jurisprudence of
state necessity and sanctioning individual judges whose conduct had
enabled Musharrafs intervention. However, the Supreme Court
simultaneously asserted its autonomy from civilian political actorsimplicitly, but unmistakably rebuking the PPP-led government for
not fully (or more quickly) reinstating the ousted judges and
forcefully reasserting its equally longstanding role as arbiter of
Pakistan's core questions of pure politics. 259 The court's decision in
the PCO Judges Case displaced a political settlement-which, after
protracted contestation and negotiation, had finally, if imperfectly,
resolved the conflict over the judiciary-in favor of its own resolution.
While framed in legal terms, the necessarily political nature of the

Indeed, the court voided all notifications by the Law Ministry reappointing
255.
those judges. Id. at 1057-58.
See generally id.
256.
257.
Id. at 1111-13, 1142-44.
Id. at 960. Most of these judges eventually resigned. The court also revised
258.
its code of judicial conduct to add a new misconduct ground prohibiting judges from
"support[ing] in whatever manner... any unconstitutional functionary who acquires
power" via extraconstitutional means. Id. at 962.
See Dana A. Remus, The Institutional Politics of Federal Judicial Conduct
259.
Reform, 31 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 2), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2154194 (discussing the role of
federal judicial conduct regulation in not only addressing misconduct of individual
judges, but also "facilitat[ing] the centralization of judicial authority, the development
of a cohesive judicial identity, and the emergency of the Judiciary's 'corporate
persona').
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court's own resolution was manifest, especially since it too had
stopped short of wiping Musharrafs extraconstitutional slate entirely
clean. The court extended recognition to orders, judgments, and
administrative matters by PCO judges during their unlawful terms
and explicitly protected the validity of the 2008 elections, even though
they were held under partially extraconstitutional auspices. 260
Moreover, even though it invalidated an amendment giving
permanent legal effect to several temporary ordinances, including the
NRO, the court nevertheless also extended their life, ostensibly to
give Parliament an opportunity to decide whether to adopt them as
ordinary laws. 261 While the government publicly welcomed and
adhered to it, the court's decision amounted to an unmistakable
assertion of autonomy not just from the previous military regime, but
also from the present civilian government, anticipating the prospect
of further conflict. 262
That conflict openly erupted in a third case in December 2009,
when a seventeen-judge bench declared the NRO unconstitutional
and ordered the government to reinstitute all cases withdrawn or
vacated under the ordinance, including those against Zardari and
other politicians. 26 3 As observers have noted, the NRO-which the
PPP-led government not only could not successfully get reenacted by
Parliament but also did not even defend before the court-was
vulnerable to straightforward invalidation on the comparatively
narrow ground that it had arbitrarily defined the categories of
individuals benefiting from its protections and, therefore, violated the
right of equality. However, in a 287-page opinion by Chaudhry, the
court also declared the ordinance inconsistent with a slew of other
constitutional provisions, leveling it, as I.A. Rehman describes, with a
"fusillade from heavy cannons," even though it was "such an easy
target that a single shot . .. was enough to demolish it."264 Once

260.
Sindh High Court Bar Ass'n, (2009) PLD (SC) at 1200-06 (applying Asma
Jilani v. Punjab, (1972) PLD (SC) 139); see also Mahmud, supra note 20, at 1255-60
(discussing similar dilemmas in Asma Jilani). The court also kept quiet about the fact
that most of the "non-PCO" judges, including Chaudhry himself, had themselves taken
extraconstitutional oaths under Musharraf's first PCO in 2000.
261.
Sindh High Court Bar Ass'n, (2009) PLD (SC) at 1203-05.
262.
Gazdar, supra note 142, at 10-11.
263.
Mobashir Hassan v. Fed'n of Pak., (2010) 62 PLD (SC) 1 (Pak.) (short
order); Mobashir Hassan v. Fed'n of Pak., (2010) 62 PLD (SC) 265 (Pak.) (detailed
judgment); see also Jahangir, supra note 23 (criticizing the effect of the Supreme
Court's decision on separation of powers); Asma Jahangir, Flaws in the Judgment,
DAWN (Jan. 26, 2010), http://archives.dawn.com/archives/32568 [hereinafter Jahangir,
Flaws] (discussing various shortcomings of the decision).
264.
I.A. Rehman, Pause, Sirs, and Ponder, DAWN (Dec. 24, 2009),
http://archives.dawn.com/archives/19722; see also Amir, supra note 181. Moreover, by
convening a seventeen-judge bench-the largest in the court's history for any caseChaudhry signaled an intent for the case to carry a high profile. See Feisal H. Naqvi,
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again, the court displaced a negotiated political settlement (in this
instance, between Bhutto and Musharraf) with its own resolution,
articulated in legal terms but no less political. Indeed, at points in its
decision the court seemed to justify its conclusion almost directly in
political terms. For example, the court concluded, based on excerpts
from Bhutto's posthumously published memoir, that despite the
ordinance's title, the NRO did not genuinely provide "reconciliation"
in the "national interest," but rather was "the result of [a] deal
between two individuals for their personal objectives." 265 As Ayaz
Amir observes, this conclusion rests on a "selective reading" of the
various roles played by different actors in the transition away from
Musharrafs regime, failing to sufficiently acknowledge that
"[d]ifferent chapters were written by different authors"-including
actors outside the lawyers' movement and judiciary-in effecting that
transition. 266
While invalidating an order issued under Musharrafs military
regime, the court's decision also converged with the military's own
legitimating discourse. The court discussed at great length the
importance of prosecuting corruption by politicians, devoting specific
attention to charges against Zardari in Pakistan and abroad and
ordering the government to write Swiss officials to seek their
assistance in pursuing corruption cases against him. The court
specifically emphasized the NRO's inconsistency with the National
Accountability Ordinance, which was adopted by Musharrafs
military regime soon after his 1999 coup and is widely understood to
have been used by his regime arbitrarily to coerce and manipulate
political opponents. 267 The court also drew upon the discussion of
corruption in Zafar Ali Shah, an extraconstitutional decision that
invoked the military's allegations of corruption by civilian politicians
as a basis to validate Musharrafs 1999 coup. 268 Finally, the court
held that the NRO violated constitutional provisions imposed by Zia
that require members of Parliament to be "sagacious, righteous and
non-profligate, honest and ameen"-provisions premised upon a
presumptive mistrust of the integrity of elected politicians and selfconsciously adopted as an instrument of deep state control of civilian
269
politics.

The Lonely Death of the NRO, FRIDAY TIMEs, Dec. 24, 2009 (suggesting that "the very
size of the bench made it clear . . . that a 'historic' judgment was in the offing").
265.
Mobashir Hassan,(2010) PLD (SC) at 352-53; Naqvi, supra note 264; Amir,
supra note 181.
266.
Amir, supra note 181.
267.
Mobashir Hassan, (2010) PLD (SC) at 400-06. On the military's selective
use of anticorruption initiatives, see supra note 75 and accompanying text.
268.
See supra text accompanying note 94.
269.
Mobashir Hassan, (2010) PLD (SC) at 422-23, 437-40 (citing and
discussing PAISTAN CONST. arts. 62-63); see also Jahangir, Flaws, supra note 263
(arguing that the Supreme Court's invocation of Articles 62 and 63 amounted to
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The NRO was unpopular, and the court-increasingly
understanding its legitimacy in the aftermath of the anti-Musharraf
movement to derive directly from the public-was applauded by many
for striking it down. But what could have been a judgment sounding
in more limited principles of equality and nonarbitrariness instead
became a wide-ranging decision decrying corruption and a
presumptive lack of morality among Pakistan's civilian politicians. In
this manner, the court suggested a role for itself not simply as a
referee of central political questions, but as an arbiter of political
integrity and morality-a role wholly congruent with the military's
self-conception of its own role and the deep state's antidemocratic
legitimating discourse.27 0 Later, when the PPP-led government opted
to aggressively resist the court's judgment, balking in particular at
the court's order to write Swiss officials concerning corruption
allegations against Zardari, the court's projection of that selfconception of its role and identity intensified to a breaking pointultimately leading to the court's ouster of the Prime Minister, which I
discuss below in Part V.
The court's inclination to act as ultimate arbiter of political
integrity and morality is manifest in a fourth case during this period,
which involved the Musharraf-era requirement that legislators hold
university degrees. As discussed above, this requirement-in addition
to disqualifying the overwhelming majority of Pakistan's citizens
from holding elective office-institutionalized the antidemocratic
logic of the military's legitimating discourse and served as an
instrument of political manipulation by Musharraf's regime. While
the court had extraconstitutionally sustained that requirement soon
after it was issued, the PCO Supreme Court under Dogar overruled
that decision in 2008, invalidating the requirement as inconsistent
with the constitution's fundamental rights to association and
equality. 2 71
It soon came to light, however, that many politicians, across a
broad range of political parties, had falsely claimed to have earned
the requisite degree in order to evade the requirement imposed by
Musharraf's regime. Even though that requirement itself had now

"plead[ing] that that legacy of dictators that suits us will be accepted and the one that
hurts us will not"); Rehman, supra note 264 (arguing that the Supreme Court's
invocation of Zia's constitutional amendments, which "have never been debated by a
representative assembly and have been consistently denounced by democratic opinion,"
was akin to "quoting a PCO judge").
See Walsh, supra note 15 (quoting Muneer Malik); cf. Shambayati, supra
270.
note 79, at 286 (advancing reasons why, in Turkey, "the military and the judiciary
might share a number of common values and assumptions about politics and
politicians").
271.
Muhammad Nasir Mahmood v. Fed'n of Pak., (2009) 61 PLD (SC) 109, 177
(Pak.) (noting that only 1.6 percent of the population were qualified as graduates, and
that the literacy rate in Pakistan is only 35 percent).
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been invalidated, the court (now under Chaudhry), reviewing a
challenge filed by a losing political candidate, took cognizance of these
false degree claims as alleged "corrupt practices" and ordered the
Election Commission to investigate all of Pakistan's sitting legislators
and sanction any who had made false claims. 272 The decision
triggered a massive spectacle, as media coverage flooded public
discourse with allegations against politicians who may have claimed
false academic credentials.27 3 While the immediate controversy
subsided,
the court's actions-which,
practically speaking,
resurrected from the constitutional dead and gave effect to an
extraconstitutional, deep state mechanism to subvert civilian
politics-prompted suspicions of a concerted effort by deep state
interests to undermine Pakistan's civilian government. 274 Regardless
of whether the court's actions involved any actual conspiracy (and no
documented evidence suggests one), the court nevertheless had, in
effect, once again actively propagated and reinforced the deep state's
legitimating discourse and arguably enhanced the military's power
vis-A-vis Pakistan's representative institutions.

C. The Eighteenth Amendment
In the immediate aftermath of the NRO Case, the PPP-led
government appeared to be in a state of chaos, amidst rumors of
imminent military intervention.2 7 5 However, beneath that volatile
surface, Parliament was functioning as a more mature and effective
constitutional actor than arguably ever before in Pakistan's
history. 276 Resolution of the crisis between the PPP and PML-N in
March 2009 had enabled an unprecedented, year-long parliamentary
process that culminated in April 2010 with adoption of the
Eighteenth Amendment, an unprecedented package of more than one
hundred constitutional changes implementing much of the Charter of
supremacy,
strengthening
civilian
Democracy-reasserting
Parliament over the presidency, devolving power to provincial
governments, and reconfiguring the balance between judicial

272.
Muhammad Rizwan Gill v. Nadia Aziz, (2010) PLD (SC) 828; see also
Kennedy, supra note 22, at 153-54.
273.
See Waraich, supranote 76.
274.
As Farahnaz Ispahani, a PPP legislator (and Wellesley graduate),
intimated, "The unconstitutional degree requirement is being invoked by those who
have constantly assaulted our fledgling democracy." Id.
275.
Declan Walsh, Pakistan Denies Coup as Court Ruling Rocks Zardari
Government, GUARDIAN, Dec. 17, 2009, at 26.
276.
See generally FRUMAN, supra note 42, at 21-22; PAK. INST. OF LEGISLATIVE
DEV. & TRANSPARENCY, MID-TERM ASSESSMENT OF THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY IN
PAKISTAN, MARCH 25, 2008-SEPTEMBER 24, 2010 (2010).
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autonomy and constraint with respect to the judicial appointments
process. 2 77
The amendments were prepared by a twenty-six-member
Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Reforms (PCCR), which
included representatives from all parties represented in Parliament
and was expressly charged with recommending amendments to
implement the Charter.2 7 8 While the military placed informal
constraints upon the PCCR's mandate, it largely left the committee to
its own devices, apparently owing to skepticism that Pakistan's
notoriously contentious politicians would reach agreement.27 9 That
expectation proved wholly mistaken, for in the Charter's spirit, the
PCCR achieved a level of political consensus rarely seen in Pakistan's
history. 28 0 When the PCCR presented the Eighteenth Amendment to
Parliament, it did so with unanimous support of its members. 28 1
Ultimately, the Eighteenth Amendment sailed through Parliament
without a single dissenting vote.
At its core, the amendment reasserted civilian supremacy,
declaring that the extraconstitutional amendments imposed by
Musharraf after his 1999 coup were "without lawful authority and
[therefore have] no legal effect" and, on that basis, repealed them.28 2
The amendment expanded the grounds for treason to include
extraconstitutional attempts to suspend or hold the constitution in
abeyance and attempts by courts to validate such actions.2 83 Beyond
their substantive effect, these provisions therefore functioned as an

277.
Constitution (18th Amend.) Act, No. 10 of 2010, THE GAZETTE OF PAKISTAN
EXTRAORDINARY, Apr. 20, 2010; see also Colin Cookman, The 18th Amendment and
Pakistan's Political Transitions, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 19, 2010),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2010/04/19/7587/the-18thamendment-and-pakistans-political-transitions/; Raza Rumi, An Unlikely Catalyst for
Change, TEHELKA (Apr. 17, 2010), http://www.tehelka.com/story_main44.asp?
filename=Nel704loan_unlikely.asp.
278.
PCCR REPORT, supra note 11, T 8; Katharine Adeney, A Step Towards
Inclusive Federalism in Pakistan? The Politics of the 18th Amendment, 42 PUBLIUS 539,
546-47 (2012).
279.
Adeney, supra note 278, at 547. Other observers credit a conscious effort by
the military to step back from active engagement in politics.
280.
The committee held 77 meetings, involving 385 hours of deliberation and
consideration of 982 amendment proposals from the public. PCCR REPORT, supra note
11, 11 13, 22; see also Haris Gazdar, Democracy in Pakistan:The Chasm, ECON. & POL.
WKLY., May 29, 2010, at 10 ("While Pakistani public spaces resounded throughout this
period with the cacophony of civil strife, terrorism, scandal, institutional clashes,
political anger and economic disaffection, the committee laboured quietly until
consensus had been reached among representatives of virtually every significant shade
of opinion.").
281.
While some members included "notes of reiteration" recording opposing
views in the Committee's Final Report, in the interest of consensus, all committee
members signed and agreed to the final package. See PCCR REPORT, supra note 11,
1 17.
282.
Constitution (18th Amend.) Act, No. 10 of 2010, pmbl. §§ 2, 96.
283.
Id. § 4 (amending PAKISTAN CONST. art. 6).
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analogue to the Supreme Court's PCO Judges decision: getting
Parliament's own constitutional house in order by disavowing its
historical role of ratifying and completing the military's process of
transformative preservation.
Substantively, the constitutional amendment package restored
parliamentary supremacy, placing selection of the Prime Minister
with Parliament and transferring most executive authority from the
President to the Prime Minister. 284 Most notably, the amendment
eliminated the President's discretionary authority under Article
58(2)(b) to dissolve the National Assembly. 285 The amendment also
eliminated constraints on Parliament's lawmaking power, limiting
the President's legislative role and eliminating two Zia-era schedules
of semi-entrenched laws-one list of laws requiring presidential
consent before they could be amended or repealed, and one list of laws
that could only be amended or repealed using the procedures for
constitutional amendments. 286 A handful of provisions recognized
287
fundamental rights not previously guaranteed.
The Eighteenth Amendment also enhanced the status and
autonomy of provincial governments, addressing one of Pakistan's
most longstanding and vexing sets of concerns. 288 The amendment
eliminated the "Concurrent List," which had enumerated forty-seven

Id. §§ 14, 15, 27, 28, 29, 31 (amending PAKISTAN CONST. arts. 46, 48, 89, 90,
284.
91, 99). Similar changes modified the relationships between provincial governors and
chief ministers. Id. §§ 42, 46 (amending PAKISTAN CONST. arts. 129, 139). Power over
most appointments was transferred to the Prime Minister, although some appointment
powers previously vested in the President, such as judicial appointments, were
transferred to other entities. Id. §§ 33, 77, 89, 90 (amending PAKISTAN CONST. arts.
101, 213, 242, 243); id. § 67 (adding PAKISTAN CONST. art. 175A).
Id. § 17 (repealing PAKISTAN CONST. art. 58(2)(b)-(c)). The amendment also
285.
eliminated the analogous provision conferring discretion upon provincial governors to
dismiss provincial assemblies. Id. § 37 (repealing PAKISTAN CONST. art. 112(2)(b)). The
President now only may dissolve the National Assembly and order elections on advice
of the Prime Minister, or if the Prime Minister loses a vote of confidence and no other
member of Parliament can form a government. Id. § 17. The President may only
dismiss the Prime Minister upon losing a vote of confidence. Id. § 29 (amending
PAKISTAN CONST. art. 91).
Id. §§ 15(i), 26, 94, 101-02 (amending PAKISTAN CONST. arts. 48(1), 75(1),
286.
268(2), 6th sched., 7th sched.). The amendment also limits the President's power to
issue ordinances having the effect of ordinary laws when Parliament is not in session.
Id. § 27 (amending PAKISTAN CONST. art. 89(1)).
Id. § 5 (adding PAKISTAN CONST. art. 10A) (right to fair trial); id. § 9
287.
(adding PAKISTAN CONST. art. 25A) (right to education); id. § 7 (adding PAKISTAN
CONST. art. 19A) (right to information). These provisions built upon other efforts by
civilian government to improve Pakistan's international human rights compliance,
including its ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (which the Musharraf regime had signed but had not ratified), the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention Against
Torture.
See Adeney, supra note 278 (analyzing and assessing the significance of the
288.
amendment's provisions altering the distribution of powers between the central and
provincial governments).
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subject areas in which both the federal and provincial governments
could legislate but in which federal law prevailed in the event of any
conflict.28 9 With this transfer of lawmaking authority, seventeen of
the federal government's forty-eight ministries were devolved to
provincial governments, requiring an extensive implementation
process to enhance provincial capacity to manage these
responsibilities. The amendment also modified the formula for
distributing national revenues to provincial governments and gave
provincial governments greater control over their own natural
resources. 290
Finally, the amendment overhauled the process for judicial
appointments. 291 As discussed above, the Supreme Court, following
precedent from India, held in 1996 that recommendations for
appointment by the chief justice in the constitutionally required
process of "consultation" ordinarily would be binding upon the
executive. As in India, this process had been criticized for
concentrating excessive power in the executive and chief justice,
without sufficient transparency, scrutiny, or meaningful engagement
by Parliament, the legal profession, or the public at large.29 2 With the
Supreme Court asserting the chief justice's primacy in the
consultation process, the judiciary effectively had seized total
autonomy over its composition-indeed, even greater autonomy than
in India, for while Indian judges may be removed by Parliament, in
Pakistan removal is constitutionally assigned to a judicial body, the
Supreme Judicial Council.29 3

289.
Constitution (18th Amend.) Act, No. 10 of 2010, § 49 (amending PAKISTAN
CONST. art. 142). Residual powers continue to rest with provincial governments.
290.
Id. §§ 58-59, 65 (amending PAKISTAN CONST. arts. 157, 160, 172); see also
Adeney, supra note 278, at 546-50 (noting "[1]ong-standing demands" for abolition of
the Concurrent List and "major tensions" over the distribution of resources between the
provinces); Asma Jahangir, Strengths and Pitfalls, DAWN, Apr. 16, 2010,
http://archives.dawn.com/archives/27059 (characterizing the amendment's federalism
provisions as its "most vital" reforms). The amendment also officially changed the
colonial-era name of the North West Frontier Province to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Constitution (18th Amend.) Act, No. 10 of 2010, § 3 (amending PAKISTAN CONST. art.
1).
291.
Constitution (18th Amend.) Act, No. 10 of 2010, § 66 (adding PAKISTAN
CONST. art. 175A).
292.
E.g., Osama Siddique, JudicialApointments and Accountability: A Flawed
Debate, FRIDAY TIMES, Mar. 12, 2010; see also Pratap Bhanu Mehta, India's Judiciary:
The Promise of Uncertainty, in PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS IN INDIA: PERFORMANCE AND
DESIGN 158, 174-80 (Devesh Kapur & Pratap Bhanu Mehta eds., 2007); Anil Divan,
JudicialAppointments:Agenda for Reform, HINDU, Dec. 17, 2009.
293.
Compare PAKISTAN CONST. art. 209, with INDIA CONST. arts. 124(4), 217(1).
See also Osama Siddique, Across the Border, 615 SEMINAR 52, 53 (2010) (explaining
and analyzing constitutional jurisprudence on judicial appointments in Pakistan and
India);
I.A.
Rehman,
Selection
of Judges, DAWN,
Jan.
21,
2010,
http://archives.dawn.com/archives/19929 (discussing concerns since the 1990s over the
judicial appointments process). Of course, as discussed above, judicial composition in

2013/1

GRA YZONE CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE JUDICIARY

71

Based on these and other criticisms, reformers had long proposed
a more inclusive and transparent appointments process that would
provide for greater judicial accountability, and the Eighteenth
Amendment established a variant on the reforms proposed in the
Charter of Democracy. 294 Relatively speaking, the overhauled process
in the Eighteenth Amendment placed only modest constraints upon
the judiciary's autonomy and power over its own composition. Initial
nominations are made by a Judicial Commission, chaired by the chief
justice of Pakistan and including representatives from the judiciary,
the executive, and bar associations.2 9 5 After reviewing all candidates,
the Judicial Commission then nominates one individual for each
vacancy to an eight-person Parliamentary Committee equally divided
between government
and opposition party members. The
Parliamentary Committee's authority is limited: it may reject a
nominee by a three-fourths vote but must do so within fourteen days,
otherwise the nominee is automatically deemed confirmed with or
without the Committee's action.2 96 Unlike the previous process, with
its broad executive discretion in consultation with the chief justice,
the executive no longer has any direct formal role beyond effectuating
the appointments upon confirmation.
Together with the PCO Judges Case, the Eighteenth
Amendment-although not without significant flaws, as critics have
noted 2 97-resolved the impasse that had deadlocked Pakistan's postMusharraf constitutional order. In the PCO Judges Case, the
Supreme Court formally invalidated Musharrafs emergency and

Pakistan has periodically been subject to significant extraconstitutionalconstraints by
the military. See supraPart ILB.1.
294.
See Charter of Democracy, § 3 (proposing the creation of a judicial
appointments commission); see also, e.g., Hamid Khan, The Problem of Judicial
Appointments in Pakistan's Historical Perspective, in HAMID KHAN, THE JUDICIAL
ORGAN 155, 165 (1999) (advocating a "permanent Judicial Commission consisting of
representatives from the Judiciary, Parliament and the Bar, which should be invested
with the power to scrutinise each and every proposed nominee" to the higher judiciary);
Rehman, supra note 293 (discussing and assessing proposals by political parties, civil
society organizations, and government entities to reform the judicial appointments
process).
295.
See Constitution (18th Amend.) Act, No. 10 of 2010, § 66 (adding PAKISTAN
CONST. art. 175A).
296.
Id.; see also Siddique, supra note 293, at 55 (emphasizing the limited scope
of the Parliamentary Committee's authority).
297.
See Fair, supra note 35, at 583 (discussing concerns that various provisions
in the amendment will weaken internal democracy within political parties and further
strengthen the power within Parliament of party leaders over rank and file members);
Jahangir, supra note 290 (praising the amendment on balance, but criticizing some of
its provisions for discriminating against religious minorities, reinforcing the power of
political party leaders, and failing to go far enough with some of its reforms); Amina
Jilani, The Constitution, the Letter and the Memo, EXPRESS TRIB., Jan. 27, 2012
(criticizing the amendment for leaving the constitution "riddled with bits and pieces of
Zia's Eighth Amendment").
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aggressively repudiated the jurisprudential basis used to validate
military interventions for generations. With the Eighteenth
Amendment, Parliament established that it was prepared to go
further by rolling back much of the legal edifice arising from
Musharrafs 1999 coup and presenting a strong first step in
challenging entrenched military and deep state interests. Taken
together, these developments have helped effect significant
reconfigurations in Pakistan's political and institutional patterns. 298
And yet, the very logic of transformative preservation means
that reconfigured political and institutional patterns will not
automatically lead to broader changes in the structure of underlying
power relationships. 299 And despite these significant institutional
changes, the basic disequilibrium among Pakistan's institutions,
particularly between the Supreme Court and Parliament, and the
dominance of Pakistan's military and deep state interests have
largely endured. While the military has most certainly shifted the
nature of its engagement with politics, it continues to wield
considerable political, economic, and social influence and has not by
any means sought to relinquish that underlying power.30 0 As
Parliament and the judiciary have sought to empower themselvesbut in a context in which the state's dominant institution remains
neither one of them, but rather the military-the structure of the
disequilibrium between them has largely persisted.

V. BALANCING AND REBALANCING JUDICIAL AUTONOMY AND
CONSTRAINT

With the Musharraf-era conflict over judicial autonomy from the
military thus transformed into one over judicial autonomy from
Parliament, the conflicts between Parliament and the Supreme Court
have sharply escalated, amidst public suspicions that military and
deep state interests have used this conflict, along with other
mechanisms, to undermine Pakistan's fragile democratic transition.

See Cyril Almeida, A More Complicated Script, DAWN, Dec. 30, 2011,
298.
http://dawn.com/2011/12/30/a-more-complicated-script/ (discussing "subtle reasons" for
the survival of civilian government since 2008 "which suggest, unbelievable as it may
sound, that democracy may be structurally stronger than it ever has been"); Zaidi,
supra note 169 (arguing that "[d]espite instability and rumours galore about the
collapsing presidency or the fall of the government, a transition to a democratic order
seems to have been made").
299.
See supranote 24 and accompanying text.
300.
E.g., SHUJA NAWAZ, WHO CONTROLS PAKISTAN'S SECURITY FORCES? 6
(2011) (predicting that "[i]n the next three to five years, the military's influence over
Pakistan's polity will likely increase"); see also Siddiqa, supra note 33 (documenting
and analyzing the dominant role played by the military and its affiliates in Pakistan's
economy).
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In this Part, I assess the perils of this continuing institutional
disequilibrium and the prospect that the relationships between these
institutions might evolve into an equilibrium more conducive to
democratic consolidation. First, I examine the Supreme Court's
decision to adjudicate the constitutional validity of the Eighteenth
Amendment's judicial appointments provisions on the ground that it
allegedly violated the constitution's "basic structure." While the
substantive dispute over those provisions echoed and reprised
conflicts over judicial appointments from the 1990s, the stakes and
potential fallout from this iteration were higher, as the court
seriously contemplated invalidating a constitutional amendment that
had been unanimously adopted by Parliament. Second, I analyze the
hazards involved in the court's adjudication of its abstract selfconception of judicial independence, risks that arise even if not
framed in basic structure terms. Third, I discuss the controversies
arising from the so-called "Memogate" case and the contempt
proceedings that led to the court's disqualification of Prime Minister
Yousaf Raza Gilani, both of which have involved even more
aggressive incursions into parliamentary authority. Finally, I assess
the judiciary's increasing self-understanding as an institution whose
legitimacy derives directly from the people of Pakistan and the
prospect that the relationships between Pakistan's institutions might
evolve into an equilibrium more conducive to democratic
consolidation.
A. TransplantingBasic Structure?
Among the many provisions in the Eighteenth Amendment, the
judicial appointments provisions in Article 175A were not, by any
means, the most consequential or far-reaching in their potential
implications.3 0 1 However, soon after the Eighteenth Amendment's
adoption, Supreme Court petitions were filed challenging the new
appointments process as inconsistent with a "salient feature" of the
constitution-namely,
"independence of the judiciary"-and,
therefore, beyond Parliament's constitutional amendment power
altogether. In advancing this claim, the petitioners, who included bar
associations and individual lawyers, raised the stakes in the ongoing
conflict between Parliament and the judiciary by urging the court to
embrace a version of the "basic structure" doctrine, a principle of

301.
See Jahangir, supra note 290 (characterizing the amendment's other
reforms as more significant). Some observers even speculated that controversies over
these provisions had been "engineered by the army in a belated attempt to derail" the
broader constitutional reform project. See Adeney, supra note 278, at 9, 22 n.14 (citing
the author's conversations with Pakistani politicians and civil society activists).
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judicial review fashioned by the Supreme Court of India. 302 The
doctrine places implied limits on Parliament's power to adopt
constitutional amendments if they damage or alter the constitution's
"basic structure," and on that basis claims judicial power to invalidate
constitutional amendments that trench upon that basic structure.3 03
In India, the doctrine's application has provoked extensive
controversy. 304 Critics argue that the doctrine is premised upon
"distrust of the democratic process, which itself must surely be part of
the basic structure," and has therefore resulted in judicial usurpation
of parliamentary sovereignty.3 05 Given the "haphazard" and
"inconsistent" way in which the Supreme Court of India has defined
the elements of the basic structure, critics argue, the doctrine appears
to have been invoked "as much to expand the scope of judicial power
as it has to delineate the core values of the constitution."306 On the
other hand, the doctrine's defenders argue that-particularly in a
context where formal constitutional amendment by Parliament is not
overly difficult-it preserves democratic constitutionalism and has
contributed to the longevity of India's constitution by inhibiting
radical constitutional change.307 Observers also suggest that while

302.

On

the

basic

structure

doctrine

in

India,

see

generally

SUDHIR

KRISHNASWAMY, DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN INDIA: A STUDY OF THE BASIC

STRUCTURE DOCTRINE (2009); Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Inner Conflict of
Constitutionalism: Judicial Review and the "Basic Structure," in INDIA'S LIVING
CONSTITUTION: IDEAS, PRACTICES, CONTROVERSIES 179 (Zoya Hasan et al. eds., 2002);

Raju Ramachandran, The Supreme Court and the Basic Structure Doctrine, in
SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

107 (B.N. Kirpal et al. eds., 2000); Robinson, supra note 134, at 27-40.
See Kesavananda Bharati v. Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461 (India) (applying
303.
the basic structure doctrine); Gandhi v. Narain, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2299 (India) (same);
Minerva Mills Ltd. v. India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1789 (India) (same).
See Ramachandran, supra note 302. In recent years, a similar controversy
304.
over the permissibility of constitutional amendment has arisen in Turkey. See Bali,
supra note 2, at 250-55 (discussing the crisis in Turkey arising from the Turkish
Constitutional Court's invalidation of amendments challenging the interests of the
Kemalist secular establishment); see also Robinson, supra note 134, at 64-66
(discussing analogous constitutional dynamics in Pakistan, Iran, Thailand, and
Bangladesh).
305.
Ramachandran, supra note 302, at 130.
Mehta, supra note 302, at 200.
306.
See Sudhir Krishnaswamy, ConstitutionalDurability, 615 SEMINAR 48, 51
307.
(2010) (arguing that the basic structure doctrine has helped to "ensure[] [India's]
constitutional survival"); Mehta, supra note 302, at 191-96 (articulating a defense of
the basic structure doctrine as a means of "protect[ing] democratic sovereignty from
usurpation by transient majorities"). Both the Indian Constitution and the Pakistan
Constitution may be formally amended relatively easily. In India, while amendment of
some constitutional provisions also requires ratification by legislatures in half of the
states, amendments to most provisions simply requires approval by a majority of the
total membership and two-thirds of those members present and voting in each house of
Parliament. INDIA CONST. art. 368. In Pakistan, formal constitutional amendment is
even easier, in virtually all instances simply requiring approval by a two-thirds
majority vote in each house of Parliament. PAKISTAN CONST. art. 239.
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the doctrine has contributed to the dramatic expansion of judicial
power, in fact the Supreme Court of India has exercised considerable
restraint in its exercise of that power. 308
Despite its readiness to draw upon Indian jurisprudence in other
contexts,30 9 the Supreme Court of Pakistan has been more equivocal
about the basic structure doctrine. On the one hand, although it has
been presented with arguments expressly based on the doctrine on
many occasions, the court has repeatedly-and expressly-declined to
fully and openly embrace it, most recently doing so in 2005.310
Pakistan's constitution expressly provides-in a provision added by
General Zia's Eighth Amendment-that Parliament's power "to
amend any of the provisions of the Constitution" is subject to "no
limitation whatever," and that amendments "shall not be called in
question in any court on any ground whatsoever."3 1 While the court
has described aspects of the constitution as "salient features" or
"essential features"-including "independence of the judiciary"-it
has never inferred a judicial power to remedy alleged infringements,
stating instead that any remedy "lay in the political and not the
judicial process."31 2 On the other hand, on occasion the court has
articulated a rule of constitutional interpretation, in the event of an
irreconcilable conflict between two provisions, that contemplates the
possibility of holding that the provision containing "lesser rights"
313
must yield to the provision containing "higher rights."

308.
See SHANKAR, supra note 132, at 177-78.
309.
See Maryam Khan, Selective Borrowings, 615 SEMINAR 56, 57-58 (2010)
(discussing the use of Indian constitutional jurisprudence by courts in Pakistan); Arun
K. Thiruvengadam, In Pursuit of 'The Common Illumination of Our House": TransJudicial Influence and the Origins of PIL Jurisprudence in South Asia, 2 INDIAN J.
CONST. L. 67, 95-97 (2008) (discussing the influence of Indian case law on early public
interest litigation cases in Pakistan).
310.
Pak. Lawyers Forum v. Fed'n of Pak., (2005) 57 PLD (SC) 719 (Pak.); Khan,
supra note 81, at 5 ("The Constitutional Courts of Pakistan . . . have never quite found
grounds for convergence with India on [the basic structure doctrine], thus insulating
constitutional amendments from substantive judicial review."); Feisal H. Naqvi, Not a
New Debate, DAWN, Apr. 23, 2010 (summarizing and analyzing "30 years of
uninterrupted case law" in which the Pakistan Supreme Court has "expressly rejected"
the basic structure doctrine).
311.
PAKISTAN CONST. art. 239(5)-(6). But cf. Minerva Mills Ltd. v. India, A.I.R.
1980 S.C. 1789 (India) (invalidating, on basic structure grounds, similar provisions
added to the Indian Constitution by Indira Gandhi's Forty-Second Amendment).
312.
Pak. Lawyers Forum, (2005) PLD (SC) at 763.
313.
KHAN, supra note 11, at 636-37 (discussing "higher rights" principle of
constitutional interpretation); see also, e.g., Wukala Mahaz Barai Tahafaz Dastoor v.
Fed'n of Pak., (1998) 50 PLD (SC) 1263 (Pak.); Mahmood Khan Achakzai v. Fed'n of
Pak., (1997) 49 PLD (SC) 426 (Pak.); Al-Jehad Trust v. Fed'n of Pak., (1996) 48 PLD
(SC) 324 (Pak.). But cf. LAU, supra note 21, at 82-83 (arguing that the Pakistan
Supreme Court had "establish [ed]" existence of basic structure doctrine by late 1990s).
As an interpretive principle ostensibly limited to conflicts between specific
constitutional provisions, this principle is, at least conceptually, narrower than the
basic structure doctrine, which not only tests constitutionality against "structural"
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Nevertheless, Pakistani lawyers, scholars, and other observers
have by and large expressed little enthusiasm for resolving this
tension in the court's precedent in favor of openly recognizing the
basic structure doctrine-particularly given the historical role of
Pakistan's judiciary in facilitating military interventions that have
undermined constitutionalism and representative institutions. 314 The
inconsistencies found in the doctrine's application in India might well
be compounded by Pakistan's shifting and interrupted constitutional
development, which could present greater challenges in ascertaining
which constitutional elements, over time, should be considered
legitimate parts of the basic structure and which should not.31 5 As the
Eighteenth Amendment itself illustrates, with its sweeping changes,
meaningful challenges to the accumulated entrenchment of deep
state power and other important constitutional reforms might well, in
some instances, require major changes to well-settled constitutional
understandings and practices that might or might not be deemed to
constitute part of some judicially fashioned "basic structure."
Observers also have been wary of the possibility that induction of the
basic structure doctrine into the Pakistani constitutional context
might result in elevation of the Objectives Resolution, which is rooted
in Islamic principles and which Zia incorporated into the text of the
constitution as Article 2A to grundnorm status-a position with

principles that transcend any particular constitutional provision, but also, as Sudhir
Krishnaswamy emphasizes, is not limited to review of constitutional amendments.
KRISHNASWAMY, supranote 302.
See generally Khan, supra note 309; Babar Sattar, People's Court?,
314.
COUNSEL, Fall/Winter 2010; Siddique, supra note 293; Cyril Almeida, Judicial
Appointment Process Under Fire, DAWN, Sep. 5, 2010, http:/atchives.dawn.com/
archives/38944 (quoting lawyer Salman Raja); Ejaz Haider, Judicial Dues Ex
Machina?, FRIDAY TIMES, Sep. 19, 2010; Nasir Iqbal, Aitzaz, Akram Spar Over
Parliament, DAWN, Apr. 21, 2010, http://archives.dawn.comlarchives/44080 (quoting
lawyer Aitzaz Ahsan); Maryam Khan, 7bwards a New Hegemony?, FRIDAY TIMES, Sep.
19, 2010; Naqvi, supra note 310; Salman Akram Raja, Excluding the People?, DAWN,
Oct. 15, 2010, http://dawn.com/2010/10/15/excluding-the-people-by-salman-akram-rajarepeated/; Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Amending the Constitution,DAILY TIMES, Apr. 11, 2010,
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010%5CO4%5C1 1%5Cstory_1 1-42010_pg3_2; Osama Siddique, Wasteland of Discourse, FRIDAY TIMES, Sep. 19, 2010.
See Khan, supra note 309, at 60 ("[T]he constitutional history of Pakistan,
315.
with its many constitutional deviations, does not speak of a consistent adoption of any
basic structure."); cf. Richard S. Kay, Changing the United Kingdom Constitution: The
Blind Sovereign, in SOVEREIGNTY IN Focus: DOMESTIC, EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES (Richard Rawlings, Peter Leyland & Alison Young eds., forthcoming
2013) (conceptualizing constitutional change, in both the United Kingdom and United
States, as entailing an extended series of discrete, "uncoordinated events by different
actors," rather than a single, "rule-making event"); LaCroix, supra note 19, at 1330-31
(questioning "central assumption[ ] in American constitutional law" that presumes
unitariness and continuity between political, legal, and institutional regimes over
time).
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which the court flirted during the 1990s, but which it has not
seriously pursued since then.316
B. Interpretingand Adjudicating "JudicialIndependence"
Against this jurisprudential backdrop, the Supreme Court's
decision to hear the petitions challenging the Eighteenth Amendment
at all-much less to convene a seventeen-judge bench to hear months'
worth of arguments-got people's attention. News reports soon
described the court and Parliament as being on course for a
"collision."31 7 When arguments in the Eighteenth Amendment cases
were held, members of the court appeared to respond enthusiastically
to the notion of applying some version of the basic structure doctrine
to scrutinize the amendment's consistency with independence of the
judiciary.31 8 Members of the court directly contested the notion that
Parliament's power to amend the constitution was "unfettered," even
though the constitution's text expressly states that it is.3 19 By one
observer's estimation, a majority of the court was prepared to
embrace some version of the basic structure doctrine to strike down
the judicial appointments provisions to some extent. 320
Of course, even accepting independence of the judiciary as part of
the constitution's basic structure offers little guidance by itself as to
what that "independence" concretely requires-with respect to the
appointments process or anything else. 3 21 Nevertheless, since

316.
See Siddique, supra note 293, at 54-55 & n.13 (cautioning that recognition
of the basic structure doctrine and grundnorm status for the Objectives Resolutions
"both carry the risk of creating and entrenching an all-encompassing, over-powerful
and unaccountable judiciary"); Ali Dayan Hasan, Objective Reality, DAWN, Aug. 6,
2010, http://archives.dawn.com/archives/28754 (discussing the Objectives Resolution
and its "misuse"). See generally lyer, supra note 20 (discussing the much-criticized
attempts by Pakistani courts to invoke Hans Kelsen's concept of grundnorm); Mahmud,
supra note 20, at 1244-47, 1255-57 (same).
317.
Mir Jamilur Rahman, Towards Collision, NEWS INT'L, Apr. 27, 2010; see
also Shafqat Mahmood, Are the Institutions Ready To Clash?, NEWS INT'L, Apr. 23,
2010 (anticipating Eighteenth Amendment litigation to be "the mother of all legal and
political battles").
318.
See Nasir Iqbal, Parliament Not Under Trial, Says CJ, DAWN, July 28,
2010, http://archives.dawn.com/archives/36559 (noting Justice Ramday's comments
that "courts in Pakistan were going through an evolutionary process and starting to
take note of the 'basic structure theory"').
319.
See Court Never Summoned Senator Rabbani, Says CJ, DAWN, Sep. 28,
2010, http://archives.dawn.com/archives/41578 (noting Chief Justice Chaudhry's
questioning whether Article 239 should be given effect since it was adopted under Zia);
Nasir Iqbal, Parliament Doesn't Have Unfettered Powers: CJ, DAWN, Aug. 17, 2010,
http://archives.dawn.com/archives/36562 (noting Chief Justice Chaudhry's comments
that Parliament lacked "unfettered powers" of constitutional amendment).
320.
See Almeida, supra note 314 (quoting an unnamed senior lawyer).
321.
See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 17, at 962-63 (maintaining that
abstract platitudes about judicial independence tend to be "as vapid as they are
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Chaudhry's restoration in 2009, the Supreme Court has made
increasingly loud noises about the importance of judicial
independence, not just as an ideal, but as a justiciable constitutional
requirement. As discussed above, in the PCO Judges Case, the court
invalidated the coalition government's June 2008 law expanding the
size of the Supreme Court in part for its inconsistency with
"independence of the judiciary."322 Several months later, the thirteenjudge bench that reinstated Chaudhry after his 2007 suspension by
Musharraf finally issued detailed reasons for that judgment. In
concluding that the President lacked authority to suspend judges, the
court characterized judicial independence as a "basic and salient
feature" of the constitution that required "security of office and of its
tenure."32 3 A month later, in the NRO Case, the court concluded that
by conferring authority upon a nonjudicial entity to withdraw
criminal cases without judicial consent, the NRO had infringed upon
"independence of the judiciary"-which the court again termed, in
abstract terms, as one of the constitution's "salient features." 324
Strikingly, the justices' comments during arguments conveyed
not only skepticism about the substance of the appointments
provisions, but disdain for Parliament itself-a remarkable contrast
from the favorable appraisals of Parliament's work, across a broad
spectrum of opinion, in adopting the Eighteenth Amendment. 325
Chaudhry criticized Parliament for lack of debate over the

axiomatic, ... the sort of thing that men and women on both sides of a discussion will
agree upon and serve up with perfect sincerity and conviction").
322.
Sindh High Court Bar Ass'n v. Fed'n of Pak., (2009) 61 PLD (SC) 1111-13,
1142-44 (Pak.).
323.
See Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry v. President of Pak., (2010) 62 PLD
(SC) 61, 173 (Pak.) (detailed judgment). The court grounded "judicial independence" in
the fundamental right to life, reasoning that the access to justice necessary to vindicate
that fundamental right would be "a mere farce and a mirage in the absence of an
independent judiciary . .. free of executive influence and pressures." Id. at 121.
Mobashir Hassan v. Fed'n of Pak., (2010) 62 PLD (SC) 265, 359-71 (Pak.).
324.
Although the court had only recently repudiated its extraconstitutional jurisprudence
of necessity in the PCO Judges Case, the court emphasized the discussion of judicial
independence in Zafar Ali Shah v Musharraf. That discussion came in an
extraconstitutional judgment in which the court-apparently "immune to irony," as
Paula Newberg observes-validated, among other things, Musharraf s subordination of
the judiciary following his 1999 coup. Paula R. Newberg, Balancing Act: Prudence,
Impunity, and Pakistan's Jurisprudence,in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SOUTH ASIAN
POLITICS: INDIA, PAKISTAN, BANGLADESH, SRI LANKA, AND NEPAL 177, 186 (Paul R.
Brass ed., 2010). Taking the logic of the PCO Judges Case to its conclusion would deem
Zafar Ali Shah a nullity as well. See supra note 159.
325.
See, e.g., FRUMAN, supra note 42, at 21-22; PAK. INST. OF LEGISLATIVE DEV.
& TRANSPARENCY, supra note 276; see also Mosharraf Zaidi, The Silver Lining in
"Memogate," FOREIGN POL'Y, Nov. 18, 2011 (praising Parliament's work in adopting the
Anti-Women Practices Bill of 2011 as embodying "how politics is supposed to work, in a
country where for decades it has not").
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amendment package. 326 Another justice criticized Parliament for not
taking the petitioners "into confidence" when drafting the
amendment, since bar associations and lawyers-as "common
litigants" before the court-were "the main stakeholders."32 7 Several
justices criticized Parliament for not articulating reasons why the
existing process required any changes.32 8 Justices even directly
questioned Parliament's legitimacy as a representative institution,
asserting that the Eighteenth Amendment did not reflect the "will of
the people," and that the Parliamentary Committee created under the
new process lacked sufficient democratic credentials because its
members-though all members of Parliament-"were not elected by
the public but by the leader of the House and the opposition." 32 9
When the court issued its decision, it exhibited more finesse than
in these comments, but forcefully asserted its autonomy all the same.
In a unanimous interim order, the court emphasized the centrality of
judicial independence as a "core value" of the constitution. 33 0
Crediting Parliament's good faith in adopting the provisions, the
court postponed any final decision on the merits, expressing a
preference to defer to Parliament "in the first instance." However,
while affording Parliament these courtesies, the court referred the
provisions back to Parliament for "re-consideration" in light of its
"concerns/reservations" and "observations/suggestions."s3 3 The court
then made explicit what it hoped to see upon "reconsideration,"
intimating that Article 175A's
"consonance" with judicial
independence required increasing the number of Supreme Court
judges on the Judicial Commission from two to four, thereby giving
the judiciary primacy. The court also "suggested" that if the
Parliamentary Committee disagreed with a recommendation by the
Judicial Commission, it should be required to "give very sound
reasons" and refer the nomination back to the Commission for
reconsideration. If the Commission reiterated its recommendation,
then its decision would be deemed binding and final. In the

326.
See Sohail Khan, Parliament Should Have Debated 18th Amendment: CJ,
NEWS INT'L, June 11, 2010; see also SC Thinks Government Doesn't Have "Good"
Advisers, DAWN, Sep. 2, 2010, http://archives.dawn.com/archives/35258 (noting Justice
Iqbal's concern that "no homework had been done" by PCCR when drafting the
appointments provisions).
327.
See Sohail Khan, 18th Amendment Destroyed CJs Institution: Ramday,
NEWS INT'L, July 29, 2010 (quoting Justice Ramday). Ramday went on to say that the
amendment constituted the very "destruction of the institution of the Chief Justice of
Pakistan." Id.
328.
Id.
329.
See Sohail Khan, 18th Amendment Eliminates Role of PM, says CJ, NEwS
INT'L, Sep. 1, 2010; Sohail Khan, Was the 18th Amendment Will of the People?, NEWS
INT'L, July 6, 2010 (quoting Chief Justice Chaudhry); SC Thinks Government Doesn't
Have "Good"Advisers,supra note 326.
330.
Nadeem Ahmed v. Fed'n of Pak., (2010) 62 PLD (SC) 1165, 1180-81 (Pak.).
331.
Id. at 1180, 1183.

80

VANDERBILT/OURNL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 46:1

meantime, since Article 175A had already gone into effect, the court
ordered its implementation with modifications along similar lines as
judicial
"consonance . . . with
ensure
to
"suggestions,"
its
independence."3 32
Nominally, the court struck a cooperative tone, emphasizing that
it did not regard "sovereignty of the Parliament and judicial
independence as competing values."33 3 Rather, the court stated,
"[b]oth the institutions are vital and indispensable ... and they do
not vie but rather complement each other so that the people could live
in peace and prosper in a society which is just and wherein the rule of
law reigns supreme." 334 Publicly, many acclaimed the court's decision
for being rendered in this spirit, avoiding the clash of institutions
that many had feared.3 35 At least superficially, the decision could be
understood as embodying restraint, avoiding direct resolution of the
contentious question of whether to recognize the basic structure
doctrine, 336 and appearing to contemplate "dialogue" with Parliament
33 7
in some manner.
However, given its longstanding jurisprudence largely rejecting
the basic structure doctrine, the court's decision to hear the petitions
in the first place could scarcely be termed an act of restraint. While
framed as affording deference to Parliament, behind this fatade the
subtext of the court's order seemed clear, if implicit, that if
Parliament did not revise the provisions to the court's liking, then it
would likely invalidate the provisions as beyond Parliament's
amendment power. Moreover, treating judicial independence as an
abstract but justiciable constitutional guarantee, as the court has
now edged toward doing in several cases, raises concerns whether or
not understood as part of the constitution's basic structure. For one
thing, placing responsibility for interpreting and specifying what

Id. at 1182, 1184-85.
332.
Id. at 1183-84.
333.
Id.
334.
Among some observers, however, such praise was more akin to a sigh of
335.
relief that the court had not openly embraced the basic structure doctrine. See Babar
Sattar, Judges as Legislators (Part 2), NEWS INT'L, Apr. 2, 2011 (arguing that the
court's interim order "was not a marvel of jurisprudential merit").
336.
Cf. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 360-67 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing the
statutory interpretation canon of "constitutional avoidance" in the United States).
See, e.g., ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS (1997) (discussing
337.
forms of "dialogue" between Congress and federal judiciary); Peter W. Hogg & Allison
A. Bushell, The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the
Charterof Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing After All), 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 75 (1997)
(analyzing ways that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom structures a form of
"dialogue" between judiciary and Parliament); Shylashri Shankar, The Judiciary,
Policy, and Politics in India, in THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN ASIA 56, 63 (Bjorn
Dressel ed., 2012) (arguing that the Supreme Court of India's accumulation of power
has resulted "not [in] the rise of a 'juristocracy' but a continuous dialogue with other
actors and organs of the state").
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"independence" requires with the judiciary itself leaves those
determinations with an actor institutionally self-interested in the
outcome.3 38 More fundamentally, as discussed earlier, judicial
independence is not an undifferentiated concept-as the court and
others often assume-but rather comprises an evolving balance
between judicial autonomy and constraint across a range of
relationships and dimensions.33 9 While courts obviously adjudicate
and specify abstract principles all the time, whether this conception
of judicial independence, given its nature, lends itself well to that
kind of concrete specification, through a process of common law, caseby-case adjudication of discrete issues, remains far from clear.
The court's piecemeal discussions of judicial independence
illustrate the difficulty. In each case, it assessed the particular issue
being considered against a static, abstract, and decontextualized
conception of judicial independence. Regardless of whether the
specific outcomes in any of these cases might have been desirable, the
court's methodology-perhaps unavoidably-neglects the larger,
overall balance between judicial autonomy and judicial constraint,
across the full range of relationships and dimensions from which
judicial independence arises. Such an approach is therefore unlikely
to pay sufficient heed to the dynamic, evolving, and context-sensitive
manner in which that overall balance should be assessed. These
concerns are significant enough when assessing the validity of
subconstitutional laws or actions. Of course, the stakes are selfevidently higher when evaluating constitutional amendments, as the
basic structure doctrine demands, since invalidation of an
amendment forecloses any response from representative institutions
and results in a permanent, entrenched change to the broader
institutional balance. 340
In any event, the "dialogue" between the court and Parliament
on the appointments process has been fairly unidirectional. In
response to the court's order, Parliament partially acquiesced by
the Nineteenth
promptly-and again unanimously-adopting
Amendment, which increased the number of senior judges on the
Judicial Commission from two to four. Parliament did not, however,
follow the court's guidance regarding the ability of the Judicial
Commission to overrule the Parliamentary Committee if it rejected
the Commission's nominees. 341 The court soon ensured the

338.
See Russell, supra note 132, at 23 (identifying and discussing concern that
in adjudicating alleged violations of judicial independence, "judges, in a sense, are
acting as judges in their own case").
See supra notes 128-133 and accompanying text.
339.
340.
See generally Khan, New Hegemony, supra note 314 (distinguishing
between legitimacy of judicial review of constitutional amendments and other ordinary
acts of Parliament).
341.
Constitution (19th Amend.) Act, 2010, No. 1 of 2011 (Pak.).
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Commission's supremacy over the Parliamentary Committee on its
own-and in effect, the court's own continued supremacy in the
appointments process. In early 2011, after the Committee rejected the
Commission's recommendations to extend the terms of several High
Court additional judges, a four-judge Supreme Court bench overruled
34 2
the Committee and ordered the nominees' terms to be extended.
The court limited the Committee's authority, concluding that the
expertise to question the
institutional
Committee lacked
Commission's conclusions regarding the "professional caliber, legal
acumen, judicial skill and quality and the antecedents" of judicial
nominees. 343 A concurring opinion by Justice Khawaja went further,
invoking "independence of the judiciary" as a constitutional
touchstone and relying upon the two Judges' Cases from the 1990s as
344
a means of preserving judicial supremacy over appointments.
The result of the court's two appointments decisions, as Cyril
Almeida observes, was essentially to "dictate" implementation of the
reformed judicial appointments process in a manner that "will pretty
much look like the [pre-Eighteenth Amendment] appointment
process."34 5 Even as it purported to act with restraint, the court had
aggressively asserted its power and autonomy-swatting away even
the modest constraints that Parliament had, unanimously, adopted
as constitutional amendments.

C. The Judiciaryand the Deep State
Since deciding the Eighteenth Amendment Case, the Supreme
Court's assertions of judicial autonomy have cut ever more deeply
into the core of parliamentary authority, most notably in two high
profile, deeply politicized cases. First, the court waded into the heart
of deep state politics by initiating a judicial investigation into the
circumstances surrounding the shadowy "Memogate" affair. That
controversy concerned an unsigned memo sent to U.S. military
officials in May 2011, days after the U.S. raid on Osama bin Laden's
compound, warning of a supposedly imminent military coup and

Munir Hussain Bhatti v. Fed'n of Pak., (2011) 63 PLD (SC) 407; see also
342.
Feisal H. Naqvi, Protecting the Independence of the Judiciary-I,EXPRESS TRIB., Mar.
13, 2011 (discussing Supreme Court's decision to overrule the Parliamentary
Committee); Supreme Court Decision Undermines Legislature, Says Asma Jahangir,
EXPRESS TRIB., Mar. 5, 2011 (reporting Supreme Court Bar Association President
Asma Jahangir's criticism of the Supreme Court's decision).
343.
Munir Hussain Bhatti, (2011) PLD (SC) at 443-45.
Id. at 465-67 (Khawaja, J., concurring).
344.
Cyril Almeida, Breathing Room, DAWN, Oct. 22, 2010, http://dawn.com/
345.
2010/10/22/by-cyril-almeida-5/; see also Mohammad Waseem, Clash of Institutions in
Pakistan, ECON. & POL. WKLY., July 14, 2012, at 16, 17 (arguing that the court "has
made it clear, if not in letter but in spirit, that the interpreters of the Constitution are
above the makers of the Constitution").
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asking U.S. officials to intercede to prevent it. 346 According to a
Pakistani American named Manjoor Ijaz, who claimed to have
delivered the memo to U.S. officials, the memo was written by thenAmbassador to the United States Husain Haqqani on behalf of
Zardari, both of whom long had been at odds with military and
security interests. A media firestorm immediately ensued over the
mysterious origins of the memo and its possibly "treasonous" nature.
Haqqani denied Ijaz's allegations, but was forced to resign as
ambassador. The Prime Minister then announced that a
parliamentary committee would investigate the matter. The military
also launched its own formal investigation-amidst rumors that the
entire affair had been engineered, somewhat clumsily, by deep state
elements to undermine the PPP-led government and that a coup even
might be imminent. 347
Meanwhile, the PML-N's Sharif and other opposition figures
filed petitions with the Supreme Court requesting a judicial
investigation, and in the course of reviewing those petitions, the court
ordered Haqqani not to leave Pakistan, despite concerns for his safety
and amidst allegations that the court had denied him due process of
law.34 8 In response, the military-directly filing responses with the
court at its direction, but apparently without the civilian
government's consent-encouraged the court to investigate the
matter, while both the government and Haqqani urged it not to do so,
especially since Parliament was undertaking its own investigation. 34 9

346.
See Josh Rogin, Exclusive: Secret Pakistani-U.S. Memo Offering Overthrow
of Military Leadership Revealed, FOREIGN POL'Y: CABLE, Nov. 17, 2011,
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/17/exclusive-secret-pakistan-usmemo
revealed-ijaz calls amb-haqqani architect of sche (discussing memo). The actual
memo is available at http://foreignpolicy.com/files/fp-uploaded-documents/ 111 17_Ij az
%20memo%2OForeign%2OPolicy.PDF.
347.
See generally Walsh, supra note 15 (discussing Ijaz's allegations); Simon
Denyer, Pakistan's Memo Scandal Pits Military Against Zardari Government, WASH.
POST, Dec. 16, 2011, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-12-16/world/35287553_1_
zardari-government-memo-husain-haqqani (discussing the military's inquiry into Ijaz's
allegations); Memogate Probe by Parliament Committee, DAWN, Nov. 29, 2011,
http://epaper.dawn.com/-epaper/Detaillmage.php?Storylmage=29_11_2011_001_011
(discussing Parliament's investigation into Ijaz's allegations).
348.
See Salman Masood & Eric Schmitt, A Diplomat in a Gilded Cage, Feeling
Trapped and Not Entirely Safe, N.Y. TIMES, January 9, 2012, at A7 (discussing
restrictions imposed upon Haqqani's freedom of movement); see also PML-N Seeks
Memogate Probe Commission, DAWN, Nov. 19, 2011, http://epaper.dawn.com/~epaper/
Detaillmage.php?Storylmage=19_11_2011_001 003 (discussing PML-N's demand for a
Supreme Court investigation). The court later eased those travel restrictions, enabling
Haqqani to depart for Washington. Nasir Iqbal, Court Lifts Haqqani Travel
Restrictions, DAWN, Jan. 31, 2012, http://dawn.com/2012/01/31/memo-commission-gets2-month-extension-court-lifts-haqqani-travel-restrictions/.
349.
See Memogate Case: Kayani, Pasha Replies Were Illegal, Implies PM,
EXPRESS TRIB., Jan. 10, 2012, http://tribune.com.pk/story/319209/memogate-gilaniterms-kayani-pasha-sc-replies-unconstitutional/ (discussing the Prime Minister's
statements "that Kayani and Pasha's replies to the Supreme Court were illegal, given
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However, the court admitted the petitions and established the
commission, concluding that the matter implicated fundamental
rights and was of sufficient public importance to warrant the court's
review. 35 0 In an unusual manner, the court's fundamental rights
reasoning was imbued with national security considerations. The
court concluded that the existence and contents of the memo "have
threatened the independence, sovereignty, and security of the
country," and accordingly, that the circumstances surrounding the
"origin, authenticity, and purpose" of the memo implicated the
petitioners' fundamental rights to life, dignity, and information under
the constitution.3 51
Second, the PPP-led government's prolonged unwillingness to
implement the court's December 2009 judgment in the NRO Case
prompted the court to convict Prime Minister Gilani of contempt of
court and take the remarkable step of directly ordering his
disqualification and removal from office. 352 Following the court's
December 2009 judgment, the government had deployed an array of
tactics to avoid its implementation-and in particular, to avoid
writing Swiss authorities to request reinstatement of the charges
against Zardari.35 3 The delaying tactics were widely understood as
calculated not only to protect Zardari from legal exposure, but also to
at least try to protect the PPP-led government from the political

they did not have clearance" from the civilian government); Saeed Shah, Pakistan
Army Steps Up Confrontation with Government, GUARDIAN, Jan. 11, 2012,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/1 1/pakistan-army-confrontation-government
(discussing the civilian government's position that the court should "drop the case" in
deference to Parliament's own pending investigation); Faisal Shakeel, Rejoinders:
Army, ISI Chiefs Stick to Their Guns on Memo, EXPRESS TRIB., Dec. 22, 2011,
http://tribune.com.pk/story/310328/mod-reply-we-only-handle-administrative-mattersof-isi-not-operationall (discussing the positions of various actors on whether the court
should formally investigate the circumstances surrounding the memo).
Watan Party v. Fed'n of Pak., (2011) 63 PLD (SC) 997 (Pak.).
350.
Id. at 1053, 1068-82. The commission established by the court later
351.
concluded that Haqqani was the author of the memo, but that Zardari had no
involvement. See Azam Khan, 'Boss' Zardari Had No Involvement in Memogate:
Commission Report, EXPRESS TRIB., June 16, 2012, http://tribune.com.pk/story/394746/
has
Haqqani
boss-zardari-had-no-involvement-in-memogate-commission-report/.
denied any involvement, and at this writing his challenge to its report is pending
before a nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court. Husain Haqqani, My Real 'Crime'
Against Pakistan,WASH. POST, June 14, 2012, at Al9; SC To Hear Memogate Case on
Oct 22, NEWS INT'L, Oct. 12, 2012.
See Azam Khan, Gone: 'The Office of the Prime Minister Stands Vacant,'
352.
EXPRESS TRIB., June 20, 2012, http://tribune.com.pk/story/396325/gone/; Anil Kalhan,
Love in the Time of Contempt, DORF ON LAW, Feb. 14, 2012, http://www.dorfonlaw.org/
2012/02/love-in-time-of-contempt.html.
See Khawar Ghumman, Government To Defend Executive's Authority,
353.
DAWN, July 20, 2011, http://dawn.comi/2011/07/20/government-to-defend-executivesauthority/.
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fallout it would likely endure by placing itself on record as requesting
criminal charges against its own head of state and party co-chair. 354
After the government had stalled implementation for over two
years, the Supreme Court's patience finally reached its limit. In a
January 2012 order, the court enumerated six "unpleasant" options it
might take to address the government's recalcitrance-ranging from
direct, outright disqualification of the President and Prime Minister
or the initiation of contempt proceedings against the Prime Minister,
at the aggressive end of the spectrum, to leaving the matter in the
hands of Parliament or the people of Pakistan, at its more restrained
end. In between these two extremes, the court floated the idea of
creating a commission to monitor the implementation of its
judgment.3 5 5 The less severe options might have exposed the court as
incapable of fully enforcing its order. As a practical matter, however,
the court faced that prospect anyway, since the likelihood of Swiss
proceedings against Zardari ultimately being revived was exceedingly
limited. 356
The court opted to indict Gilani for contempt. In response, the
Prime Minister argued, among other things, that he could not
constitutionally write the letter because, as President, Zardari had
absolute immunity from criminal prosecution during his term of
office. A seven-judge bench rejected Gilani's arguments and convicted
him in April 2012, but only imposed a symbolic sentence lasting
approximately thirty seconds. 35 7 At the time, some observers
interpreted this "token" sentence as an effort by the court to back
down from the conflict and instead let Gilani's fate be determined by
the political process. 3 58 However, in May 2012, the Speaker of the
National Assembly ruled that the conviction did not require Gilani's
referral to the Election Commission for disqualification from holding

354.
See Cyril Almeida, The Swiss Conundrum, DAWN, Feb. 5, 2012,
http://dawn.com/2012/02/05/the-swiss-conundrum/ (assessing political consequences if
the letter to Swiss authorities were written).
355.
Adnan Khawaja v. State, Crim. M.A. 486/2010 (Jan. 10, 2012) (Pak.), available
at http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-30345-SC-NRO-Implementation-verdict-text.
356.
See generally Kalhan, supra note 352 (discussing the low probability that
any proceedings in Switzerland against Zardari would be revived).
357.
See In re Yousaf Raza Gilani, Crim. O.P. 6/2012 (Apr. 26, 2012) (Pak.) (short
order) (on file with author); In re Yousaf Raza Gilani (detailed judgment), available at
http://www.scribd.com/docl92823324fPrime-Minister-Gilani-s-Case-Detailed-Verdict
(sentencing Gilani until the "rising of the court").
358.
Jon Boone, Pakistani PM Serves Token Sentence of Less than a Minute for
Contempt, GUARMAN, Apr. 26, 2012; see also Declan Walsh, PakistaniPrime Minister
Is Spared Jail but Faces More Battles, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 27, 2012, at AS (characterizing
the court's decision as a "victory of sorts" for Gilani and the PPP). The court stated that
the likelihood of "serious consequences in terms of Article 63(1)(g) of the Constitution,"
including the possibility of a five-year ban from serving in Parliament, constituted a
"mitigating factor[]" when imposing Gilani's sentence, but did not treat those potential
consequences as part of the sentence itself. In re Yousaf Raza Gilani, T 2 (short order).
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office under Article 63(1)(g). 35 9 Opposition politicians petitioned the
Supreme Court to overrule the Speaker's decision.360 In June 2012, a
three-judge bench of the court, including Chaudhry, exercised
jurisdiction to review the Speaker's decision, overruled that
determination, and directly ordered Gilani's disqualification on its
own-with retroactive effect from the date of his conviction in April
2012.361 The court again invoked judicial independence as a basis for
its decision, concluding that the Speaker's ruling had "defied the
principles of independence of the judiciary" by disregarding and
effectively trying to overrule the court's own conclusion, in convicting
Gilani of contempt, that he had brought the Supreme Court and
judiciary "into ridicule." 362
With these assertions of autonomy since Chaudhry's restoration
to office, the Supreme Court has veered remarkably close to reprising
its traditional role of facilitating the subversion of representative
institutions-relying in the process, once again, on an underlying
discourse that coincides with the military's own legitimating
discourse. In the Memogate Case, the court directly invoked the deep
state's interests to privilege its own investigation over that of
Parliament, and to privilege national security over fundamental
rights. Haqqani's lawyer, Asma Jahangir, went so far as to suggest
that the military, unable or unwilling to directly intervene to remove
Zardari or the PPP-led government in Parliament, instead sought to
use the judiciary and the government's political opponents to subvert
the civilian government indirectly. 36 3 But even in the absence of any
conspiracy, the episode illustrates Pakistan's institutional
disequilibrium at work and the way in which the judiciary can

359.
Article 63(l)(g) of the Pakistan Constitution provides for disqualification
from Parliament for any individual that "has been convicted by a court of competent
jurisdiction for propagating any opinion, or acting in any manner, prejudicial to . .. the
integrity or independence of the judiciary of Pakistan, or which defames or brings into
ridicule the judiciary or the Armed Forces of Pakistan." PAKISTAN CONST. art. 63(1)(g).
Article 63(2) confers the Speaker of the National Assembly with authority to refer any
question as to potential disqualification to the Election Commission "unless he decides
that no such question has arisen." Id. art. 63(2). Under Article 63(3), if the Election
Commission then "is of the opinion that the member has become disqualified," then the
individual will cease to be a member of Parliament. Id. art. 63(3).
360.
See Nasir Iqbal, Petitions Filed in SC: PML-N, PTI Want Gilani
Disqualified, DAWN, May 29, 2012, http://dawn.com/2012/05/29/petitions-filed-in-sepml-n-pti-want-gilani-disqualified/.
361.
Muhammad Azhar Siddique v. Fed'n of Pak., (2012) 64 PLD (SC) 106
(Pak.).
Id.
15, 22-23.
362.
See Sidrah Moiz Khan, "DarkestDay" for Judiciary:National Security Has
363.
Trumped Fundamental Rights: Asma, EXPRESS
TRIB.,
Dec.
30,
2011,
http://tribune.com.pk/story/314153/civilian-authority-has-come-under-the-army-asmajehangir/ (reporting Jahangir's criticisms); Syed Irfan Raza, Asma Criticises Memo
Commission, Quits as Haqqani Lawyer, DAWN, Jan. 2, 2012, http://dawn.com/2012/
01/02/asma-criticises-memo-commission-quits-as-haqqani-lawyer/ (same).
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weaken representative institutions to the benefit of military and deep
state interests. In the case of Gilani's disqualification, the court set
itself up as an "arbitrator[] of democratic righteousness," assuming
for itself the role of not only determining whether democratically
elected legislators are sufficiently honest to remain in office, but also
whether Parliament's own internal processes are sufficient to police
those qualifications. 364 Although the court recognized, as it had in
previous cases, that the constitution confers the Speaker and Election
Commission with discretionary and apparently exclusive authority
over questions of disqualification from Parliament, the court's
decision purported to eliminate the discretion of both the Speaker and
the Election Commission altogether in cases involving "conviction of a
member of Parliament by a court of competent jurisdiction."365
Rather, the court essentially concluded, disqualification would flow
automatically as a consequence of any such conviction, subject only to
appellate judicial review of the conviction itself.
In both cases, the court functioned as an extraparliamentary
broker, like the President and military during the 1990s, to whom
opposition politicians turn when seeking short-term advantage
against the party in government. In both cases, the court also cut
closer to the core of Parliament's inner workings. In the Memogate
Case, the court declined to defer its own investigation in favor of
Parliament's own inquiry, while in the Gilani disqualification case,
the court took the remarkable step of reviewing and overruling a
ruling made by the Speaker of the National Assemblycharacterizing it as falling outside the "internal proceedings" of
Parliament precluded from review under the constitution. 366 The
court also directly ordered the President of Pakistan, following
Gilani's retroactive dismissal, "to take necessary steps .. . to ensure
continuation of the democratic process through parliamentary system
of government." 36 7 The implication in both of these cases was a
paternalistic one: in matters near the core of the democratic process,

364.
Siddiqi, supra note 132.
365.
Muhammad Azhar Siddique, (2012) PLD 106, IT 28, 48 (distinguishing
Articles 63(1)(a), (g), & (h) from other subsections of Article 63(1)).
366.
See id. TT 33-35 (characterizing the Speaker's determination as an
"administrative task" subject to judicial review). While the court cited case law from
the Supreme Court of India in support of this conclusion, at least one leading Indian
constitutional lawyer has said that those cases have "nothing to do with the situation
in Pakistan." Experts Divided on Pakistan Court Citing Indian Verdicts, HINDU, June
20, 2012, http://www.thehindu.com/news/nationallarticle3551660.ece (quoting Rajeev
Dhavan).
Muhammad Azhar Siddique, Const. P. No. 40/2012 & CMA No. 2494/12
367.
(June 19, 2012) (short order).
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Parliament and the President could not be trusted to handle their
own affairs without the judiciary's oversight.3 68
D. JudicialPopulism and JudicialAccountability
In the United States, scholars have extensively studied the
relationships between judicial decision making and public opinion.36 9
Recent experiences in Pakistan offer an interesting context in which
to examine those relationships, as the judges of Pakistan's higher
judiciary rapidly have come to understand their roles and
professional identities as being defined and legitimated directly by
the Pakistani people. The seeds of this self-conception were sown
before the lawyers' movement, when the Supreme Court began to
expand its use of public interest litigation and suo motu powers.370 As
Upendra Baxi observed thirty years ago, as the Supreme Court of
India was embarking on its own innovations with public interest
litigation, these mechanisms of adjudication can open "new bases of
legitimation of [judicial] power and authority, relatively autonomous
from the executive and the legal profession," since they are not
mediated by other state institutions or the legal community, but
rather purport to engage ordinary litigants directly.37 1
In the wake of the anti-Musharraf movement's popular
mobilizations in support of the judiciary, this self-conception has
deepened further. As the lawyers' movement's leaders have
emphasized, the movement's strategies were self-consciously designed
to sensitize judges to issues of concern to the legal community and the

368.
See Saroop Ijaz, Don't Pity Us, My Lord, EXPRESS TRIB., May 12, 2012,
http://tribune.com.pk/story/377911/dont-pity-us-my-lord/ (criticizing Justice Khosa's
concurring opinion in the Gilani disqualification case as "purely political and polemical
writing" and "paternalistic," and interpreting it as having "very strong whiffs of
contempt for our weak nation").
369.

See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC

OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE
CONSTITUTION (2009); Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence
the Supreme Court-Possibly Yes (But We're Not Sure Why), 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 263
(2010).

See PAK. SUPREME COURT., ANNUAL REPORT, APRIL, 2010-DECEMBER, 2011,
370.
2
(discussing
at 128, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/page.asp?id=38
the court's Human Rights Cell); Kausar, supra note 22; Kennedy, supra note 22.
BAXI, supra note 131, at 33; see also Khan, supra note 81, at 3 (discussing
371.
ways in which public interest litigation can enable the judiciary to "act fairly
autonomously in assuming judicial control over issues of public importance"). Until
recently, however, as Maryam Khan observes, the jurisprudence of public interest
litigation in Pakistan, to a somewhat greater extent than in India, has carried "a more
conspicuous flavor of political elite struggle in the larger battle for democratization,"
emphasizing adjudication of the political claims of those elite interests more
prominently than the fundamental rights claims of ordinary litigants. Khan, supra
note 81, at 5.
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public. 372 When the demonstrations against Musharraf and in
support of the judiciary widened to include more ordinary citizens,
particularly during the emergency, judges increasingly came to
understand themselves as both accountable to and legitimated by the
members of the public who rallied in their support.37 3 For example,
Chaudhry's own account of the judiciary's role, as articulated in a
speech at Harvard Law School in 2008, self-consciously justifies the
court's assertions of autonomy and power-against both "civilian as
well as uniformed politicians and our intelligence agencies"-as being
designed to benefit "the general population at large and the
economy." 374
Since Chaudhry's restoration to office in March 2009, this
institutional self-understanding also has been increasingly manifest
in the court's opinions.3 7 5 In his concurring opinion in the Gilani
contempt decision, for example, Justice Asif Saeed Khan Khosa traces
a straight line from the will of the people not to Gilani's status as
member of Parliament and Prime Minister, but to his contempt
conviction-owing to the fact that "ultimate ownership of the
Constitution" and its institutions "rests with the people of the country
who have adopted the Constitution":
The power to punish a person for committing contempt of court is
primarily a power of the people of this country to punish such person
for contemptuous conduct or behavior displayed by him towards the
courts created by the people .. .. It is, thus, obvious that a person
defying a judicial verdict in fact defies the will of the people at large
and the punishment meted out to him for such recalcitrant conduct or
behavior is in fact inflicted upon him not by the courts but by the people

372.
See MALIK, supra note 144, at 76-77 (explaining that the movement sought
"to change the mindset of the judges, especially those who manned the superior
courts"); Ghias, supra note 22, at 1009 (noting comments by leaders of the lawyers'
movement that "the responsibility of the bar is to sensitize the Court to political
questions-and the Court was sensitized when public opinion was mobilized").
See Pakistani Lawyer's Movement, supra note 22, at 1722-23 (discussing
373.
effect of lawyers' movement and anti-emergency demonstrations on judges' professional
identities); Walsh, supra note 15, at Al ("Judges say their expanded mandate comes
from the people, dating back to the struggle against the military rule of Gen. Pervez
Musharraf.").
374.
Chaudhry, supra note 14 (emphasis added); see also Cyril Almeida, A
Jan. 22, 2012, http://dawn.com/2012/01/22/aTransformative Court, DAWN,
transformative-court/ ("Having slain a military ruler, the Supreme Court under Chief
Justice Chaudhry has embarked on a transformative agenda.").
375.
See Raza Rumi, The Task Ahead, NEWS INT'L, Apr. 11, 2010 (discerning a
"clear tilt towards the popular as opposed to the technically legal" in the court's
decisions after Chaudhry's restoration, including the NRO Case); Siddiqi, supra note
132, (discussing Supreme Court's self-conception since 2007 that "real power lies in its
ability to represent itself as a people's court or as the 'Supreme Court of the People of
Pakistan').
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of the country themselves acting through the courts created and
376
established by them.

Justice Khawaja made similar observations in his opinion concurring
in the judgment disqualifying Gilani from office, claiming for the
judiciary a coequal basis, with Parliament, for reflecting the popular
will.3 77 Justice Khawaja directly contested the notion that
"Parliament alone represent[s] the will of the people," asserting
instead that by exercising its contempt power and disqualifying
Gilani, the court had "performed its democratic role stated in the
Constitution to keep elected representatives in compliance with the
will of the people manifested in the Constitution."3 78
At one level, this depiction of the judicial role might be
understood as reflecting a popular sovereignty-based understanding
of constitutionalism in which the judiciary-no less than other
government institutions-is both legitimized and constrained by a
constitution that embodies and reflects the popular will.3 79 And to be
sure, even as it has challenged civilian politicians, the court
simultaneously has tried to continue asserting its autonomy and
power vis-A-vis military and deep state interests as well. For
example, in recent years the court has moved forward on two
sensitive cases involving the intelligence agencies, one investigating
the circumstances in which individuals have "disappeared" while in
the custody of intelligence officials and one investigating allegations
that the agencies had infiltrated and manipulated the political
process during the 1990s.3 80 However, the court's aggressiveness with

6 (Apr. 26, 2012) (Pak.)
376.
In re Yousaf Raza Gilani, Crim. O.P. 6/2012,
(detailed judgment) (Khosa, J., concurring), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/
92823324/Prime-Minister-Gilani-s-Case-Detailed-Verdict.
377.
See Siddique v. Fed'n of Pak., (2012) PLD (SC) 106, 1 7 (Pak.) (Khawaja, J.,
concurring).
2, 7.
Id.
378.
See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/ConstitutionalLaw, 99
379.
YALE L.J. 453, 464-65 (1989) (describing how, under a "dualist" theory of
constitutionalism, courts, "[r]ather than threatening democracy by frustrating the
statutory demands of the political elite," instead "serve democracy by protecting the
hard-won judgments of a mobilized citizenry against fundamental change by political
elites who have failed to establish the requisite kind of mobilized support from the
citizenry at large"); David S. Law, A Theory of JudicialPower and Judicial Review, 97
GEO. L.J. 723, 730 (2009) (arguing that judicial review "supports popular sovereignty
by mitigating the principal-agent problem that lies at the heart of democratic
government").
See Asghar Khan v. Beg, Hum. Rts. Case No. 19 of 1996 (Oct. 19, 2012)
380.
(Pak.) (short order), available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/453773/asghar-khan-caseshort-order-full-text/ (ordering legal action to be taken against retired generals
involved in manipulating the 1990 elections, and ordering military and intelligence
agencies not to interfere with political process); Declan Walsh, Court Challenges Put
Unusual Spotlight on Pakistani Spy Agency, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 2012, at A4
(discussing Supreme Court cases against Pakistan's intelligence agencies); 1990
Election Was Rigged, Rules SC, Dawn, Oct. 19, 2012, http://dawn.com/
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cases involving civilian politicians goes.well beyond an understanding
of its role rooted in conventional popular sovereignty-based
constitutional principles, carrying instead the more directly populist
valence of the anti-Musharraf movement.38 1 And whether the court
will successfully manage to be genuinely evenhanded in its treatment
of civilian versus military interests over the longer term, in the face
of continued military and deep state dominance, remains highly
uncertain.38 2
Fashioning a judicial role more conducive to reinforcing
democratic consolidation will require directly confronting and moving
beyond at least two ironies that may be seen in the higher judiciary's
increasingly populist institutional self-identity, which Faisal Siddiqi
characterizes as a self-conception of "judicial sovereignty."3 83 The first
irony involves a disconnect between the priorities of the higher
judiciary and other pressing public needs in reform of the judicial
system. After all, a judiciary animated by a sense of accountability to
and legitimation by the Pakistani people might, in fact, prioritize its
work somewhat differently. As Osama Siddique argues, the court's
extensive investment of resources in major political cases-which it
increasingly undertakes in the name of the "people"-might, from
another perspective, be "tantamount to neglecting an uplift of what is
essential from the standpoint of [ordinary citizens] who daily face a
deeply eroded court system," over which the Supreme Court and High

Asghar
Khan);
(discussing
2012/10/19/asghar-khan-case-sc-resumes-hearing-3/
Allbritton & Chaudhry, supra note 15 (discussing journalist Ahmed Rashid's view that
the court "has also given at least the appearance of being willing to take on the
military").
381.
See Faisal Siddiqi, A Defining Judicial Moment, DAWN, May 21, 2012,
http://dawn.com/2012/05/21/a-defining-judicial-moment/ (identifying and discussing
Supreme Court's "new judicial philosophy of basing judicial legitimacy not only on the
written words of constitutional legitimacy but also on public legitimacy and potential
public mobilisation").
382.
Saroop Ijaz, Setting the Record Straight, EXPRESS TRIB., Oct. 21, 2012,
the
(contrasting
http://tribune.com.pk/story/454377/setting-the-record-straight-3/
court's aggressive decisions against Parliament, such as the dismissal of Gilani from
office outright in the NRO contempt case, with its more restrained decision to merely
"ask[] the federal government to investigate" and prosecute military and intelligence
agencies' unconstitutional interference with electoral process in Asghar Khan). In
recent months, the military has begun to push back against these assertions of
autonomy by the court. See Imdad Hussain, Don't Cross the Limits: Kayani, DAILY
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2012, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2012%5C11%
5C06%5Cstory_6-11-2012_pgl_1 (discussing a speech by General Kayani defending the
military against criticisms in Asghar Khan and warning the court and other
institutions to act within limits).
Siddiqi, supra note 141 (arguing that the Supreme Court's removal of
383.
Gilani as Prime Minister was enabled by "the perceived unpopularity of his
government and the lack of popular resistance to such judicial removal").
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Courts have ultimate supervisory responsibility. 384 Notwithstanding
tools like public interest litigation and suo moto powers, ordinary
Pakistani citizens are still much more likely to interact with courts in
the lower judiciary, which suffer from huge case backlogs, widespread
corruption, uneven quality, and other problems interfering with
access to justice.38 5 Even within the higher judiciary itself, the
intensive focus on these political cases necessarily means that other
public interest cases get placed on the back burner. 386
The second irony concerns the nature of the judiciary's perceived
legitimation and accountability. While the judges increasingly
understand themselves as directly legitimated by the people, in fact
the judiciary has no direct lines of accountability to that source of
legitimation. The people have no direct role in the appointment or
removal of judges-and indeed, given the manner in which the
appointment and removal processes have evolved, the people do not
even have a meaningful indirect role through their elected
representatives in Parliament. There is no way for public opinion to
directly inform judicial decision making in any sort of unmediated
way. While judges might hope to infer the will of the people from
Pakistan's increasingly lively and open media, the often
sensationalist and partisan nature of much media coverage and its
susceptibility to deep state influence make the media an imperfect
proxy for popular will.3 87 Indeed, Pakistan's judiciary has
increasingly sought to curtail even these limited lines of judicial

384.

Siddique, supra note 314; see also MARC GALANTER, LAW AND SOCIETY IN

MODERN INDIA 295 (1989) (drawing attention, in the context of India, to the distinction
between "higher state" and "local state"); supra note 30.
See Walsh, supra note 15, at Al (noting that "critics accuse Mr. Chaudhry
385.
of failing to reform the chaotic lower courts, which remain plagued by long backlogs");
Nick Jackson, The Last Word: "Not Judicial Diktat," NEWSWEEK PAK., July 6 & July
3
13, 2012, http://www.newsweekpakistan.com/component/content/article/36-scope/14 7not-judicial-diktat (interviewing Human Rights Watch's Ali Dayan Hasan and
discussing problems with access to justice in Pakistan).
386.
See JudiciaryAlways Supports Army Rule, Rues Asma, EXPRESS TRIB., Jan. 12,
http://tribune.com.pk/story/319949/asma-jahangir-criticises-judiciarys-approval-of2012,
past-military-takeovers/ (recounting lawyer Asma Jahangir's view that instead of pursuing
the NRO case, the Supreme Court should instead "take up thousands of other pending
cases'); Shyema Sajjad, Justice, Samosas and the Ostrich, DAWN, July 27, 2012,
that
hopes
("One
http://dawn.com/2012/07/27/justice-for-ostriches-and-samosas/
between the madness and monotony of the Swiss letter cases, our judiciary will
eventually realize that there are families and institutions and individuals all waiting
for justice . . .. [The Court] needs to think about what matters more and prioritise its
time and rulings accordingly."); see also Khan, supra note 81, at 5 (discussing the
emphasis in Pakistan's public interest litigation jurisprudence on contestation among
political elites).
See Waseem, supra note 345, at 17 (discussing skewed nature of discourse
387.
in Pakistan's "media echo-chamber," especially in light of formal legal prohibitions
against putting the military and judiciary "in disrepute" in media coverage); supra
notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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accountability by attempting to restrict criticism of the judiciary in
the media.38 8
In this context, a judiciary that sincerely desires its legitimation
to rest with the Pakistani people has an interest in stronger
representative institutions and stronger lines of accountability to
those institutions, and a more robust public conversation on how to
implement mechanisms of judicial accountability that could help to
better legitimate the role that the Supreme Court has increasingly
sought to perform.38 9 So far, however, Parliament has not effectively
asserted meaningful external constraints upon the judiciary. To be
sure, the government has not, by any means, conceded that the
Supreme Court has always been acting lawfully and constitutionally.
But it also has not been in a position to act forcefully upon that
position. For example, in what one might consider a rather feeble
variant on departmentalism,3 90 the PPP-led government questioned
the court's disqualification and dismissal of Gilani and, even after
designating a new Prime Minister, Raja Pervez Ashraf, to replace
Gilani, continued to resist the court's orders to write the Swiss letter
in the NRO Case. Given that resistance, the court initiated contempt
proceedings against Ashraf, as it had against Gilani, and the cycle
began anew.39 1 At the same time-apparently owing in large measure
to the risk of military intervention in the event of an escalating
constitutional showdown-at no point did the government seriously
contest the court's remarkable sanction, opting instead to acquiesce to
Gilani's judicially ordered dismissal.3 9 2 While senior PPP officials
intimated that the government was prepared to continue playing this
game of chicken indefinitely-permitting the court to continue
ousting sacrificial prime ministers by using its contempt power until
the government's full term of office was complete and elections were

388.
See Pakistan: Judges Muzzling Critics in the Media HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/11/27/pakistan-judges-muzzling-criticsmedia.
389.
Cf. Faisal Siddiqi, Why Is the SC So Powerful?, DAWN, Oct. 15, 2012,
http://dawn.com/2012/10/15/why-is-the-sc-so-powerfull (arguing that "the key challenge
[in Pakistan] is not to fear a powerful Supreme Court but to develop mechanisms to
ensure the public accountability of judicial power").
390.
See Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Linking the Questions: Judicial Supremacy as a
Matter of Constitutional Interpretation, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1309, 1318-25 (2012)
(discussing departmentalism and similar theories of shared authority over
constitutional interpretation between the judiciary and other state actors).
391.
See Adnan Khawaja v. State, Crim. Misc. Application No. 486/2010 in
Crim. Appeal No. 22/2002 (Aug. 8, 2012) (Pak.) (short order) (ordering Prime Minister
Ashraf to show cause as to why he had not written the letter to Swiss authorities).
392.
See Siddiqi, supra note 389 ("The reason why the PPP-led government is
not willing to take on the [Supreme Court] is because of the permanent danger of
military intervention in the face of a constitutional deadlock.").
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scheduled-ultimately, the government acquiesced and agreed to
draft the letter to Swiss officials.39 3
Ultimately, this pattern of responses-standing, of course, in
sharp contrast to the constraints to which the judiciary is vulnerable
from military and deep state interests-is one of institutional
weakness, not strength. Parliament has not been able to
meaningfully constrain the judiciary or, indeed, even tried
particularly hard to do so. 394 Most recently, while the government has
attempted to shield the Office of the Prime Minister from the
Supreme Court's assertions of power, by adopting a new Contempt of
Court Act that limits the court's contempt power, a five-judge bench
invalidated that law as unconstitutional. Notably, the court
interpreted its constitutional power to punish contempt of court as
effectively plenary, concluding that the constitution did not permit
Parliament to "curtail[] the [contempt] powers of the Supreme Court"
and that any such limitation would infringe upon the "dignity" and
independence of the judiciary. 395 The court also has continued to cast
more fundamental aspersions on Parliament's legitimacy as a
democratic institution that echo the deep state's legitimating
discourse. 396 Even as the court continues to assert its autonomy in
the name of "judicial independence," a judiciary without an
appropriate balance between autonomy and constraint, across the full
range of its relationships with other actors, remains elusive.

See Declan Walsh & Salman Masood, Pakistani Government Relents in
393.
Judicial Standoff Over Corruption Case, N.Y. TIMES, September 18, 2012, at A14
(reporting Ashrafs agreement to write the "Swiss letter"); Salman Masood, Battle
Eases Between Pakistani Government and High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/11/worldlasia/battle-eases-between-pakistanigovernment-and-high-court.html?_r=0 (reporting Supreme Court's approval of text of
Ashraf's letter to Swiss authorities).
394.
See Cyril Almeida, Judging the Court, DAWN, July 15, 2012,
("The chief justice has claimed
http://dawn.com/2012/07/15/judging-the-court/
parliament isn't supreme, but no one has stood up in parliament to shut down the chief
justice."); cf. Abu El-Haj, supra note 390, at 1316-17 (discussing the tendency in the
United States to conflate judicial review with judicial supremacy).
Baz Muhammad Kakar v. Fed'n of Pak., Const. P. No. 77/2012 & CMA No.
395.
3057/2012, 1 14 (Aug. 3, 2012) (short order).
Saroop Ijaz, Ward of the Court, EXPRESS TRIB., Aug. 12, 2012,
396.
http://tribune.com.pk/story/420805/ward-of-the-court/ (criticizing the Supreme Court
for "inquiring into the motivation or the good faith of Parliament" in enacting the
Contempt of Court Act and "demean[ing] the manner in which parliamentarians
debate or choose not to debate matters in Parliament"); cf. Pamela S. Karlan, The
Supreme Court, 2011 Term-Foreword:Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARv. L. REV. 1,
13 (2012) (similarly criticizing the U.S. Supreme Court for "dismissing democratic
politics and democratic engagement in the articulation of constitutional values" and
expressing concern that "the Court's decisions convey a broad message about the
democratic process itself that may undermine public confidence in the democratic
process").
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VI. CONCLUSION

Pakistan's current shift to civilian rule has involved remarkable
institutional and political change, developments that stand in sharp
contrast to the standard, longstanding narratives about Pakistan's
perpetual crisis and imminent "failure." The current moment can
genuinely be understood as one with potential to lay a solid, longterm foundation for democracy and constitutionalism. But the path
ahead remains treacherous. As with other countries in the gray zone
between authoritarianism and democracy, tackling the complexities
of that challenge may not lend itself to prescriptions arising from
conventional, evolutionary accounts of constitutional and political
change. The ultimate success of this transition process will depend
upon a sustained, effective challenge to entrenched military and deep
state dominance that is supported by a range of actors, including the
judiciary.
In this context, it is crucial to develop an understanding of the
judiciary's role and institutional identity that goes beyond
unqualified, decontextualized notions of "judicial independence" that
uncritically assume that "maximal autonomy" is necessarily
preferable. Writing about U.S. debates over judicial review, Barry
Friedman has described how normative discussions of the judicial
role tend to coalesce around two basic positions-one regarding the
judiciary as a "threat" that "diminishes or interferes with democratic
governance" and one offering a basis for "hope," in which the
judiciary, if conferred with sufficient "independence," can help
"ensur[e] that government adheres to constitutional command."3 97 As
Friedman elaborates, however, the "'hope' stories" often fail to
sufficiently account for real world constraints upon the ability of
courts to live up to the idealized role that normative theories often
contemplate.3 9 8 Insofar as courts are embedded within particular
political, institutional, and social contexts-and are both constrained
and empowered by those contexts-more complete understandings
must account for those contextual realities. As Pakistan's historical
experience demonstrates, gray zone countries present contextually
distinct versions of this threat-hope dilemma, in which aggressive
assertions of judicial autonomy against weak representative
institutions can weaken those institutions even further-and, in the
process, further reinforce the already well-entrenched power of status
quo interests.
Pakistan's long-term trajectory out of the gray zone requires
representative institutions with strengthened governance capacities

397.
398.

Friedman, supra note 16, at 309.
See id. at 317, 330-34.
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and power to rein in entrenched military and deep state interests. 399
Given the existing weaknesses of Pakistan's representative
institutions-and their enduring vulnerability to the deep state and
its antidemocratic legitimating discourse-a judiciary without an
appropriate balance between judicial autonomy and judicial
constraint, across the full range of the judiciary's relationships with
other actors, can pose "threats" that might not be present or as severe
in other countries. These lessons have broader applicability, since
other countries undergoing constitutional regime shifts similarly
contend with status quo interests, such as the military, that wield
considerable
power.
Pakistan's
experiences
are
therefore
instructive-or at least suggest notes of caution-about the
relationship between military and other status quo interests and an
"independent judiciary" for other countries that risk languishing in
the gray zone, but seek a more complete shift to democracy and
constitutionalism.

399.
See Rumi, supra note 220 ("In a country of 160 million people with strong
traditions of democratic yearning, the process of change cannot be articulated outside
the mainstream electoral politics, however faulty the political parties.").

